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ABSTRACT
The overall research questions addressed in this dissertation are twofold. First,
what are the largest, under-evaluated (or unorthodox) factors that cause growth volatility
in both the short and long terms? Second, how can one best determine how much risk is
being taken across both of these periods, and how can states increase and/or diversify
their risks? The principle hypotheses are that finicky consumerism and structural
economic changes, undiversified trade, and under-financed investment contribute
significantly to growth volatility. Above all, risk taking actions and policies in countries
cause economies to fluctuate. Further, the dissertation suggests that the short-term risk
characteristics of an economy can be best measured by breaking an economy down, and
then aggregating it, using a Keynesian national income accounting equation, in which
GDP (Gross Domestic Product)= C (Consumption) + I/S (Investment/Saving), + G
(Gov't spending) + Net Trade. Each one of the articles presented employs an institutional
analysis for long-term implications, in the time periods of when trade first started after
the Napoleonic Wars (late-1700s), after World War II, the period during which the global
institutional framework that exists in the 21st Century was shaped, since the 1970’s
stagflation, and following the global crisis of 2007-2009. Therefore, the dissertation
attempts to generally link the short-term with the long-term; although different epochs
have policies aimed at either, the principal emphasis here will be the short-term since this
is the time frame easier to foresee. Methodologically, the entire dissertation uses both
qualitative and quantitative metrics, with an emphasis on conceptuality. In total, the
focus is on the United States, Japan, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
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Development (OECD) states, Europe, and developing ones accordingly, with policy
suggestions towards the end of each article and at the end of the entire dissertation.
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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION
The Oxford English Dictionary defines risk as “(Exposure to) the possibility of
loss, or other unwelcome circumstance; a chance or situation involving such a
possibility” (Oxford English Dictionary 2015). For social scientists, risk is defined
simply as those actions on which the return may differ from expectations, in either a
positive or negative way, which can be represented by the mathematical concept standard
deviation. However, even standard deviations deviate from their expectations, and even
the mean of the population may change, influencing the standard deviation as well. One
goal of managers or policy makers is to minimize the “co-variances,” which is the
combined standard deviation between different variables.
The question is what causes volatility in growth within countries, a dilemma that
dates to the 1600s. And, as German relativist economists Gustav von Schmoller and
Wilhelm Roscher, note, there may not be one correct answer. After World War II, for
example, U.S. government economist Wesley C. Mitchell (1954) outlined over 30
possible causes of recessions, and correspondingly volatility, all of which have one aspect
in common: risk. Risk effects are true whether explaining economic institutions longterm, which British economist John Maynard Keynes despised discussing, or in his
expertise, the short term. Risk may have hundreds of applications across all sectors of
the economy, as Keynes himself would have thought most useful and explanatory.
In term of schools of thought, New Classicism, to which the greatest number of
economists as of 2018 subscribe, combines elements of Classical economics, such as that
of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, with the “rational expectations” movement of the
1970s, that firms and investors use forecasts. New Keynesianism, by contrast, reluctantly
1

accepts expectations, but holds firm to its faith in the stickiness of markets of the original
Keynesians. The Keynesian theory holds that supply and demand are slow to adjust to
market forces, such as how labor contracts prevent firms from cutting wages, blocking
them from hiring more workers and producing greater output.
Keynes’ General Theory (1936) is elegant in prose, and is nearly poetic in its
conceptuality, but not its math. Financial economics and the study of interest rates, based
on risk, dates to Irving Fischer in the early 1900s, but the concept of risk first became a
prominent topic of discussion in the early 1950s when the discipline of finance broke
away from economics. However, it would be useful to conversely add finance back into
economics. The earliest financial economists, such as Sharpe, Markowitz, and
Modigliani, found that investors can eliminate some risk by diversifying, or spreading out
their assets, in more than 20-or-so stocks. As the old adage says, “do not put all of your
eggs in the same basket.” William Sharpe’s Capital Asset Pricing Model (1964), which
was novel and Nobel-Prize winning, indicates that investing has both a risk, and a riskfree, portion. With the U.S. financial fallout of 2008, Hyman Minsky’s “financial
instability hypothesis,” how complex finance creates an unstable economy, has come
back into prominence, reigniting a new financial risk interest (Charles 2008, 125-128).
Minsky believed economies are risky from having numerous investors and firms,
such as hedge and Ponzi firms, all with competing motives, which transfer money but
create few goods (Fig. A1). But, in his seminal work, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy
(1986) the word “risk” appears less than three times. Recently, Reinhart and Rogoff
(2009, 2010, 2012) point risk in the direction of national debt and deficits. Conrad
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(2013) writes broadly on risk and the 2008 Crash, blaming buyers for poor mortgage
choices, but is week on risk reducing solutions.
In the simple national accounting equation identified in the late 1940s by U.S.
government economists, particularly Simon Kuznets (Pressman 2014, 172), basing their
work on the Great Depression, British theorist John Maynard Keynes: GDP (output) is a
function of C, consumption, I, investment or savings, G, government spending, and trade
(T), or Ex-Im, exports minus imports, provided that interest rates and taxes are constantly
changing and causing serial correlation between these components. This national income
accounting equation is the framework that will be employed by this dissertation.
In this basic framework, risk can affect: consumption (C), as consumers may wish
to save more during unsteady times, with so-called “greed” being able to be considered a
type of institution. It can affect investment (I), as instruments are added a premium for
the quality of the source from which they come, as well as for their duration. It can affect
government policy (G) through organizations, as fiscal policy of changing taxes can
create uncertainty while government debt runs the risk of defaults. Meanwhile, monetary
policy is risky for it affects interest rates, which can result in inflation, alter the value of
currencies and loans, and involve central banks purchasing large numbers of assets. And,
risk affects trade (T), as uneven account balances can force underdeveloped countries to
intervene with reserves to stabilize currencies, or else turn to the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), created at the 1944 conference at Bretton Woods. Institutions are the overall
framework that humankind need not create anew again. There may be even many more
applications, such as to hiring the right amount of labor, and to the health care sector.
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Furthermore, risk can affect technology, the economic engine, and for that reason,
Hyman Minsky’s mentor, the famous Austrian School economist Joseph Schumpeter,
speculated that only large firms could take the risk necessary to invest in research in new
innovations. This process would drive out older products, a process he called “creative
destruction.” This topic will be addressed with the new iterations of high-tech products
in Article I, and will be a concept useful in the analysis of institutions and trade. Modern
neo-classical economists such as Solow, Romer, and Lucas wrote about how much of a
society should be devoted to innovation, and that the key is savings to provide the funds,
which is addressed in the overall conclusion of this dissertation. Savings does not take
advantage of money’s multiplier effect, though, and so saving can be thought of as future
growth. However, innovation results in bursts of growth, but large firms also become
accustomed to their long-held product lines, whereas smaller firms bring the motivation
and new thinking needed for entrepreneurship. Thus, large firms may need buyouts and
mergers. Similarly, large countries become institutionally set in their own ways, whereas
smaller developing economic countries are freer to experiment with new institutions and
frameworks. This debate will be addressed in the regression on consumerism in Article I,
and trade in Article II, and then in the overall policy debate in the conclusion.
While there are financial experts, and financial economists, very few of the
economists have attributed risk to being the primary reason for nations succeeding shortand long-term in terms of development. The question of long-term is nearly as intriguing
to economists as it was 200 years ago, as with the recent book by institutionalists
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) entitled, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power,
Prosperity, and Poverty. The early classical economists, led by Adam Smith in 1776
4

with his seminal work, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,
put their proverbial fingers on competition and capitalism. But, is not competition, in
addition to being a way of lowering costs, also a way of spreading out risk between firms
to establish those that are best suited to meet consumer demand? Was not the emergence
of the first Dutch, joint-stock companies at the end of the mercantilist period a means of
reducing risks, through lessened transaction costs, contemporarily defined by Fukuyama
(1999) as “monitoring, contracting, adjudicating, and enforcing formal agreements”
(Fukuyama 1999, 18)? In other words, such historical, formal and informal aspects of
capitalism, which lend themselves to new business creation, took hold because, in part,
they reduced risks. In fact, historically, early sea voyages spread out risk across as many
ships and investors possible. Smith’s offerings were about the division of labor, which
not only saved time in working but required skilled workers only for their particular task:
this reduced the risks of error and raced production. Granted, capitalism has emerged
differently in varied countries, affecting risk, which even Minsky acknowledges (Minsky
1986, 295-296), though mainly writing on financial institutions (Minsky 1986, 193-201).
The purpose of this dissertation is neither to delve into the mathematics that
enabled the calculations of risk, nor its philosophy, but to present overlooked, unorthodox
conceptual issues both short-term, which Keynesian economics does, and long-term, as
institutional economics does (Fig 2, App.). Risk can have thousands of applications, so
the focus is on those that are the largest, under-evaluated (or unorthodox) factors that
cause economic risk in a state such as to create volatility, in both short and long terms?
How can one best determine how much risk is engaged in across these periods, and how
can states increase and/or diversify their risks? The answer to these questions are
5

intermixed in short- and long-term components. The researcher admits these questions
are not new; some writers have even called it a great puzzle in history. Still, the answers
are variegated in theory. This dissertation, which uses the three article model, is intended
to be an explanation connecting both time frames, using history, its theories, and the
concept of risk.
Article I addresses the consumption and saving sectors of the economy.
Consumption constitutes approximately 2/3 of the U.S. economy, but a much smaller
amount in developing nations, especially in Asia. The research question for this article is
as follows. Why has the period after the “Great Recession” produced output volatility,
and large swings in unemployment, particularly in states with high tech economies such
as the United States and Japan, while having low, unanticipated inflation and interest
rates? In addressing that question, the article presents and assesses the extent of the
validity of the following hypothesis: that consumers and producers both collaborate and
compete over the production and consumption of high tech goods, creating risk and
causing volatility, and long-term, saving methods affect wealth and societies’ volatility.
In addition to covering this aspect of consumption, which is termed “finicky
consumerism,” the most recent swings in GDP (Gross Domestic Product) and
employment are explained in terms of the Phillip’s Curve’s unemployment, wage-price
relationship, and by comparing the liquidity trap following the “Great Recession” with
the “stagflation” of 1970s, when both inflation and unemployment were high.
The differences of the “Great Recession” from the 1970s stagflation, stems, in
part, from a lack of safe investments and a productivity (output/inputs) flattening of the
slope of this relationship. These undermining causes produced a dangerous, Keynesian
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liquidity trap following the 2008 financial crisis. Finally, Article I proposes a policy of a
“cash tax” to solve this problem of consumer and business liquidity, which differs from
an earnings tax on the income sheet, and would incentivize firms to spend more money or
assuage the risks of increased investments, especially pertinent during the current cycle
of wage inequality. This article also offers “pump theory,” linking taxes to savings.
Article II addresses the following research question. Why do countries open to
trade, and when they do, why do states produce goods for vast industries and businesses,
when classical economics suggests countries just specialize? In response to that question,
the article presents and assesses the extent of the validity of the following hypothesis.
Contrary to orthodox trade theory, countries, chosen from the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), increase trade (x variable) and diversify it until a
point so as to protect against the risk of wars, famines/drought, shocks, and cyclicality,
which have convinced countries to expand into different sectors/industries and more
firms (y). States also trade similar goods (x) via intra-industry trade, which reduces risk.
Larger economic nations (x) are better able to take risks (y), but may become immobile.
Article III, notes that, in the financial sector, risk taking is usually rewarded with
the anticipation of higher interest rates. However, defaults, crises, and flaws with
projects can cause deviations from expectations. The research question for this article is
as follows. Can bond yield curves (x) and the “Anxious Index” indicate if too much or
little risk is being expected in the short-term, thus predicting recessions through risk (y)?
The corresponding hypothesis is that bond yield curves, the spread between short and
long term government bonds, indicate risk and recessions, looking at diverse states, as
well as can Western surveys called the “Anxious Index.” Method wise, state bonds are
7

inherently less risky, because there is less chance of a government default (Fig. A3).
Other theories for the “causes of the curve” include that certain investors prefer one
length or type of bond over another, inflation, debt, or central bank activity altering
interest rates, in the time since World War II. The risk is an underfinanced investment.
The remainder of each article of this dissertation seeks the most overlooked,
poignant way to connect the long with the short-term, a so-called “synthesis,” by using
institutions, the periphery around which all sectors operate. Institutions are a broad
concept of the rules of the game for an economic system, and the organizations needed to
direct them. The true advent of institutional economics is attributed to legal scholar John
R. Commons (1924), who wrote about the rules of capitalism. Beyond Commons,
another one of such “Old Institutionalists,” Wisconsin native Thorstein Veblen (1899,
2006), wrote through the 1920s, sometimes sardonically, about the consumption (C)
sector, namely “conspicuous consumption.” Though this author cannot find a quote from
Veblen on cars first introduced in the 1920s, cars, ironically, according to Galbraith’s
(1997) book, affected the 1929 Crash, and the onset of the Great Depression that spanned
the 1930s. Luxury goods have the propensity to break down suddenly, and insurance is
not always available (Fig. A4). Veblen saw institutions as passed on from primitive
societies, and engineers, not the wealthier classes, as the value creators in the society.
Property rights, housing, social mores, and regulations are an important aspect of
institutions, but are scarce in undeveloped countries, that the journalist Henry George
wrote about in the 19th Century in Progress and Poverty (1879). In almost all economic
crisis, including the “Great Recession,” one of Stock and Watson’s “sub-cycles” totaling
four decades in the United States, the rules regarding property rights have affected
8

historical diversification. Property rights can also prevent the elitist and government
"extraction" that Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) write about contemporaneously.
In the 1980s and 1990s, neo-institutionalist (neo for new) such as Douglass North
(1990) wrote about land property rights in the Middle Ages, which evolved during the
Black Plague and changed feudalism in Europe, a system in which the nobles alone
controlled land. Economist Elinor Ostrom (1990) penned about the dividing of property
in 19th century England, and elsewhere. Alan Greenspan (2008), both a hero and a villain
of the 1990s, addresses property rights in his work, The Age of Turbulence. Radical
institutionalist Joan Robinson wrote about branding, “monopolistic competition,” that
links consumers and producers, analyzed in Article I (Pressman 2014, 186). In the last
two decades, new/neo institutionalism is gaining importance. The difference is that new
institutionalists, like North, and Rodrik (2000) argue that man is rational (Fig. A5).
Rodrik (2000) writes, applicably to trade (T) and Article II, that adopting
institutions is like moving to a higher production possibilities frontier. Being able to
produce more, nations have greater utility, or happiness, which British economist John
Stuart Mill (1806--1873) theorized is most important. Rodrik (2000) describes four types
of institutions: property rights, regulatory institutions, institutions for macro stability like
central banks, social insurance, or safety nets, and those for mitigating conflict (Rodrik
2000, 3-31). Redek and Susjan (2005) expound upon the last of these, politically.
In total, institutions can be applied to consumption, trade, and finance, but
institutional change can occur, theoretically, says Campbell (2004), through: diffusion, or
the spread of institutional practices with few modifications, translation, the combination
of new elements, or bricolage, the combination of old elements (Campbell 2004, 77, 80).
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The problem is how to tell, and how to diversify policy, which will be tested for in
Article III. Taking too little risk, written about by Mancur Olson (1982), can be the result
from an economy made of powerful, rent-seeking interest groups, and society will
stagnate, or, as Niall Ferguson (2004, 2013) says, bureaucracy and corruption will cause
it to stall. This characterized 1970s America and characterizes 21st Century Europe, as
noted in Article I. Goldstone (early 2000s) writes that institutional change is more
difficult, or risky, for developing countries than imitating the West. For developing
countries in particular, they must not immediately follow the West but be put on
“pathways.” These are, in his order, which some might find unusual, liberty, scientific
advancement, engineering, manufacturing, and better transportation and infrastructure.
Chinese economist Justin Lifu Yin questions if there is an organizational model
that is alone best: such a choice might be termed the risk-return tradeoff (Osnos 2010,
42). According to Pechman (1989), no arrangement is better than another. However,
Kohli (1999) dissents, blaming underdeveloped global states on colonialism, which
resulted in highly concentrated organizational bodies (Kohli 1999, 136). Tipton (2009)
says of institutions that “we find that they matter a great deal… ” (Tipton 2009, 402).
According to Lubke (2012), statistics indicate strong link between “moderate economic
concentration and good governance…” (Lubke 2012, 39). Chia et al. (2007) writes that
institutional framework depends on a nation’s goals: some states pursue growth, others
“capabilities” to offer goods, as economist Amartya Sen writes, some pursue living
standards, while others strive for equality. Each system has its strengths and weaknesses,
and the receptiveness to risk-return policies may be key. Civil society’s concentration,
also affects institutional risks too, as Banfield (1958) and Putnam (1993) demonstrate.
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Society can be concentrated or diverse, as can be long-term, societal bequeathing
methods. Migdal (1988) refers to this institution as strengths of society versus the state.
A final, concluding section discusses the overall results, and how risk from all
three articles, consumption, trade, and finance, based on the national income equation,
affects an entire economy’s growth and stability, as well as long-term institutions. While
economies can choose to some extent to increase or decrease risk, the focus of this
dissertation will be mainly how to reduce it. Individual investors or entrepreneurs are
very risk-taking and optimistic, shown through simple observation, or the studies of
Robert Shiller (2000). Business leaders care about individual and firm wealth, whereas
policy-makers must consider the economy holistically. In general, the greater the
government activity, the greater is volatility, unless the government aims at
diversification. A risk index for countries is created in the overall conclusion, and lowrisk policies are summarily explained, particularly the neoclassical endogenous growth
model, micro-finance, political-economic policies, and developmental Islamic banking.
In Keynes’ General Theory (1936), Keynes has no single equation for tying
together his writings: money leads to investment, which then leads to employment: he
tied them together “generally.” Similarly, this conclusion will elaborate about how all of
parts conceptually come together, using a degree of math. The computer software
programs that will be used throughout are Microsoft Excel and Stata, but mixed methods
will be used, since statistics cannot capture all of the specific changes to an economy, as
“triangulation” does (Yin 2009, 115-117). The figures and tables that go along with the
reading are included with the text, while additional ones are included in the Appendix.
Now, the dissertation turns to the articles, focusing on consumption, trade, and finance.
11

Each part will be followed by conceptually and empirically addressed institutions, and
specific policy ideas, with broader policies in the overall conclusion.
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CHAPTER II ARTICLE I: CONSUMPTION – THE HIGH-TECH, DEVELOPING
ECONOMY: FINICKY CONSUMERISM AND POLICIES FOR RISKY
LIQUIDITY PROBLEMS
Abstract
In the 1970s, economists demonstrated that firms develop expectations about
future economic conditions, called “rational expectations.” They believed businesses
would consider possible wage and price changes in the future to avoid “risk,” with
growth and unemployment self-adjusting and not changing as much as this price-wage
component of the Phillips Curve, first conceived by British economist A.W. Phillips in
1958. Instead of employment staying stable, during the “Great Recession,” a global
event following the 2008 U.S. financial crisis, the largest changes to developed countries
have been wild swings in rates of unemployment, and Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
with inflation very low globally. Some have blamed weather conditions on volatile
growth after 2008. Are there better explanatory reasons why, which encompass 19702014? This article hypothesizes that the differences between the volatile stagflation of
the 1970s, the docile 1980s, the 2008 volatile crash, and the topsy-turvy stagnation
afterwards, are several fold: first, a finicky, inconsistent consumption of risky high-tech
products; second, the entrance of countries such as the United States and Japan into
dangerous liquidity traps, where firms decline the risks to spend or invest it, which, with
productivity declines, causes Phillips Curve pivots; third, central bank assertions that feed
expectations; and fourth, structural changes. These differences are hypothesized to create
low wages and inflation of 2017 with swings in unemployment. Method wise, this article
analyzes company R&D investments noted in their annual reports, offers a game theory
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model of investment versus consumption, and uses a regression with variables for
productivity, investment, and the socio-economic make-up of labor markets. It concludes
with an analysis of long-term consumption, and social bequeathing, with new policy
ideas, such as “pump theory,” or staggering state taxes during times of risky, consumer
and business illiquidity, and a cash tax during illiquid periods to spur business spending.
Introduction
In the 1970s, economists demonstrated that firms make expectations about future
economic conditions, called “rational expectations.” Business leaders, essentially
reducing risk, focus on possible wage and price changes in the future. Unemployment
and growth self-adjust and do not change as much as the price-wage element of the
Phillips Curve, developed by British economist A.W. Phillips in 1958. However, during
the “Great Recession,” a global event following the 2008 U.S. financial crisis, the most
significant change for developed countries have been “topsy-turvy” swings in Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), such as -1.2% in Q1 of 2013 to 5% in the Q3 of 2014 in the
United States (Statista “Quarterly” 2017b, 1). Unemployment rates have swung, too, for
instance from 9.4% in Oct., 2010, to 9.8% in Nov., to 9.3% in Dec., and from 7.7% in
Nov. 2012, to 8% in Jan. 2013 and 7.5% in May 2013 (United States Department
“Labor” 2017b, 1). Inflation is low globally, coupled at times with stagnant GDP, the
fluxes of which the Federal Reserve have attributed to weather. The intermittent years of
the 1990s, now called the “New Economy,” saw R&D investment grow by billions: 6%
per year. The Internet spread, and productivity doubled (Samuelson and Varian 2001, 9).
With these introductory observations providing a necessary contextual
foundation, this article addresses the following research question. How did the “Great
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Recession,” with its low growth, low inflation and high, volatile employment, with the
topsy-turvy, inconsistent stagnation that followed, differ from previous periods of
exuberance or “stagflation,” a combination of high inflation and unemployment? While
unemployment has changed markedly in the “Great Recession,” price levels have stayed
the same, characteristic of liquidity traps, which have low investments due to riskiness of
new production, and can last decades if firms sacrifice output for lower prices.
In addressing that question, the article presents and assesses the extent of the
validity of the following seven hypotheses. First, U.S. and global structural changes (x
variable) have put downward pressures on wages and inflation (y). Second, a finicky,
volatile consumerism related to risky investment in producing high-tech goods (both x),
rooted in game theory, has resulted in “stop-start” growth in the Great Recession (y).
Third, countries such as the United States and Japan have entered into dangerous liquidity
traps (x), where firms and consumers sit on cash and refuse to spend it due to risks, also
causing low inflation and growth (y). Fourth, Federal Reserve assurances and policies
(x) have added to low inflation and interest rates (y). Fifth, a lack of investment and
productivity causes the Phillips Curve to unexpectedly pivot its slope (x), affecting the
employment-inflation relationship, particularly generating lower wages with more
volatile unemployment, and growth volatility (y). Sixth, in times of slow or near zero
productivity increases (x), firms focus on future hiring decisions, and part-time jobs,
rather than wages (y). Seventh, long-term, families, chosen over several generations
from an earlier, similar period, diversify wealth (x) institutionally to maintain and
consume it (y). The main risks, then, are finicky consumption, from structural changes,
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and buying patterns over high-tech goods, which do not match with investment, due to
production risks, all of which are some of the qualities causing the 1970s-2010s to differ.
Article Structure
Focusing mostly on the United States and Japan, the countries most affected by
illiquidity, this article first reviews the relevant literature, on the history of unemployment
and inflation. The article then explains theories on the Phillips Curve, liquidity traps, and
expectations. Next, the article, methodologically analyzes structural changes to global
economies, including central banks’ actions, offers a conceptual risk equation, presents a
consuming game theory model, examines company (R&D) investments in annual reports,
and uses a regression with structural variables. The article then uses an institutional
analysis, primarily of family bequeathing. Finally, the article concludes with policy ideas
for using “pump theory,” or staggering taxes during periods of consumer and firm
illiquidity, and proposes a “cash tax” during such times to spur business spending.

Figure 1. Linking Risk. Consumption risk is shown here; for full schematic, see Figure
A6.
Literature Review
This article is the longest of this dissertation, fittingly because consumption is the
largest sector in Western economies. In explaining inflation, employment, and output
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volatility, early theories about unemployment come from post-World War II British
economist John Maynard Keynes, who differed from Classical Economists in that he was
the first to consider a state’s economy could have undesirable unemployment.
Unemployment is harmful, in a positivist way, since it is an under-utilized resource.
Keynes labeled different types of unemployment as “frictional,” which is the delay of the
movement of workers from one job to another. Cyclical unemployment is from “gluts”
or “gaps” in the economy. Keynes also disagreed with Say’s Law in a money economy,
that “supply creates its own demand,” because money has many uses; it stores value, as
people also save (Pressman 2014, 142). He “generally” tied money to interest rates and
jobs, not mathematically, and theorized that even with low interest rates, firms could be
slow to borrow and invest, due to low liquidity, and lack of investable prospects. These
traits occurred during the U.S. Great Depression, with Japan in the 1990s, briefly with the
United States in the 1990s, and then in the United States following the Great Recession,
but sundry definitions of liquidity traps exist. The definition here is that while interest
rates are near zero, there is no investment, and low inflation, due to risk (Sancya 2015, 5).
Early theories about inflation came from Knut Wicksell in the late 1890s, one of
the early “monetarists.” He believed, incorrectly, that there was a natural rate of interest,
which can only be true if it equals the rates of investment, but this does not occur during
liquidity traps, as shall be discussed. Additional inflation work was conducted by Irving
Fischer, one of America’s first great economists, in the 1920s, who discovered, among
other ideas on inflation, that investors are awarded an inflation premium, analyzed in
Article III (Pressman 2014, 122, 129). Keynes disagreed with the quantity theory or
exchange theory of inflation, which had been actually known since David Hume in the
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1740s and formalized by Fisher in the 1920s, because inflation would always adjust.
Changes in the money supply would only affect price levels, not Gross Domestic Product
(GDP). Keynes hardly talks of central banks in his works, and the “Investment: SavingLiquidity: Money” (IS-LM) curve was developed shortly afterwards by J.R. Hicks and
others to include the idea of interest rates, linked to the goods market and households
(Pressman 2014, 141). Keynes also differed from classicism in that he divided graphs by
time, with a short-term supply curve that was horizontal, because all resources were
available, but a fixed, vertical long-run supply curve, because all resources are used.
Although many of these ideas are traced to Keynes, his philosophies and theories, like
those of most economists, developed fluidly over time (Pressman 2014, 140-148).
The crisis of economic volatility that began in 2008 in the United States and
around the world, which have since seen huge changes to unemployment but little in the
way of inflation, are attributable to a confluence of problems that Keynes foresaw. These
ideas were prescient of the 2008 Crash, which was part of the business cycle, but went
beyond normal fluctuations. History will read, in part, that the “Great Recession” was a
systemic problem, with many villains and causes. In the 1990s the federal Housing
Department and quasi-governmental entities of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac followed
too easy lending policies over a decade, allowing home owners to take out easy loans and
mortgages that were converted into complex financial derivatives. Such derivatives were
so complex that no one realized how risky they were. As some financial macroeconomists predicted, most notably Hyman Minsky (1977, 1982, 1986), this has created
the perfect storm of financial risks, and eventually credit returns deviated from their
means, resulting in losses and the collapse of oligopolistic big banks, such as Bear Sterns
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and Lehman Brothers. There was no trust to provide credit, and the unsold houses, in
part due to demographic change, have left vast, immobilized resources. The United
States’ government faced massive debts, as did private firms, so its response was tepid.
The Federal Reserve meanwhile pursued too loose monetary policy leading up to it, and
too strict a policy right before. Everyone was to blame. The unemployment rate rose to
10.4% at its peak, while inflation stayed bizarrely near zero (Zuckerman 2015, 3).
Growth rates in the United States declined from 5% in the 1970s and 1980s, with
a brief uptick during the 1990s, what Stock and Watson (2010) call sub-cycles. The state
of the American economy today compares with America’s “Long Recession,” and the
inequality of the “Gilded Age,” a period of the 1880s-1890s that 30 years later saw a
nostalgic revival in history, and was called the “gay” 1890’s. The sub-cycle period from
1986-2006 has largely been defined by the prudent monetary policy over this time.
Presidents Ronald W. Reagan and William J. Clinton followed different budget and tax
policies; Reagan lessened regulations and unleashed competition, while Clinton did not
impose many new regulations and offered tax credits for low-risk investing which
spurred productivity-increasing technologies. The end of the Cold War enabled Clinton
to slash military spending by $62 billion yearly by 1996 (Kessler 2017, 3), allowing for
the balancing of the budget from Reagan’s debt creation, that ironically fueled the 1980s’
expansion. The intermittent 1991 recession largely resulted from a lack of a coherent
fiscal policy, while the 2001 “brief recession” occurred due to lack of certainty and
confidence, the first due to the dot-com firms collapsing from greater competition, the
latter from corporate book fixing scandals and the political-economic world events during
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the George W. Bush administration. The entire sub-cycles’ growth rate, though, reached
a 5% mean. This article addresses two failed eras: the 1970s, and late 2000s-2010s.
The author observed that the “Great Recession” truly began, but may not be
completely correlated with, a $1.6 trillion dollar President George W. Bush tax cut in
2001, followed by further cuts in 2003, mostly for the wealthy, a credit and confidence
crunch a year later, FICA (Social Security) tax rebates to spur consumer spending while
usurping long-term funds, and volatile equity markets. The government responded with
the financial and auto sector bailouts, and then Mr. Obama’s construction stimulus plan.
Next came predictions of a double-dip, a fiscal cliff by the Congressional Budget
Office over the expiration of the Bush tax cuts, which President Obama eased, a
government shutdown over increased spending budgets, disagreements over raising the
debt limit, Executive Orders to circumvent Congress such as on federal employees’
minimum wage, and the budget sequester which saw huge cuts to military spending. The
United States Federal Reserve responded with three phases of quantitative easing, the
largest of which was called “Operation Twist.” While much has been written on its
causes, little is yet written on the 2007-2009 “Great Recession’s” aftermath, especially
compared to earlier eras. Facing all of these problems, the U.S. government probably
was wise to solve the short-term growth problems first. Now, longer term problems such
as the national debt, income inequality, and tax reforms can better be addressed without
volatility. This article contributes to the literature by combining consumption theories
(see Fig. 1) to explain inconsistent growth: “finicky” consumers who purchase new
iterations of high-tech products, which take years of risky investment to create.
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Definitions of the Article
This article frequently notes a variety of ways how wealthier and poorer classes
spend and save differently. The middle-class will be defined as those earning between
75% and 125% of the median U.S. income, which is roughly $45,000 (Hodgson 2016, 2).
The United States and Japan are defined as being “developing economies,” amongst other
states, in that they use industrial (technological) policy to develop resources, and were the
first to do so in the 20th Century (The Free Dictionary). “High tech” refers to states that
devote over 40% of R&D ventures to computers, electronics, optics, and motor vehicles,
or import and/or export over $80 billion dollars since 2012, on such goods. These
include the United States, Japan, China, South Korea, Singapore, and several states in
Europe and Southeast Asia (Worldatlas “Global” 2017, 3, OECD “ANBERD” 2017a).
Theories
Theory I: Consumerism Versus Saving: The Money Multiplier
The first theory to explain inconsistent, or “topsy-turvy,” growth is consumerism.
Keynes, along with Professor A.C. Pigou and others, helped develop the concept that
from their income, people either consume or save/invest, the only options in economics,
creating a marginal propensity to consume. Keynes gave no explanation why this metric
changes other than that of tastes and preferences. From this was born the multiplier- that
money expands as it is changes hands, in a chain reaction (Dornbusch et al. 2011, 200).
Keynes believed that consumerism depends on liquidity, the willingness to spend.
He disagreed with the monetarists that this concept, when applied in the equation of
exchange (MV=PQ), derived by Fischer, was not a fixed amount in the value of v
(velocity) (Pressman 2014, 132, 144). Keynes, however, did not specific why
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consumption changes. He did, though, disagree with the writings of John-Baptiste Say,
an earlier French economist, who had held that supply creates its own demand. Keynes,
who debated with his uncertain rival A.C. Pigou, held that demand must come first.
Today, it seems clear that Say’s “law” would hold true in underdeveloped economies,
because producers cannot make all of the specific items consumers demand. On a desert
island, for example, only certain goods can be made, forcing trade and full consumption.
In more economically developed societies, demand comes first since people can decide to
save their money in financial institutions and instruments, and not be forced to buy those
goods supplied. However, in the 21st century, high-tech economies, so much money and
time is invested into developing sophisticated products, that by the time the “gizmo”
reaches the market, it has inherently changed, defying the Latin economic phrase ceteris
paribus, which roughly means “assuming the market has stayed the same.” Consumers
thus face a difficult decision of whether to buy, or save for the next great innovation.
Such changes in consumption versus saving can be called “finicky consumerism,” which
creates volatility, because consumption affects GDP short-term. Saving, which is
primarily done by consumers, not firms, might not always equal investment by
businesses. Furthermore, others like Wicksell added to theory that finance institutions
can lend on credit. Savings provides not only a collateral base from which to borrow
loans, Wicksell saw, but can be withdrawn in total in the future (Pressman 2014, 120).
Keynes subscribed to the relative income hypothesis, that people spend a percent
of their marginal income, conditioned on income, age, wealth, marital status, and other
variables (Tin 2000, 110). He also observed that there is an element of “precaution,
foresight, calculation, improvement, independence, enterprise, pride, and avarice” (Tin
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2000, 113), or “risk,” to spending, while using no statistics. The question about why
people save was revisited in the 1950s by Franco Modigliani, one of the first financial
economists. The Life-Cycle Hypothesis was his idea, that savings and consumption stay
smooth long-term (The Comm. “Angus,” 2015, 12). Hall (1978) later developed the
“Euler equation,” which involves risk since consumers could save for the future,
compensated by the time value of utility (happiness) (Tin 2000, 113).
Most historical theory suggests consumption is smooth, and not finicky. In the
1950s and 1960s, Milton Friedman, a monetary economist, developed the Permanent
Income Hypothesis, similar to the Relative Income Hypothesis, which is supported by
empirical data that the wealthy tend to save more proportionately than the poor. More
authoritarian states, though, may limit spending and savings choices of their populations
through trade policies, so they may save more, as in Asia (The Comm. “Angus” 2015,
12). Friedman show that a person does not decide how much to spend daily, but takes a
long-term view (Kosicki 1987, 75). People save wealth in the long term, and they make
spending decisions in-part on expectations of future income. There still will be, however,
transitory income in life, so Friedman included room in the theory for borrowing earlier
in life, such as for a home or children, which could be paid back later (Ruby 2003, 1-2).
Franco Modigliani retorted with a contrasting view, suggesting that these two
theories should contain a bequeathing element (Kosicki 1987, 66). People should not be
viewed to have an infinite life, but to want to leave as much as possible to posterity.
Most wealth is bequeathed by the wealthiest 20%, but poorer young individuals tend to
spend less, so, the inequality eventually evens out, spoken to in this article’s institution
section (Siilats “Life Cycle” 2016, 1-2). Institutionally, Duesenberry from the 1940s
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asserted that the need to “maintain self-esteem” affects spending (Kosicki 1987, 67), and
Brennen (1983) added that an unexpected increase in social status convinces one to be “to
innovate and take risks” (Kosicki 1987, 66). James Tobin added that racial minorities
have had less wealth to pass on, and have less credit access (Kosicki 1987, 67-69).
In the 1980s, British economist Angus Deaton reconsidered the question of
consumerism versus saving. The issue of household spending actually stems from the
ancient Greeks, as the word “economics” comes from two Greek words, meaning
“households,” and “norms” or “mores.” Working at times with John Muellbauer, Deaton
used consumption data to compare poverty programs in developing states. His work
shows how household demand for each goods varies by total expenditures (The Comm.
“Angus” 2015, 3”). This was based on Barten (1969) who had found that households do
not always essay to maximize happiness, called utility (The Comm. “Angus” 2015 1-5).
According to Deaton, “consumer choice…does not necessarily hold at the
aggregate level, even if all individuals are rational. Second, the [previous models were]
too restrictive” (The Comm. “Angus” 2015, 5). The equations also did not properly treat
taxes and subsidies, which can cause a budget constraint curve to shift. In addition,
Deaton, with others like Jorgensen, Lau, and Stoker, hypothesized that demand for risky,
luxury goods and necessities, and the make-up and sizes of households, would all affect
spending (The Comm. “Angus” 2015, 1-8). Deaton relaxed several statistical
assumptions, and added the possibility of buying on credit. He found that consumers
were indeed still rational, but only by aggregating a wider variety of heterogeneous
consumers. In addition, he discovered that individual consumption is rough; household
consumption is smooth, but it is again volatile aggregately, a mystery titled the “Deaton
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Paradox” (The Comm. “Angus” 2015, 5-9, 13, 15). Income risk, Deaton showed, and
consumption, are driven by “precautionary savings” (The Comm. “Angus” 2015, 18).
Theory II: The Phillips Curve and Expectations
The Phillips Curve, derived in 1958 by British economist A.W. Phillips, suggests
that an economy has a trade-off between inflation and unemployment. More pointedly, it
depends on consumerism generating economic activity, creating numerous jobs, but
leading to inflation, or vice-versa. Originally, the idea of inflation applied to wages, but
was later adapted to prices. Empirically, the Phillips Curve held true in the United States
in the 1950s-1960s, but then began shifting outwards as in the following graphs. The
Phillips Curve relationship can affect risk and instability through Okun’s “rule of thumb,”
such that a 1% increase in unemployment reduces GDP by 2-3%, but the amount of GDP
reduced is diminishing, and the exact relationship is not quantified (Durden 2012, 1).
The simplest way to observe how changes in the economy affect employment and
inflation in the Phillips Curve model comes from Poast (2001), who depicted a temporary
equilibrium. However, when some condition or variable causes supply to change in the
economy, the short-run demand curve shifts to either to the right or left. Shifts to the
right increase employment and GDP temporarily, but raise prices. Shifts to the left
reduce employment and GDP temporarily, but lower prices. Despite such temporary
changes, firms, faced with more or fewer employees, will raise or lower wages, causing
the short-term supply curve to shift back to its long-term level (Arnold 1998, 140-144).
In effect, most economists prefer that wages fall in recessions so firms have more money,
shifting the supply curve outwards to reach full employment, as it did, for instance, in the
United Kingdom’s 2014 recovery (Pettinger 2014, 1-5). Labor is viewed as a “resource,”
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which it is the goal of economics to maximize, whereas wages and prices are not. Supply
and demand shift first, then employment, then GDP. A simple multipart figure is below:

Figure 2. Basic Phillips Curve. These graphs show the Phillips Curve’s components.
The Phillips Curve is better understood if broken into wage and unemployment
components, in the bottom part. Both parts react differently to what Keynes called
“sticky” variables, such as velocity of money, contracts and unions, inflation and the
Cantillon Effect of money sticking in sectors, credit ability, employment at will,
minimum wages, price/wage controls, regulations, and supply chains. The 1970s had
massive amounts of private and public spending, with U.S. federal spending as a % of
GDP increasing from 18.% in 1970 to 20.6% in 1980 (“Federal Net Outlays” 2017, 1),
due to the long Vietnam War, what Milton Friedman would call temporary, or “one
shot,” inflation. Monetary policy was weak, keeping rates high. These policies, along
with higher energy costs, and high productivity, as high as a 4% increase in 1974 (see
Table 1, App.), added to Phillips Curve shifts. Conversely, Ball and Moffitt (2001),
explained the low inflation “New Economy” of the 1990’s as resulting from lagged
employer demands for wage increases. This echoed Shapiro (1981), who found retraining
programs lowers unemployment, causing inward Phillips Curve shifts. R. L. Thomas
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(1977) found that in Sweden, lower union rates caused a slope change, while Hercowitz
(1983) found that the level of transactions in a country changes the slope.
A changing Phillips Curve slope or shift, and their underlying reasons, may affect
volatility. Randomly chosen Phillips Curves for the United States, Canada, Japan, and
Germany are shown in Figures 3-6 (with data from the BLS “International Comparisons,”
“International Indexes” 2017). The United States has the most reliable curvature shape,
likely from better central bank and fiscal policy. Japan’s “linear” graph reflects better
expectations. None of these curves are stable, partly from expectations, shown next.
United States Standard Phillips Curve (1970-2012)
I
N
F
L
A
T
I
O
N

0.16
0.14
0.12
0.1
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0
-0.02 0.0

2.0

4.0

6.0

8.0

10.0

12.0

Unemployment

Figure 3. United States’ Phillips Curve. This graph shows policy changes.
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Canada Phillips Curve (1970-2012)
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Figure 4. Canada’s Phillips Curve. This graph shows high inflation.

Japanese Standard Phillips Curve (1970-2012)
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Figure 5. Japan’s Phillips Curve. This graph shows low inflation.
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Figure 6. Germany’s Phillips Curve. This graph shows structural change.
These graphs, elegant by themselves, will be used for the regressions; ideally, if
stable, they should look consistently curvilinear as in Figure 2. One can infer that
inflation is lessening globally, while some nations have seen gains in hiring. Germany’s
volatile graphs can be attributed to the political upheaval from post-Cold War unification,
while France, for instance, not shown here, has had high unemployment from socialist
labor regulation. Canada’s graphs reflect sound fiscal policies of surpluses used to pay
down debt and for $80 billion in stimulus in the 1990s and 2000s (Lee 2011, 7-8).
In an economic renaissance, the “expectations-augmented” Phillip Curve was
conceived by Milton Friedman in the 1960s. He believed that there was a “monetary
illusion,” inspired by Fisher, which would cause the curve, over several years, to rise
directly upwards, from higher prices. Along with Edmund Phelps, Friedman argued that
only “real” wages mattered. Real wages would render the quantity supplied and
demanded for labor always constant, at the natural rate of unemployment, and at the
“non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment,” called the NAIRU. If unanticipated
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inflation caused short declines in real wages, workers would demand higher wages,
causing layoffs, but unemployment would fall to its natural rate (Mulligan 2011, 88).
This idea was developed further by Lucas, Sargent, and others after realizing that
the Phillips Curve shifted between the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, which they initially
theorized was due to structural changes in an economy, for example, oil prices, or
pressures from labor unions (Fuhrer 1995, 4-5). These scholars then composed a
“rational expectations theory,” which contends that workers and firms negotiate future
wages for the next year based on the expectations of inflation for the current year.
The “Lucas critique” revolution that followed, which emphasized expectations,
began with a Robert Lucas paper in 1972, contending that investors are aware of possible
policy changes. Firms raise wages before interest rate cuts, and skip the processes of
supply or demand economic adjustment. These ideas helped explain the “stagflation,” or
joint high inflation and employment in the 1970s, which from Orphanides (2004) is now
believed to have resulted from easy Federal Reserve policy, the already stated Vietnam
War spending, the oil crisis, and going off the gold standard. Stagflation was eventually
ameliorated by Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, appointed by President James E.
Carter, Jr., who knowingly drew the United States into recession to control inflation for
the long-term good, perhaps costing Mr. Carter reelection to Ronald Reagan. The “Great
Moderation” (Knotek 2007, 84) followed from 1984-2008, named for its low inflation.
One flaw with the Phillips Curve thinking, addressed in hypothesis number two of
this article, is how the curve may “pivot” in its slope, but not shift, if there is a change in
productivity, which is related to wages, and other factors like investment. A second flaw
is always assuming increases in demand, rather than decreases, in which case the
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resulting equilibrium may be lower along the Phillips Curve. Figure 8 was created from
unemployment and inflation data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, assuming that next
year’s inflation will be this year’s, but it still does not look amply curvy, convex right.
Expectations theory says unemployment is at its “natural rate” when actual inflation
equals expected inflation. The second graph is more accurate to theory. Verily, the
Phillips Curve could change from any of the supply or demand “shifters,” such as
expectations, substitute goods, “acts of God,” costs of imports, changes in tastes and
preferences, or changes in the number of consumers or suppliers (Arnold 1998, 55-64).
United States Expectations-Augmented Phillips Curve (1971-2012)
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Figure 7. United States Expectations Phillips Curve. This figure shows some
expectations.
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U.S. Expectations Augmented Phillips Curve Refined (1979-2012)
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Figure 8. United States Refined Phillips Curve. Very linear, this graph shows foreseeable
accuracy.
In Figure 7, the author used expected rates of inflation. In Figure 8, entitled
“refined,” the author used the difference between actual and expected rates of inflation,
which is a more accurate measure of how inflation affects the Phillips Curve. The
negative inflation is from low actual inflation. The data for both graphs comes from the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, using average annual unemployment rates, with
inflation calculated from the University of Michigan Survey Research Center. Figure 8,
highlighted in blue, shows more of an inflation-unemployment tradeoff, although it
appears more linear than curvilinear, across several point at a time, because the curve is
not shifting, but moving along a horizontal supply curve. Wages do not change more
than a percent, short-term, and ultimately readjust to the long-term average. Expectations
remove the in-between data points, yielding a visually smoother, linear, less risky curve.
With prices/wages staying the same during the “Great Stagnation,” what some
call the period after the “Great Recession,” it is possible that employers focus on hiring,
which is the sixth hypothesis of this article, in which unemployment and GDP would
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vary, but not wages/prices (Fig. A7). But, wages are easier for employers to foresee than
hiring. This alternative model would more likely only happen under wage/ inflation
stagnation, a complete lack of productivity, in which employment is easier to forecast
than wages, also due to central bank assurances. In such cases, temporary workers can
alleviate repetitive hiring or firing. This will be demonstrated in Results I.
The paper by Ball and Moffitt (2001) proposed and found statistical evidence that
productivity causes the Phillips Curve to shift, but it is the expectations of prices/wages
changing. The theory here about the slope of the Phillips Curve pivoting accounts for
both expectations shifts and productivity changes, because shifting with low productivity
would not be consistent with an expectations Phillips Curve. Under expectations theory,
unemployment would not change, which it substantially has since the “Great Recession.”
Theory III: Liquidity Traps
The United States and Japan, as of 2008, may have entered liquidity traps. The
trap is a term coined by Keynes, in his section on money in The General Theory (1936),
which describes an economy in which there is no place to invest. Keynes includes this as
his final section, and traces the ramifications backwards, that is, upon interest rates and
investments and then employment. The word “liquidity” itself is an accounting term
meaning the ease of spending money. So, Keynes wrote, it is like “pushing on a string”:
no matter how low interest rates go, from central bank moves, or other policies, firms or
investors will not take out the loans to spend and invest. The rate of return on such
investments will not make them worthy, if investments are too risky compared to the
expected return. Liquidity traps are risky because they can affect growth for years,
because states must use aggressive policies to increase investment, which are often
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contentious politically. Many less developed countries offer higher rates on capital,
which, combined with saving, lend themselves to investment and productivity, and more
growth per each fall in interest rate (Fig. A8). Consider the Asian “tigers,” Taiwan, Hong
Kong, Singapore, and South Korea (Jones 2002, 45, 70).
A liquidity trap may result if demand becomes infinitely elastic at an interest rate,
not changing. An increase in the money supply will not affect interest rates, and GDP
will not rise, noted Keynes. The main culprit, as with the United States and Japan, says
Carlstrom et al. (2009), is the lack of positive technology shocks. According to Harvard
economist Lawrence Summers, the current trend could be an indication of greater saving
than investment, which was a theory proposed in the Great Depression by Alvin Hansen,
the “American Keynes.” Summers says income inequality has produced wealthy citizens
who save more than lower classes, lowering interest rates through a greater supply of
funds. Technology has lessened physical investment in plants that could go to increase
construction or manufacturing jobs, in favor of investment in software (Summers 2016,
93-102). Writes Summers, “these forces push interest rates down” (Summers 2016, 103).
All of these trends have created what Summers calls, not a liquidity trap, but the
“secular stagnation hypothesis” (Summers 2016, 104), which is different from liquidity
traps in that it includes high unemployment, and financial institution instability. He
provides explanations from various economists. Robert Gordon has pointed to slow
productivity, but Summers says that low inflation and quantity of output is more likely a
demand problem than a supply one. Former Federal Reserve Chair Bernanke noted high
savings, particularly by developing countries, who do not buy Western goods. Paul
Krugman’s theory involving liquidity traps, says Summers, should only be a temporary
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problem of stagnation. And, others note, the U.S. Federal Reserve’s promise to keep
interest rates low have fed into expectations. The only precedents for negative interest
rates are Japan and a few European states, dating to Babylon (Summers 2016, 108). One
would think it possible if investors borrow to earn profits greater than the loaner’s
expense, or if they shared the profits. Such loans would still be very risky.
Summers foresees the importance of preventing another recession, saying, “one
should be prepared to take risk [for growth and stabilization] that one would not take in
normal times” (Summers 2016, 108). In 2016, Paul Krugman called the rut a “timidity
trap,” because central banks set their inflation targets too low (The Economist, “Central”
2016a, 53). For instance, central banks could set their inflation targets at 4% rather than
2%. But, missing goals could lead to lower than expected growth, and layoffs. The 2017
low rates stem partly from Chairwoman Janet Yellen’s here-to cautiousness to raise them.
Conceptual model. This papers adds to the literature, that conceptually:
Consumer/saving risk = ∆ consumption (not saving) / ∆ investment (R&D, not
production). This article also treats risk as the spending on high tech goods over
necessities, such that risk= ∆luxuries/ ∆ necessities, because high tech goods only have a
short life-span in terms of durability, they are usually more expensive, they are a
consumer “investment” than mere food or clothing products, and should they become
damaged it will be a large loss without insurance or warranty. The wealthy may save
more to offset risks that could occur from luxury goods, such as on high-scale cars, boats,
or houses that may need repair or upkeep.
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Methodology
The article analyzes structural changes, Federal Reserve transparency in the
2010s, a game theory model, and firm annual reports to evaluate the relationship between
finicky, inconsistent consumerism and investment illiquidity. Then, the article regresses
these variables, with variables for the Phillips Curve changes, for the United States’ and
Japans’ economy to find causes of volatility. The methodology finishes by analyzing
long-term institutions, namely, the bequeathing of wealth for future consumption.
Background Data I: Structural Changes Overview
Additional explanations for the current changes in employment, inflation, and
growth volatility, specifically in the United States and Japan, stem from structural
changes, some which will be used in this article’s regressions. These changes include the
retirement of older workers, and the entrance of many younger workers globally, which
raises unemployment since younger workers often have fewer skills. Economies are
changing structurally from manufacturing to service-oriented economies, creating
“Baumol’s disease,” since services, everything from retail to architecture, take more time
to produce output. Other changes are in innovation, productivity, investment, part-time
workers, changes in female employment, executive compensation, income inequality,
changes in energy resources, union membership, entitlement programs, and globalization.
For brevity, other changes not directly linked to inflation, wages, or hiring, such as bank
lending, or ambiguity over such figures’ calculations, are removed. Below are specific,
1970s-2010s descriptions of structural changes, chiefly to the United States and Japan.
Innovation
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In order to survive and compete against the giants, small firms must make quicker
and better decisions, and learn to innovate, like Apple, now history’s largest company by
inflation-adjusted market capitalization (The Economist “The rise of” 2016d, 15). From
1978-2012, in the United States, small businesses actually declined by 44% (Foroohar
2016b, 31). Larger firms, in order to stay innovative, pay higher wages to highly-capable
executives. This leaves less money to pay for less-skilled workers, lessening inflation
(The Economist “The rise of” 2016d, 15). It also creates more risk since there is a less
diversified skill set among workers that could give rise to new ideas for products or
production. Finally, the rise of global e-commerce businesses, like Amazon, which 41%
of global internet users had used by 2013, with the highest rate surprisingly from China,
has driven out warehouse workers through automation. While artificial intelligence (AI)
may in time increase growth, it may lessen human hires; its true use has yet to be
discerned, to increase productivity. Online sales have led to wage loss worldwide, in
Germany, Brazil, the United Kingdom, and India. The United States has 205 million
consumers who shop online (Statista “E-commerce” 2016b, 1), all lowering wages.
Online/Technology/Productivity
United States labor productivity has improved in some sectors over 2014-2015,
up-ticking 2.6% in wholesale trade, 1.9% in retail trade, and 0.3% in food services, partly
from technologies and global competition (Fig. A9). Still, productivity gains have been
slow since 2007-2008, even still since the 2000s before the Great Recession, and much
slower than the New Economy of the 1990s (Sancya 2015, 1-2). Productivity growth in
the U.S., excluding agriculture, had a mean of 2.9% from mid-1995 to 2005, yet only
1.3% afterwards (Blinder 2015, 1-2). Such changes can affect output volatilely.
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Compensation growth has been declining, from a U.S. high of 13.8% in 1979, to
-5.8% in 2009, back to only 5% in 2014 (“United States Wages” 2017b, 1). Productivity
is always important to wages: in order to profit in competitive markets, marginal revenue
must equal marginal costs. Industrial equipment used by American companies in 2012
was, on average, 10 years old, the highest since 1938, limiting the ability of workers to
produce goods efficiently (Sancya 2015, 1-2). America is still one of the world’s most
productive nations, fifth behind five small European states (Johnson, 2017, 1), but
productivity growth slowed down after the 1970s. William Nardaus concludes that 2/3 of
the productivity slowdown was with the energy sector, and, as with the “Great Recession,
there was declining marginal productivity (Lozada 2016, 1).
Alan Blinder, one of the most prominent Keynesian economists today, also cites a
decline in “entrepreneurial dynamism” (Blinder 2015, 3). He writes that innovations
such as Twitter and Snapchat “might even reduce productivity (through) wasted time”
(Blinder 2015, 3), contending that new technologies do not compare to the Internet, or the
personal computer (Blinder 2015, 3). Robert Gordon agrees: he writes that at the turn of
the 20th Centuries electric lights, telephones, and automobiles greatly improved the speed
of the economy. In the 21st Century, the Internet has, but Uber, Facebook, and even
Amazon pale in comparison, and may even hurt non-technical firms like taxis. It takes
time to learn how to productively use advancements (Phillips 2016, 4-6, 9).
Investment
American investment, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, rose from
the 1960s to the 1980s, then fell slightly in the early 1990s, rose until 2000, then fell
slightly until around 2007, when plummeted to 1.4%, and then began rising again around
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2010. This corresponds with the U.S. business cycle (Matthews 2015, 4). In more detail,
investment in public construction has risen from near zero to $100 billion dollars per
year, compared to $500 billion dollars per year prior to 2007 (Cole 2014, 1, 7).
According to Alan Blinder’s calculations, weak investment is to blame for 70% of the
productivity slowdown after 2010, but only 25% of the slowdown after 2005 (Blinder,
2015, 2); the rest is likely technological. Gordon cites late- 1930s investment as helping
to lead the United States out of the Great Depression, largely from government finance
(Phillips 2016, 5, 9, 11). This is not seen in the technology gains after 2008; an “app”
only saves a small business $275 dollar/week on average (Ciccone 2012, 1), and 22% of
individuals who use one never do so again (Vanderkam 2014, 1).
Part-Time Work
The “On demand” economy allows for more part-time hiring. Part-time work is
substituting full-time work; 53 million American workers are “freelance” (The Economist
“The on-demand,” 2015). Part-time workers are up 84% since the start of the Great
Recession, and are often paid less. This creates uncertainty and risk for individuals in
how to smooth and spend their income (Zuckerman 2015, 2-3). Individuals need more
high-tech skills to compete, and although college enrollment is increasing, this demand
increases school prices, along with spending on buildings and equipment, and the need to
attract top researchers and administrators (United States General “Higher” 2017, 4-30).
The average U.S. student owes $35,051 in debt (Zuckerman 2015, 4). More hiring as of
2017 is done via social media and networks. Forms to work full-time remind one of
college applications. This reflects that firms want high-skilled labor, but flexibility.
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Working-Level Age and Gender
More women today have entered the workforce, and the “Great Recession” has
been called a “man-cession,” since women are needed in burgeoning sectors like nursing.
Women also earn less, equal to around 0.79 cents to every dollar a man makes in the
U.S., due to a “good old boy” attitude, lowering aggregate wages. European states fare
slightly better, while Asia fares slightly worse (Catalyst “Women’s Earnings” 2016, 1-2).
This is despite global efforts, and by the U.S. Department of Labor, which, upon
President Obama’s executive order, will now keep more detailed statistics.
The greatest change to the U.S. Labor Force Participation (LFP) rate, which
excludes those unemployed over 26 months, has been to workers aged 25-54, the rate of
which fell from 83.8% in 2004, to 81.2% in 2013 (Hall and Petrosky-Nadeau 2016, 1-4).
The middle class is hollowing out, as mid-skilled jobs become rare (Hall and PetroskyNadeau 2016, 4). And, 2.1 million more youth join the U.S. workforce with each college
class (Carnevale et al. 2014, 3). All of these factors contribute to lower aggregate wages.
Entitlements and the Very Aged
Social Security and Medicare imbalances put stress on the U.S. debt, deficit, and
privates savings, and thus upon growth. The United States will be spending a rising,
nearly $1 trillion dollars per year over several decades on Social Security (“Policy
Basics” 2016, 1). Unchanged, the plan becomes insolvent between the 2030s or 2040s,
despite talks of “lock boxes,” “means testing,” raising the cap on taxable income, or the
“Chilean model.” Minsky (1977, 1982, 1986) wrote about how such entitlement
programs can generate inflation, by producing no goods. There has indeed, though, been
a slowdown in healthcare costs, partly from the Affordable Care Act, but it is a question
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if it is sustainable. Conversely, in developing world, as Fukuyama (1999) notes, is seeing
“youth bulges” of younger workers, and when they migrate, as The Economist Group
(The Economist Group “Neither” 2017d, 1) notes, measuring economic gains is complex
due to problems estimating long-term revenue. In developed countries, according to
Anderson, Botman, and Hunt (2014), low inflation can be attributed to an aged
population. The former Japanese central bank director, Masaaki Shirakawa, argues that
aging should not cause deflation, yet since 2000, in 24 developed states, Katagiri (2012),
shows they are linked; for Japan, aging caused a 0.3% effect on deflation. Thus, there is
a general belief that aging puts downward pressure on wages (Cohen-Setton 2015, 1-4).
Unemployment Inaccuracy (Labor Force Rate)
After 26 weeks, from what was once known as the shoe-string effect, because
one’s shoes would were down from searching for a job, the long-term unemployed are no
longer accounted for in metrics- in the U.S., they have risen to 2.1 million, and those
forced to work part-time, who would prefer to be full-time, has risen to 6.0 million. The
U.S. labor force participation rate, which does not include the long-term unemployed or
the retired, has fallen from 67% in the late 1990s to 62.9% in 2014, for men and women
included. It is expected to fall further to 60.9% by 2024, because of an increase number
of retirees, and those with disabilities (Perryman “The US” 2016, 1-2). Lower classes,
those earning under $24,349 dollars/yr., cannot buy luxury goods, and purchase staples.
Unions
The decline in global labor union workers have put less pressure on wages.
Union membership has fallen from 20.1% in 1983 to 10.7% in 2016 (Wilson 2017, 1), a
trend that began after World War II (Faux 2014, 1-3). Private sector membership is at
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6.9%, the lowest rate since 1910 (Heidecker 2013, 1). Vacations, sick days, and holiday
time are decreasing. And, despite a Supreme Court ruling that non-union interns must be
paid, they are often not (Faux 2014, 1-3). Unions have less power over layoffs, wages,
benefits, and working conditions, and are less admired; they are seen as “bloated,
inefficient, and often downright corrupt,” and they are associated by many Americans
with mobs and bribery (Heidecker 2013, 2). Instead, workers in 2018 are relying on the
state for healthcare, pensions, and discrimination protection (Heidecker 2013, 1-2).
Increase In Services: Decrease In Manufacturing
Since the Industrial Revolution of the 1840s, services have seen a steady increase,
agriculture labor has declined, and manufacturing employment was rising until about the
mid-1950s, but then declined precipitously (Johnston, 2012, 3). The financial sector of
the United States economy now accounts for 7% of GDP, as opposed to 4% in 1980.
Some 25% of corporate profits go to pay for financial employees (Foroohar 2016b, 28).
Services include finance, and everything from lawyering to customer service, retail, and
restaurants, which often pay lower wages, being less productive than manufacturing. A
mild revival of manufacturing has occurred due to wage hikes in China and India, but the
financial sector has grown, most intensely after 1979, due to deregulations by President
Ronald W. Reagan (StateofworkingAmerica “Structural Change” 2016, 1-5).
Energy
Just like the 1970s, the 2000s and 2010s have seen large changes in energy. Due
to the collaboration or competition of the oil-rich OPEC countries, and the introduction of
substitute goods, as well as investment speculation, there have been either huge upswings
in oil’s commodity price on stock exchanges, to over $100/barrel, or massive declines,
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under $30. In many countries, such as those that sell oil, this increases GDP, but in the
United States and Japan, energy prices hampers it. Higher prices for the consumer at the
pump drives out other consumption: for every 25% increase in the price of oil, GDP falls
approximately 1% (Rasmussen and Roitman 2012, 1-3). However, the $1 dollar/gl. gas
decline over 2015 caused a 73% decline in the number of U.S. oil rigs, each loss costing
an average of 28 jobs, not including drilling and shipping (Saha and Muro 2016, 1-3).
Housing Market
The housing mortgage crisis that culminated in 2008 was in part a result of
excessive easy lending, with subprime mortgages doubling from 10- 20% of the total
(National Commission 2011, 104), coupled with demographic change, and new complex
financial instruments raising the “inability … of many younger families to qualify for a
mortgage” (National Commission 2011, 492). Housing shortages precede, and surpluses
follow, most recessions, historically; the economy of 2018 will benefit if more baby
boomers bequeath their homes to their children, in time (Zuckerman 2015, 5).
Trade and Globalization
In the writings of The Wall Street Journal (2015), it is the inflow of low cost
foreign parts, or intermediate goods, driving down final product prices. The United
States imported $138 billion in car parts in 2014, compared to $31.7 billion on average in
the 1990s. The imported goods cost less, lowering prices and inflation (Hagerty and
Bennett 2015, 1-2). Over the “Great Stagnation,” global trade as a percent of GDP has
fallen from 61% to 60% (The Economist “A Troubling” 2014, 1). In others’ views, like
Yellen (2006b), it is globalized competition of workers in different countries that lessens
prices/wages, causing the Phillips Curve relationship to flatten. Globalization, mainly the
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economic integration with China, whose people have a 40% savings rate, causes money
to fail percolate abroad, lessening inflation (The Economist “Low pressure” 2016b, 22).
Furthermore, trade and technology are causing inequality, by creating jobs that the poor,
76% of whom cannot afford college, are untrained for (Illinois “Are Cost Barriers” 2003,
5), which Putnam (2016) writes about, as well as scholars ranging from Simon Kuznets to
Kenneth Arrow.
Background Data II: The Historical Liquidity Trap Case of Japan
It is hypothesized here that Japan entered a liquidity trap due to developing,
structural, and demographic changes. Japan saved in the 1950s and 1960s, which was
low risk, while U.S. consumers spent riskily. Japan most likely entered the trap in the
late 1980s, and it lasted to the late 1990s, called their two “lost decades,” though it may
still exist today (Kobayashi 2015, 35). One explanatory theory is that of the dependency
ratio, those too young or old to work, since Japan’s fertility rate has fallen since the
1950s, and life expectancy is rising. Japan’s elderly in 2011 were 23% of the populace,
among the world’s highest (Shirai 2012, 1-3), and 26% in 2013 (Kobayashi 2015, 32).
Japan’s “baby boom” generation changed the layout of the country by migrating
from rural areas to cities, with culturally preferred smaller houses. The elderly are
morphing into a “consumer generation”: making up over 40% of total consumption, the
elderly spend more on nursing, medical services, tourism, “social expenses,” and food,
and less on education, transportation, and communication (Shirai 2012, 7).
Moreover, the uncertainty over pension policies have led firms, with expectations,
to react slowly to tap these markets, which have low prices and lesser profits (Shirai
2012, 14). Yet, financial institutions are expected to provide the credit over the next
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decade for firms to be able to innovate into robotics, medical care, and biotechnology,
which should drive loans. The Central Bank, a very concentrated organization, is aiming
for and targeting short-term inflation at 1%, and 2% long-term (Shirai 2012, 14-15).
Japan’s economy has seen a bounce of growth of 2% for three quarters in 20162017 (Hoenig et al. 2017, 3), mainly due to an aggressive fiscal stimulus of $276 billion
dollars (Harding 2016, 2) under the leadership of its charismatic leader, Shinzo Abe, in
office continually since 2012, whose “Abenomic” tax hikes for stimulus, child care
measures, and efforts to increase women in the workforce have had mixed results. In his
defense, the “baby boomers” may be linked statistically to the decline in private housing
investment (Kobayashi 2015, 33). Aging may have contributed to the liquidity trap, as
the elderly save more, in accordance with the life-cycle hypothesis (Shirai 2012, 8, 1213). The main differences of Japan, compared with the United States, is that Japan, while
lowering interest rates, did not purchase assets or equity after the 2008 financial crisis as
with the U.S. Troubled Asset Relief Program. The population remained pessimistic,
affecting consumption. While the United States’ construction industry cut back the
supply of houses to help keep average prices high until they reached pre-2008 levels in
2016, Japan’s did not, particularly in Tokyo (Doctor “The 20 year” 2017, 1-3) These
policies are lessons should China or Europe enter a liquidity traps (Kobayashi 2015, 35,
37). Writes Japanese analyst Kobayashi, “Once caught in deflation, it is very difficult to
get out of [so] it is very important to take measures … especially for Europe where the
demographic trend is closer to Japan than the US” (Kobayashi 2015, 38).

45

Presentation of Results
Results I: Expectations – Federal Reserve and Inflation In the United States
Beyond structural change, which will be included in the regressions, the evidence
collected suggest that central bank assurances have kept wages down, and put emphasis
on employment, changing Phillips Curve expectations. The definition of inflation is too
much money chasing too few goods, not necessarily just too much money, as shown by
Fisher (1928). As Milton Friedman said, inflation, long-run, it is solely dependent on
central banks’ monetary policy (Arnold 1998, 140-144). Low inflation globally is also
exacerbated by housing being included in the Consumer Price Index (CPI), which have
risen globally since 2008 levels (IMF “Global House” 2016, 1), but core inflation, which
excludes gas and food, is still low at 1.5% globally as of 2015 (Yardeni et al. 2017, 4).
In the “Great Stagnation,” different policy approaches have been used by differing
central banks and different parliaments, the United Kingdom using austerity, with both
Canada and Germany running traditional surpluses, China using fiscal and monetary
stimulus, Japan using fiscal stimulus and inspiring female employment, India changing
their sales tax and employment laws, and Latin America deregulating and refinancing.
The U.S. Federal Reserve may have held inflation low, despite rate cuts, because
it increased money accumulated in accounts “held by banks at the Fed without being
loaned out” (Dornbusch et al. 2011, 260). Second, “the Fed was very explicit that it
expected to ‘unwind’ the new purchases after the danger to the economy had passed. So,
the increase in the monetary base was viewed as largely temporary” (Dornbusch et al.
2011, 260). Firms react to reports and “moral suasion” statements aiming to guide them.
With signals from the Fed, they have focused more on hiring (Appelbaum 2014, 1).
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Supply has increase due to the Fed reducing interest rates, but wages and prices are still
flat: though Fed assertions have helped keep inflation low, as former Chair Bernanke
notes, inflation can also have a Keynesian “stickiness” (Bernanke 2003, 5).
The U.S. central bank, and those globally, are turning more transparent to firms
via how much information they reveal, whether about their assets or their policies, which
help with expectations. Before becoming U.S. Chairperson, as New York Bank
Governor in 2003, Ben S. Bernanke warned of the risk of deflation (Bernanke 2003, 3),
calling for better “communication of its policy” (Bernanke 2003, 9). He added that
monetary success centers on “how well the central bank communicates…than on any
other single factor” (Bernanke 2003, 10). In 2005, at his Senate confirmation, Bernanke
suggested specifying a long-term inflation goal (Federal “Hearing” 2005, 15).
Transparency at the Federal Reserve has increased greatly in the last several
decades. In 1994, the Fed began a post-meeting press release; in 2000 it started issuing a
statement of “balance of risks”; in 2002, releasing individual members’ votes, in 2003,
giving a forward-guidance statement; and in 2005, releasing its minutes sooner (Yellen
2006a, 6-7) In 2006, San Francisco Bank President, Janet Yellen, who would become the
next Fed Chair in 2014, said the Fed and public should “work together” to guide “public
expectations about inflation,” blaming the 1970’s stagflation on this flaw (Yellen 2006a,
2). She followed: “it is only when the Fed’s commitment to low inflation is credible that
people will expect low inflation … and set prices accordingly” (Yellen 2006a, 3).
By 2013, in his final years, Mr. Bernanke spoke about the Federal Reserve’s plan
to keep inflation “well anchored” (Fed.res. “Transcript” 2013, 4). Since 2013, the reserve
bank holds press conferences after meetings, and according to Chairperson Yellen, “other
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central banks have adopted … practices aimed at improving both transparency and
accountability” (Yellen 2006a, 15). The U.S. Federal Reserve has suggested showing
meetings live on television. The downside is potential volatility in equity markets. The
table below compares inflation, via the Consumer Price Index (CPI), since data after Fed
moves is scarce, with new hires from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (“International
Comparisons,” “International Indexes” 2017), rather than the jobless rate, for accuracy.
Table 1 Central Bank Effects.
Hiring (in thousands) during low inflation (GDP, CPI) in trillions, in % change
Jan. 2013

Feb. 2013

Mar. 2013

Apr. 2013

May 2013

June 2013

(16.52, 0.0)

16.46, 0.7

16.53, -0.2

16.58, -0.4

16.55, 0.1

16.64, 0.5

200 employ.

275 employ.

140 employ.

205 employ.

200 employ.

200 employ.

July 2013

Aug 2013

Sept 2013

Oct 2013

Nov 2013

Dec 2013

16.65, 0.2

16.73, 0.1

16.81, 0.1

16.86, 0.0

17.01, 0.1

17.01, 0.2

150 employ.

205 employ.

165 employ.

225 employ.

325 employ.

75 employ.

Jan 2014

Feb. 2014

Mar. 2014

Apr. 2014

May 2014

June 2014

16.91, 0.1

16.98, 0.1

17.07, 0.2

17.17, 0.3

17.28, 0.4

17.35, 0.3

170 employ.

180 employ.

225 employ.

335 employ.

240 employ.

280 employ.

July 2014

Aug. 2014

Sept. 2014

Oct. 2014

Nov. 2014

Dec. 2014

17.43, 0.1

17.56, -0.1

17.57, 0.1

17.59, 0.1

17.66, -0.3

17.60, -0.3

250 employ.

220 employ.

150 employ.

225 employ.

425 employ.

335 employ.

Jan. 2015

Feb. 2015

Mar. 2015

Apr. 2015

May 2015

June 2015

17.58, -0.7

17.72, 0.2

17.65, 0.2

17.81, 0.1

17.92, 0.4

18.00, 0.3

255 employ.

265 employ.

85 employ.

250 employ.

275 employ.

230 employ.

Note. Low inflation expectations beget low wages.
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In recessions, with no expected price/wages changes, as policies increase demand,
there should be new hiring, but in the figure it is difficult to link hiring to long-term GDP
presages. With the hypothesis, in a low inflation environment, firms should have been
hiring based on demand expectations, but, while this appears true to a degree, it seems
that rather than hire long-term based on future expectations about inflation, which is low,
firms were and are deciding to hire ad hoc based on short-term combinations of changes
in wage/price levels, from 2013-2015, and more-so, GDP. In the “big box stores,” and
service fields, which developed economies are turning to, there is a dogma called “oncall” shift scheduling, which employees have to ready within one hour to arrive to work
promptly. Some states are considering laws to require 24 hour notice to ease planning for
the employee (Norton 2016, 1). This indicates that firms, during low inflation times, are
not relying on wage expectations, which is key in the modern Phillips Curve tradeoff.
Results II: A Game Theory Model and Annual Reports Micro-Analysis
This article has presented theories of consumption, which depends on investment.
In this section, finicky consumption is evaluated in light of investment that tries to meet
its demands, via game theory. Game theory, as first developed by von Neumann and
Nash, analyzes competition versus collaboration. Which of the two, of consumption and
saving/investment, comes first one might ask? One would probably answer saving/
investment. Say’s Law can also be true in high tech, developing states. Consumers
compete with producers, consumers wanting better deals, producers wanting higher
profit, while they work together to meet demand. Investments in high tech goods, which
need massive investments, may not meeting consumer satisfaction (Fig. A10). This is a
near Neo-Ricardian model: Pierre Sraffa, writing in Italy in the 1920s, argued that firms
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compete for resources, so one’s use of resources affects another (Pressman 2014, 157).
Consumer branding and loyalty is almost a “resource” in the high tech economy.
Consumers cooperate by buying, in effect telling producers what they want made, but
compete by saving, awaiting better “deals.” Observe the following, building off Nobel
Prize winner Edmund Phelps’ concepts of holding and spending (Conrad 2013, 40):

Figure 9. A Game of Consumption vs. Investment. Four conceptual modes are shown.
Consumers collaborate with producers for the goods they want through their
previous purchases, which provide information about prices, as well as through brand
loyalty developed via marketing, while they compete with producers for lower prices, and
also saving money for the future. Producers, meanwhile, collaborate by investing in new
products they believe the market will want, but sometimes compete by deciding to hold
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onto money for the future, due to excessive risks, leading to liquidity traps. The games’
terms rest on expectations of prices- how they relate to utility or profit.
With respect to the United States, consumption and investment data from the St.
Louis Federal Reserve Bank, which only goes back until approximately 1959-1960,
shows that such a situation for the first quadrant (liquidity trap and risky low growth)
occurred around 1967, 1980, late 1981-1982, and 1991. In the second quadrant (low
growth but high future growth), we see such activities occurring in the 1960s until 1967,
the early-mid 1970s, the late 1980s, and 2014 until today (except for the 2nd Quarter of
2016: then, investment plummeted, as analyzed below). The third quadrant (balanced
growth but low future growth) occurred in the mid-to-late 1970s, the early 1990s, and the
2000s. The fourth quadrant (exuberance with high, but risky growth) occurred, strangely,
in the late 1970s, and, as would have been expected, the mid-1990s. Of course, there are
other aspects not covered by the model, such as trade and government spending, but in
general, this scenario meets anticipations in terms of growth and volatility. Research and
development, also, followed this business cycle trend (all data from St. Louis Fed 2016).
The caveats are that traditionally, according to the National Bureau of Economic
Research, a recession occurred in 1960, which was not identified by this schematic, as
well as in 1969-1970, which came two years later than expected here, and from late
1973-1975, which only corresponds with low growth in this case. Volatility of GDP
actually increased with inflation, as evidenced by the fact that business investment in the
United States dropped near fifty percent during the fourth quarter of 2016. This can best
be explained by a slowdown in housing, as well retailers “playing it safe” with inventory
(Craig 2016, 2). If spending slows, too, recession is possible, given the lagged effect of
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investment not meeting consumer needs. In Japan, while investment has seen a constant
decline, saving rose from 1979-1981, and GPD fell slightly. Near 1988, both investment
and saving rose, and growth improved. In 1992, both factors fell again, and growth
turned negative; each has been low since then, as has growth, signifying a liquidity trap.
As The Economist (2016d) writes, tech companies today are pursuing marketing
and branding more, to link consumption with investment (The Economist “The rise of”
2016d, 6). They also encourage, or find out technologically, information about
consumers, which requires “research … (to get) users hooked on their products” (The
Economist “The rise of” 2016d, 14). Firms are using technology to form better
relationships with customers, trying to discern what customers want to invest and
manufacture to their needs, often lowering prices to do so. In fact, Amazon and Uber
keep prices down, while Google and Twitter provide many services for free, to some
$280 billion dollars per year one expert calculates (The Economist “The rise of” 2016d,
9, 16). Demand shifts if consumers lose interest in the product during production: supply
shifts if expenses in production become more volatile than planned. Typically, firms
expect good things, not the Keynesian shocks that occur ad hoc. If one expected
everything, economies would never change (see Fig. A10).
To assess the consumption-investment relationship empirically, three uniquely
different, global companies were selected for their size in the technology field, Samsung,
Apple, and IBM. Their annual reports were examined roughly from 2011 to 2015 to
determine how they limited their risks of investment, and whether or not their sales,
based on inventory, met expectations made at the initial time of investment in the
product. Regrettably, that data is not listed per good, and neither are hiring decisions.
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While the U.S. Federal Reserve Chairwoman blamed the low U.S. growth in the final
quarter of 2014 on weather, low sales befell the final quarter 2011, and also in 2015.
Low growth is better explained by technology investment not met with consumerism.
Apple, ironically, does not invest as much as imagined. During the period of
study, Apple spent approximately $1.5 billion per quarter on research, below Microsoft,
Amazon, and Google. Most of such spending occurs in the middle of the year, focusing
on inventories towards the year’s end (Leswing and Villapaz 2015, 1-2). Apple’s iPhone
7, launched in October, 2016, was the first cell phone it produced in several years. Once
offered, revenues from other phones, which were already “lukewarm,” fell 9% (McMillan
2016, A1). A Wall Street Journal writer notes, “consumer buying habits are changing”
(McMillan 2016, A1). Apple’s stock price fell from $124.6 a share in July, 2015 to $88.2
in May 2016, from investor worries over China’s sales, but the stock has risen since
(Yahoo “Apple Inc.” 2017, 1).
Examining 4th quarter sales, Apple’s and other firms’ sales of cell phones declined
in the 4th quarter of 2011. In 2014’s 4th quarter, it sales were slightly higher than that
year’s third quarter, but at $39.27 million, still very low by Apple’s standards during that
year (Statista “Apple iPhone sales” 2016a, 1). In the 4th quarter of 2015, Apple’s sales
stayed only constant, but smartphone sales in North America fell by 6%. These were the
periods the Federal Reserve blamed on weather. As the subtitle of one article says,
“[The] Market is saturated with high-end smartphones, and customers are keeping them
longer” (Hamblen 2016, 1). Says analyst Kevin Walsh, “‘More contract free packages
are coming to market, encouraging consumers to hold on to their handsets for longer …
.” (Hamblen 2016, 2). Also, buyers wait for falling prices (Hamblen 2016, 2).
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Therefore, finicky consumers were not buying such products instantly but waiting
until they became established on the market at a lower, more discounted price. While
companies do try to diversify their products, such with Google’s Pixel phone, such
products have a short life span, and customers look to buy a newer version. Such actions
show how finicky, or risky, the high-tech economy is. The annual reports of IBM
(International Business Machines) identify interest rate, currency exchange, and
cybersecurity risk, analyzing the effects of a 10% change in each to the firm’s finances.
Apple’s annual reports point to many possible risks in selling its products, much
more so than other firms do. The company yearly explains to the investor numerous
potential pitfalls, covering the entire gambit of their business, listing 27 risk possibilities.
Strangely, Apple dropped “education” as a goal from the 2012 report to 2013 (Annual
Report 2013, 2, 9-19), indicating either less social concern, or that consumers had
become familiar with its products. Its inventories more than doubled from September
2012 to September 2013, increasing from 791,000 units to 1.76 million units. From 2013
to 2014, the time period of interest, inventories increased to 2.1 million. The next year,
2015, they rose slightly to 2.3 million (Apple Annual Report 2015, 55). For IBM, they
increased sharply at the end of 2013 at 1.89 million units, and then declined slightly the
next two years, but the effect to cash flows was a huge decline (IBM Annual Reports).
Jack Rasmus, a banker, attributes the decline in the in the first quarter of 2014,
originally set at -1.0%, but later revised to -2.9%, not to weather, but consumerism. This
is in contrast to such government officials as Jason Furman, head of the White House
Council of Economic Advisers, who said it was from “intensifying winter weather”
(Harlan 2015, 3). Cell phone sales were strong, but there was left over inventory from
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the previous two quarters for a sales surge that did not occur. Interestingly, this is in lieu
of the fact that the U.S. government changed the way Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is
calculated, which often happens, in this case including new forms of investment. The
decline in GDP hypothetically would have been greater: -3.2% (Rasmus 2014, 1-2).
In addition, there was a lack of exports and sales overseas, which journalist Chico
Harman calls the greatest trade-led drag down in growth since 1985 (Harlan 2015, 3).
This was possibly because of the strengthening of the U.S. dollar, the emerging markets
slowing, competition from China, or China’s saturated markets. Furthermore, healthcare
sales declined (Rasmus 2014, 1-2). Harman also suggests the idea of sluggishness due to
consumers paying off debt or saving, rather than spending. He cites economist Carl
Tannenbaum as saying, “it’s a bit of a puzzle” (Harlan 2015, 3-4). Rasmus calls the era
since the United States’ financial crisis a “stop-go” trajectory, very erratic, with sporadic
periods of high and low growth, moderation and stagnation (Rasmus 2014, 2).
An opposite spectacle occurred in the second quarter of 2016. Firms did not put
forward the money for large inventories, and were taken aback by the surge in consumer
demand. Two industry economists said that firms were “caught off guard” and “were
playing it safe” by way of inventories (Craig 2016, 2). Since then, firms have worked to
improve forecasting, says a senior online editor (Cassidy and Hutchins 2016, 1).
One of the reasons firms are having difficulty estimating demand is that, today,
consumers “delay their phone upgrades to take advantage of the lower monthly service
prices carriers offer to consumers who wait to upgrade phones at the end of their twoyear contracts” (Entner 2015, 1). The “handset replacement cycle” increased from an
average of consumers holding phones for 22.4 months in 2013, to 26.5 months in 2014,
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the largest such change in approximately four years. In the words of analyst Roger
Entner, “consumers’ phone purchase have changed significantly” (Entner 2015, 1). A
bifurcation exists in purchasing behavior, between those who upgrade their phone every
year and those who update it only when it becomes obsolete. About ½ upgrade it every
year, while over 1/3 wait until it becomes outdated in use (Entner 2015, 2). Consumers
must consider their own families, as 68% of smart phone owners belong to a group or
family plan (Smith 2015, 2), which might suggest an addendum to Deaton’s paradox
from theory 1 that household spending on technological goods is not always so smooth.
The economists at PNC, a banking firm, say that going forward, the Federal Reserve is
more likely to evaluate macro factors, such as the weak 2017 housing market, and student
debt, than “wild swings” in inventories or “finicky” consumers (Craig 2016, 3).
Samsung, a South Korean based firm with many sales in the United States, is a
perfect example of the problem of technological, micro-economic risk. Samsung ranks
2nd in research and development, after Volkswagen (Triggs 2014, 2). After spending
$13.4 billion dollars in 2014 on total R&D, Samsung’s Galaxy Note 7 began physically
exploding in October, 2016, because the inner mechanical parts were too tightly packed,
leaving no room for battery expansion. Said one expert, “There is now so much that can
go wrong with such devices” (The Economist Group “Charred” 2016, 57).
Samsung’s losses are estimated at $900 million, and its stock has declined by 5%,
added to the damage to its reputation and with its suppliers, and its loss in R&D. The
phone sold for around $350 dollars, and was estimate to cost $225 to produce, plus the
company was offering a $25 gift card, and a full repayment of 2 million recalled devices
(Trefis Team 2016, 1-4). Focus is shifting to artificial intelligence (The Economist
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Group “Charred” 2016, 58). Samsung, though, is diversifying into biotech drugs, which
still have a high risk of failing drug trial tests (The Economist Group “Charred” 2016,
58). By developing high-tech goods that are so complex, a deficiency can lead returns
for a refund, lessening total sales. Another example of costly defects are those that occur
in the auto industry.
Results III: Regression
The author tests the macroeconomic economic changes in the United States and
Japan from the 1970 to 2014, using many of the variables discussed in the preceding
sections, to analyze their effects on inflation, unemployment, the Phillips Curve
relationship, and volatility (risk). The data caveats are that an Innovation index, minimum
wages, and union membership were not available for this range. The data is from:
Bo/Dependent: Volatility- calculated from St. Louis Fed
Bo/Dependent: Phillips Curve Slope: dummy variable analyzed from the St. Louis Fed
Bo/Dependent: Phillips Curve Shift: dummy variable analyzed from the St. Louis Fed
B1: Inflation over unemployment: calculated from the St. Louis Fed
B2: Saving: from the OECD
B3: Female workforce: St. Louis Fed
B4: Capital Investment: Index from the World Bank
B5: Trade over GDP: World Bank
B6: GINI inequality: OECD, Chartbook, UN Inequality Spreadsheet
B6: Housing: from the St. Louis Fed
B7: Part-time work: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Houseman and Osawa
B8: Productivity: calculated from the St. Louis Fed
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B9: Demographics: Dependency Ratios from the St. Louis Fed
B10: Energy Prices: St. Louis Fed
MV= PQ, LWV= GDP, M= LW, where L= labor, M= money supply as via the
Federal Reserve V= velocity, P= prices, quality, Q= quantity of goods, as in fiscal policy,
W= wages. Whether M affects L or W depends on productivity and investment (See
Figs. A11, A12) Before the regression, there was some heteroscedasticity, but the
variables pass a Breusch-Pagan test. Below, the hypotheses via the preceding work, are:
The Inflation/Unemployment, Saving, Female, Investing, Trade, and Part-time
variables should create flexibility, reducing risk and volatility, in the next two tables.
Ho: B = 0

H1: B < 0: The beta figure standardizes coefficients for comparing.

For Gini, Housing, Productivity, these create greater risk, and should be volatile.
Ho: B = 0

H1: B > 0: The beta figure standardizes coefficients for comparing.

Table 2 Volatility via Consumption Variables.
Inf_over_unemployed 0.2359

1.82

0.072*

0.2983

Saving Rate

0.1008

0.76

0.439

0.3143

Female Workforce

-.0644

-0.83

0.407

-0.1842

Capital Inv.

-0.0439

-0.33

0.740

-0.1220

Trade over GDP

-0.2108

-2.13

0.036 *

-0.3209

GINI

5.4364

0.516

0.516

0.1592

Housing

-0.0000176

-1.88

0.063*

-0.2969

Part-time Work

0.1464

1.11

0.269

0.2838

Productivity

0.0679

0.58

0.567

0.0625

Constant

5.3830

1.03

0.304

N/A

Variable: Volatility [abs.(growth-ave.)] No. of Obs: 90 F > p= 0.0864
Coefficient

t value

p value

R2= 0.1633
beta

Note. Several variables are significant. * = Significant at 90% or greater.
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The housing market, in particular, creates massive aggregate volatility. Keynes
would have called this a “shock.” As the housing market improves, it reduces volatility,
significant at the 90% level. Trade per GDP is negative, which is an unusual result. One
explanation for this is that as countries grow larger, they solidify their institutional supply
chains, and GDP in the denominator increases, which is stabilizing and allows for greater
risk taking, as will be discussed in Article II. The changing inflation-over-unemployment
relationship (the Phillips Curve) is also significant as destabilizing. Energy, not included,
is insignificant and interferes with the inflation variable.
Table 3 Volatility via the Phillips Curve.
Saving Rate

0.0606

0.46

0.646

0.1889

Female Workforce

-0.1363

--1.74

0.085

-0.3897

Capital Inv.

0.1435

1.15

0.252

0.3988

Trade over GDP

-0.2023

-2.03

0.046*

-0.3079

GINI

18.5216

2.36

0.021*

0.5399

Housing

-0.0000192

-2.06

0.043*

-0.3238

Part-time Work

0.1958

1.48

0.142

0.3796

Productivity

0.0440

0.34

0.737

0.0405

Energy

-0.0175

-0.67

0.504

-0.0873

PC Shift

1.4109

1.69

0.096*

0.3679

PC Slope

1.8422

2.07

0.041*

0.4459

Constant

-1.7441

-0.33

0.742

N/A

Variable: Volatility [abs.(growth-ave.)] No. of Obs: 90 F > p = 0.0901 R2= 0.1929
Coefficient

t value

p value

beta

Shifts and slope changes are destabilizing.*= Significant at 90% or greater.
Phillips Curve shifts, and new slopes, affect volatility, more-so the slope (>beta).
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For Saving, Female, Trade, GINI, Housing, Part-time, Productivity: these
variables, if increased, should result in greater unemployment, causing a shift inwards,
which were and are rarer than shifts outwards. Refer the earlier Figure 2.
Ho: B = 0 Ha: B < 0.
For Saving, Investing, Gini: these variables, when increased, lessen the money
multiplier, discussed in Theory I, and as workers need tools to work. The GINI
inequality index should also cause a shift outward, since the wealthy tend to save more.
Ho: B = 0

Ha: B > 0

Table 4 Phillips Curve Shift Regression.
Saving Rate

-0.0206

-0.63

0.528

-0.2468

Female Workforce

-0.0219

-1.20

0.235

-0.2405

Capital Inv.

0.0138

0.46

0.647

0.1468

Trade

-0.0362

-1.45

0.150

-0.2111

GINI

1.2275

0.72

0.477

0.1428

Housing

-4.25e-06

-1.85

0.069*

-0.2750

Part-time Work

0.0322

0.98

0.330

0.2391

Productivity

-0.0358

-1.21

0.231

-0.1265

Constant

1.6127

1.29

0.200

N/A

Variable: PC Shift

No. of Obs.: 90

F > p = 0.01

Coefficient

t value

R2= 0.2104
p value

beta

Housing is the main determinant. *= Significant at 90%.

The Phillips Curve shifts primarily due to the housing market; the negative sign
means the shift is inward with an improved mortgage market. Energy is excluded for
serial correlation: the Phillips Curve includes an inflation component.
For Saving, Female, Trade, Gini, Part-time: they will lessen price/wages-to jobs.
Ho: B = 0

H1: B < 0
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For Capital, GINI, Housing, Productivity: these will reduce price/wages related to jobs.
Ho: B = 0

H1: B > 0

Table 5 Phillips Curve Slope Regression.
Saving Rate

0.0459

1.50

0.138

0.5915

Female Workforce

0.0196

1.14

0.258

0.2318

Capital Inv.

-0.0457

-1.62

0.110*

-0.5242

Trade

0.0218

0.93

0.355

0.1370

GINI

-2.3811

-1.42

0.161

-0.2867

Housing

2.30e-06

1.06

0.292

0.1601

Part-time Work

-0.0257

-0.83

0.292

-.02061

Productivity

0.0138

0.49

0.407

0.0525

Constant

0.7632

0.65

0.517

0

Variable: PC Slope

No. of Obs: 90
Coefficient

F > p = 0.025
t value

R2= 0.1883

p value

beta

Investment Affects the Phillips Curve Slope. *= 90% significance, given the 1% room for human error, explained below.

Slope changes were codified first, the lesser in curvilinear magnitude when
compared to shifts. Judging slope changes is difficult, which is not quite the same as the
relationship between inflation and unemployment, so this analysis has significant room
for human error, including the rare event, with “sticky” expectations, the curve may shift
and pivot simultaneously. Two or more, same direction shifts would indicate
expectations. Energy affected other variables, as the Phillips Curve has an inflation
component. Only capital investment is significant, though saving comes close. Low
investment signals low profits, and therefore lower wages. Flattened slopes were coded
with a dummy variable, so an increase in saving should flatten the slope, since it would
lead to less spending and inflation, and the reverse for capital investing, which, with a
negative sign, means it would conversely steepen the curve. Capital investment is low, at
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19.9% of U.S. GDP in 2014, versus 24.8% in 1978, causing a flattening of the curve
(“Gross Capital,” 2017, 1), and nearly significant is saving, the reverse of consuming,
which fell from 9.5% in 1978 to 3.4% in 2014 (“Saving Rate,” 2017, 1).
To determine the best balanced growth (inflation/unemployment), see the table
below. This table was used to create the “line of balanced growth,” using the fact that
inflation over growth is volatile, but that liquidity traps bring slow growth, a finding by
Solow that equivalent wage and employment growth is stabilizing (See Fig. A13).
For Saving, Female, Trade, Gini, Part-time: they will lessen price/wages-to jobs.
Ho: B = 0

H1: B < 0

For Investing, Housing, Productivity, Energy: these will increase price/wages- to jobs.
Ho: B = 0

H1: B > 0

Table 6 Inflation Chart.
Saving Rate

0.1008

0.97

0.335

0.2486

Female Workforce

-0.1294

-2.08

0.040*

-0.2926

Capital Inv.

0.3537

3.59

0.001*

0.7772

Trade

-0.0259

-0.33

0.745

-0.0312

GINI

24.9552

3.96

0.000*

0.5752

Housing

-0.0000161

-2.19

0.032*

-0.2141

Part-time Work

0.0989

0.94

0.352

0.2281

Productivity

0.0659

0.65

0.519

0.1516

Energy

0.0714

3.53

0.001*

0.2825

Constant

-10.7113

-2.67

0.009*

N/A

Inflation/Unemployment

No. of Obs: 90

Coefficient

t value

F > p= 0.0000
p value

: Consumption variables affect inflation.*= Significant at 90% or greater.
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R2= 0.6630
beta

Capital investment steepens the inflation-over-unemployment relationship (see
Fig. A11), which can also shift the curve outward, most likely because it results in greater
risk taking that leads to higher inflation and interest rates; this is consistent with other
parts of the study. In 2018, with low investment, the relationship is becoming less steep,
which would contribute to greater unemployment, which, through Okun’s rule of thumb
that unemployment lessens growth, also increases volatility. The GINI inequality
variable was unusual. Income inequality is increasing inflation, implying that the middle
class is morphing into lower classes that spend more, proportionately. But, there is a
difference between core and non-core inflation; core inflation eliminates food and energy
prices. The data from the St. Louis Federal Reserve included both. Finally, female
workers make the economy more elastic, since they give employers greater flexibility in
production, and since employers can lower wages. Women earn only approximately 79
cents to every dollar men earn in the United States, and even less abroad. Productivity
was insignificant again, perhaps because it only has short-run effects. Although volatility
was included here, a GDP growth regression was also run, but since many factors go into
growth, the model was not significant, and so it is not included. Also, adding the
dependency ratio variable was insignificant in all of the regressions, and interfered via
serial correlation, making other variables counter-intuitive, as well as raising the
heteroscedasticity number, and the F values, so, it was not included. The regression’s
results and Result II are overlaid with the Phillips curve to better depict their relationshipwhich areas of the model are most risky/volatile (Fig 13 again, App.)
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Results IV: Long-term Institutions
Interest Groups/Political Elites. Institutionally, Mancur Olson asserted that for
the stagflation of the 1970s, the overriding factor was Keynesian in nature, in that prices
and wages were being “sticky” and slow to adjust to market forces, particularly
downward. But on top of this, Olson put forth his own theory, that the causal nature was
the influence of strong interest groups developed over decades in United States and other
nations from political culture, leading to less policy risk taking, termed “institutional
sclerosis,” or the Clower-Olson theory (Olson 1982, 201), with another scholar of similar
research. Olson admits, though, that interest groups policies are less important than
macroeconomics (Olson 1982, 183-184). Another institutional term, the “social
contract,” can refer to collective bargaining, which determine rules for working
conditions and also stirs political change (Faux 2014, 1). While this social agreement has
existed in the United States since World War II, other nations have pursued corporatism.
Germany is one significant example, as the government works with businesses and
unions alike, with less influence from lobbyists.
Internationally, studies show politicians may try to alter the Phillips Curve in the
year-to-year short term since it has been found to be able to affect 5% of the vote. Albeit
with limited data, Alt and Rose (2007) say a political business cycle exists. A leader may
exploit the Phillips Curve trade-off to produce lower unemployment before elections,
despite higher inflation later. According to Persson and Tabellini (2002) parliamentary
systems are more likely to take economic-priming action, because one party is not
checked by the other, but one can see U.S political parties conspiring to put off decisions
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past elections. These actions are more likely in new democracies, which are less
transparent in terms of information available to the public (Alt and Rose 2007, 845-867).
Greed. The short-term institution most closely related to risk that affects
consumption is the institutional of greed, written about by economist Thorstein Veblen,
and Alan Greenspan decades later. Psychologically, though, humans may have the
“tendency to overweigh recent evidence” rather than the long-run (Bernstein 1998, 180).
This increases risk, and is largely cultural. The cutting-edge works of Robert Shiller
(2000) found that people take greater consumption risks when the choice is more vivid,
such as in a description from a friend. Daniel Kahneman in the 1970s, offered Prospect
Theory, that we like what we already have, and gamble more when the choice affects
ourselves, not others (Bernstein 1998, 273-300). Risk, then, is misperceived (Bernstein
1998, 300).
Yet still, the risk of greed can also be good: writes Bernstein, “When the Soviets
tried to administer uncertainty out of existence through … planning, they choked off
social and economic progress” (Bernstein 1998, 12). He ensues, “without risk, a society
might turn passive … .” (Bernstein 1998, 206). To this extent, “greed is good” because it
creates incentives and risk taking, pulling along resources, as if via Adam Smith’s
“invisible hand,” to their greatest uses. Some have called Japan’s current cohort as the
greedy, “me,” consumption generation (Ahern 1989, 30-64).
As another example, in the 2016 United States’ presidential election, Democratic
candidate Hillary Clinton criticized young people for sleeping in their parents’ basements
and working as coffee baristas, jobs that 50 years ago may have engendered respect. The
“American Dream,” or that of any nation, is changing- “millennials” want more jobs, the
65

ability to make an impact, more free time, and enjoyment. While one can measure gains
and losses, the basis of welfare economics founded by Knut Wicksell, we cannot measure
utility, or happiness, though some economies have higher indifference curves than others.
Labor Versus Leisure. Greed depends on, and is affected by, the blend of work
versus leisure balance, which is very personal. One expert, Serroukh, provides an overall
comparison between push and pull models in inventory. This model is applied to an
economy’s labor and education market. A pull system, as in most democracies, is where
money attracts workers, instead of the government or families pushing workers. Pulling
can be faster and more efficient, but labor will be not trained if it is not needed on
demand. One might envision the quixotic majors offered in higher education (Serroukh
2011, slides 16-20).
Serroukh provides another model in which a push strategy is used to create
“generic” products, like a generic student that has studied the basics, and then a pull
strategy is used to create a “customized” product, such as a specialized student.
Specialization harkens to Adam Smith’s division of labor. Applying the same line of
thinking, Serroukh’s models suggest pull strategies are greatest when there is demand
uncertainty, also called risk, such as in high tech economies, which would apply to
developed, Western countries today (Serroukh 2011, slides 16-20).
The problem is that many workers in Western and developing countries are not
selling the most specialized goods, in other words, not pushing high technology skills. .
Push strategies can help to minimize cost by less specialized labor, and therefore less
costly, labor (Serroukh 2011, slides 16-20). The freedom to choose one’s own profession
could result in less risk because workers seek out new, diversified industries, but this is
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changing in that many young people do not value money as greatly. In Article II of this
dissertation, pull strategies in newly democratic countries in Europe, with new economic
choices, failed to lead to new industries. The economic freedom to choose one’s
profession does not always result in greater labor mobility, due to the lack of greed,
irrationality, inexperience with pull models, and lack of information about labor markets.
Families as Institutions. Consumption and wealth long-term also depends on how
families pass down wealth for consumption; can it be diversified by leaving sums to
multiple children? Written analysis of primogeniture, leaving wealth to one child, dates
to the colonial era, but Evelyn Cecil Rockley (1897) provides in-depth information on
early English colonies, and the majority of America’s colonial states. Once separated
from the United Kingdom primogeniture was outlawed, particularly through efforts by
Thomas Jefferson (Rockley 1897, 74-77). Pal (1929) discusses various societies but
particularly notes that in India, once a British colony, primogeniture created “[a]ppalling
confusion.” Sisk (1985) critiques an essay by Noble Prize winning economist James
Buchanan (1983); he writes that primogeniture was a monopoly for one child, arguing
that Buchanan was wrong in his belief that governments should intervene, resulting in
endless court battles.
Keim (1968) writes that the winds of historical change began in the United States
with the Jamestown colony. Murdock and Provost (1973) examined how primogeniture
arose in societies of middle stages of development. Baker and Miceli (2002) write that
primogeniture was successful because children, particularly the eldest male, learned to
farm their father’s land. Largess to a single child was productive because it maintained
economies of scale- the larger one asset, the lesser the costs in maintaining it all. Finally,
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Glenn (2006) cites Ekelund, Hebert, and Tollison (2002) as showing non-primogeniture
societies were more open to innovation, competition, and investment, which typified
Protestant, northern European societies, greater risk takers than Europe’s Catholic south.
The fascinating, descriptive data below comes from books by Myers (1911),
(1939) and Flynn (1941), Cowles (1979), and Forbes and others’ articles: American
families were chosen since this is the most accessible information, and American families
have historically been the wealthiest. Families were chosen semi-randomly via available
data, and to compare different degrees of successful or unsuccessful families in different
industries. The family trees come mostly from Forbes magazine, other articles, websites,
and books- a full genealogical study could not be possible or “prudent” time-wise. With
the lineages below, some genealogies differ, listing still born births, while others do not.
Table 7 Wealthy Families.
Family

Background #Gens Size

Start

Rockefellers
(John D.)
Vanderbilts

German
Protestant
Dutch
Episcopal/
Moravian

4

Astors

Reformed/
Episcopal/
IT/Ger/UK

8

A handfull.
36/gen.

Strohs

Germany

5

A handfull.

$150
1850

Du Ponts

French
Huguenots

7

3,500
6 +/gen.

Woolworths

N/A

N/A

0 believed
heirs.

$26 m.
before
1900.
$566 m.
in 1925
$70 m.
near
WWII

6

174
13+/gen.
120
45+/Gen

$4000
1863
$100
1810
$100 m.
1877
$450 m.
1808

Long-term family wealth is not smooth, even if diversified.
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Charities
$1 billion
$ 1 m.
for
Vanderbilt
University
NY Public
Library
($400,000),
parks, and
trade schools
Minimal.

$200 m.

Minimal.

Wealth Today
$6.5 b.
1996
0, virtually. No
trust.

$100 b. in 1912.
$129 m.
in 1960.
No trust
Fund, but land.
$700 m.in 1988
$500 m. in 1991
1 building now.
$8.6 b. 1991
$14.3 b. 2016

$0

From this cursory chart, one can ascertain that the number of heirs today is
important, but diversifying would not be linked statistically to maintaining wealth.
Neither would the number of male children. The data indicates the reverse, that more
children leads to less wealth; this would seem to contradict Deaton’s argument from
Theory I that households smooth income better than individuals. Even choosing Catholic
families, which typically are larger, would not likely have proved different, and the bulk
of Catholic immigrants did not arrive at America’s shores until later. Instead, as it will be
shown, family business diversification, and forming trusts, are more important, but
families of the 21st century have fewer children, possibly affecting risk. According to
Myers, wealthy families like the Van Rensselaers, were broken up, and wealth spread to
all parts of early America. The American South, with slavery, took longer to change, due
to economies of scale. Writes Myers, “Great estates no longer passed unimpaired from
generation to generation…” (Myers 1911, 42). Instead, he writes in his second book,
“Now, no longer shielded, (people) had to face the same risks…” (Myers 1939, 20).
Writes Myers, wealth was determined by “luck,” and “The prospect of dazzling fortune
… instigated owners of capital to take the most perilous chances” (Myers 1911, 61).
Passing down of wealth by family, by the time of World War I, was still
considered an “imported institution” from Europe (Myers 1939, 237-239). By the time of
World War II, America’s greatest fortunes were in place, so when U.S. President
Franklin D. Roosevelt took office, numerous, historically overlooked, political parties
formed to curtail the “finicky rich” (Myers 1939, 107-220). Globally, some European
states, such as Belgium, eliminated primogeniture right away, while it took the United
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Kingdom until 1920, and Germany until the World War II Nazi regime (Myers 1939, 2224). Many of America’s wealthy had emigrated from Europe sooner (Savchuk 2015, 2).
If an individual has an investment, and another option comes along that matches
one’s risk-return expectations, they would still make that investment, and have two
investments; it is an individual choice. But, one’s total risk is still declining because they
are minimizing their downsides by diversification, spreading the risk out across diverse
children. If one child’s wealth goes down, another’s may go up. So, there really are two
types of family risk: each individual investment (systematic), and the risk of one’s total
portfolio, the family (unsystematic, or diversifiable). So, bequeathing money to multiple
children lowers unsystematic risk, but says nothing about the risks taken by each child.
Leaving money philanthropically is a non-risk choice, while the trust funds that emerged
in the mid-1800s were a risk lowering mechanism (Scott et al., 219-220).
One of the wealthy families on the chart, the Vanderbilts, who made their fortune
first in steamboats, and then in railroads, supposedly lost their wealth due to
“spectacular” consumerism, to achieve “social prominence” (Bonner 2016, 2). The
family neither educated their children on how to save finances, nor did they have a
trusted family advisor or trust (Gil 2015, 2-3), or else they gave to found such universities
as Vanderbilt (Martel 2014, 1). The Strohs made their money in beer in Detroit, but
bought too many other breweries, which were not a good match, and thus not diversified
(Gil 2015, 3-4). The Strohs were able to withstand Prohibition by diversifying to syrup
and ice cream (Dolan, 2014, 2). In the 1980s, a new CEO tried to grow the firm too
quickly, taking too many acquisition risks. He also borrowed heavily, $500 million,
when the family fortune was $100 million. Mr. Stroh borrowed another $300 million in
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1996, and actually diversified the company, to biotech and real estate (Dolan 2014, 5-7),
but it was too late, fields that were not the “family’s core competencies” (Dolan 2014, 8).
After selling the businesses, all funds were exhausted by 2008 (Dolan 2014, 9).
The Du Pont family made their wealth in early American munitions, such as gun
powder used for the American Revolution, War of 1812, and Civil War. The Astors were
not affiliated with any one business, but with fur and real estate (Maranzani 2013, 1-5).
The Rockefellers made their money in oil, Standard Trust, and quickly became, with the
Rothchilds, one of America’s great families. Much of their money went to museums and
universities. Cornelius Vanderbilt, the railroad tycoon, left all of his fortune to a single
son, unwisely, but John D. Rockefeller Jr. decided to bequest his money to all five sons,
treated as equals, hoping each would reach a deal and “work out their own modus
vivendi” (Marcus and Hall 1992, 281). After establishing these rules, which was prudent
to the theories addressed here, the brothers and the managers descended into infighting,
yet in 1939, they finally agreed to create the Rockefeller’s Brothers Fund (RBF). The
leader of the fund, an aide, helped it in “growing diversity” (Marcus and Hall 1992, 282).
As of 2017, some members, such as of the Rockefellers, complain that the family
firms, which were broken up to form new oil companies, is too preserved, and not risktaking to generate new growth. Therefore, they are now investing globally, and
diversifying into technology and mining (Hylton 1992, 1-3). The family keeps a $3
billion dollar fund, divided and managed by each member via their own “tolerance for
risk” (Hylton 1992, 3). It is debated why the Rockefellers, and Rothschilds, are not listed
on Forbes individual wealthy lists; the answer is that these families have “distributed,” or
diversified, their wealth over many members (Australian “Why the world’s” 2015, 2-4).
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In terms of strategies for staying wealthy, beyond diversified bequeathing,
families need to have a motto, goal, or mission statement. Curtis (2016) provides advice,
writing that each needs a good education plan for its youth (Curtis 2016, 50, 100, 255).
Many families inter- or intra-married, leading to health problems, and drugs were major
problem of consumption since the 1920s (Myers 2 1939, 20). Families must confront
inheritance taxes, shocks like the 1929 crash, and inflation (Hylton 1992, 4). According
to Bonner, the great families lost wealth by changing from “producers” to “consumers” of
it (Bonner 2016, 3). In 2018, many wealthy families’ children have attended top colleges
such as Yale’s and Dartmouth’s business schools, a new outlook (Hylton 1992, 4).
Of the 400 wealthiest people in the world listed by Forbes in 1982, only 13%
remain today. In separate lists for the U.K., France, Germany, Sweden, and other
countries, the same is true, as wealthy families have been replaced by innovative
individuals (Lynn 2005, 2). The problem with long-term wealth, consumption, and
investment, writes Lynn, is either the so-called “idiot child” syndrome, a child with no
experience at running firms or managing money, or the fact that “families don’t
diversify,” especially with their stocks, or oversees (Lynn 2005, 3). The Walton, Buffet,
and Gate families “will, in a generation or so, seem as archaic as the great … fortunes of
a century ago” (Lynn 2005, 3). Despite the fact that many inequality scholars have
studied if families merely take money away from each other, or from the poorer classes,
Lynn writes that money will “dissolve back into the wider community” (Lynn 2005, 4).
Policies for Consumption and Liquidity
What could remedy the inconsistent, finicky consumerism and global illiquidity
of today? Political leaders must make the traditional Phillips Curve choice, recognized as
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far back as Solow, but which is now more complex (Solow 1956, 93). While classical
economists like Adam Smith were laissez faire, and favored non-government interference
in the economy, Keynes, though only briefly in The General Theory (1936), urged for
risk-taking fiscal stimulus, such as the Depression era construction projects. President
Herbert Hoover, and even Franklin D. Roosevelt initially, were for balancing the budget
at all costs. Keynes argued this was foolish. Fiscal policy and even deficit spending, at a
multiplier rate of 2.5 at his time, were necessary, he said, because prices and wages could
be “sticky” and slow to adjust to the market. This section will address how taxes and
other laws can be used to remedy the volatility of the “Great Recession,” with a focus on
preventing future “great recessions” left for Article III of this dissertation.
American companies today have a record total of $2 trillion dollars in cash on
their balance sheets, which, if it were a country, would be the tenth largest in the world
(Foroohar 2016b, 32). Apple keeps nearly ¼ of its market capitalization (the value of its
equity, which is about $700 billion) entirely in cash, which allows it to quickly buy startups firms when synergy opportunities arise. However, this also lessens investment.
Global companies are outsourcing their money to do research and development (R&D) in
less expensive countries. General Electric, for example, conducts more than ¼ of its
healthcare research in India (The Economist “The rise of” 2016d, 6, 7). And, U.S. firms
are now spending $1 trillion dollars per year, or 95% of their earnings, on buying back
their own stock, known as “treasury stock,” which increases the stock price, rather than
invest it. For instance, Microsoft bought $20 billion of treasury stock in 2006 to repair a
stock market fall when they had announced a new R&D plan, which did not impress
investors (Foroohar 2016b, 31). Taiwanese-American economist Richard Koo has called
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the current global dilemma a “balance sheet recession.” Firms use profits to pay off
debts, and to offer high CEO salaries, rather than invest or pay minimum-wage workers
higher wages. But, some progressive companies such as Walmart, Starbucks, and Target
have been able to differ and offer higher wages to store employees (Foroohar 2016b, 32).
The best way to solve liquidity traps might be large investment tax credits, which
were implemented by U.S. President William J. Clinton in the 1990s. The tax credits
helped prevent a liquidity trap by stimulating investment, which went towards the use of
technology, and ushered in the New Economy. Therefore, it would seem that, just as
dividends have been taxed twice, on both the company and individual side, policy-makers
should consider a cash tax on a firm’s balance sheet during illiquid periods of falling
investment. Although it would mean taxing cash in the form of income as well on the
income statement, unless taxing the latter were temporarily reduced, a cash tax would
encourage firms to spend money, on: more risky investments, paying higher wages, or
paying off debt, since they would seek to use the cash rather than have it taxed. This
could go to creating greater, and more stable, growth. Economist James Tobin suggested
taxing Wall Street transactions. This would lead to investment outflows, which occurred
to Scandinavian countries in the 1990s. A cash tax would encourage investment, and, if
firms did not spend the cash, the state would still receive revenues for policy options.
This idea is original, never before perceived, and would could also help improve income
inequality by freeing cash from wealthy firms that could multiply down to lower classes.
Assume that a company has $100 dollars in cash. If the cash is taxed at 10%, then
the “cash tax” burden is $10 dollars. The company could instead spend that $10, and be
cash taxed $9 dollars ($90 cash x10% cash tax= 9), and save $1 in cash tax. Then, for the
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company to come out ahead under a cash tax, the $10 spent would have to earn a return
to make up for the $9 future’s return, and it does so by making investments at a risky
time, which are thereby encouraged by the policy. So, the company would spend the
money if the return of the cash flow and the tax saving is greater than the future expected
return. Therefore, to stimulate such spending, the government could set the cash tax rate
just less than the going rate of return, which could be at the 1 year Treasury Bond yield.
This would keep the program one that is short-term focused which is easier for planning.
Assume the return is around 1%. The benefit to the company would be the: (cash spent +
saving x 1 yr. bond rate), or ($10 x [1+g]) = $10.10 > $9 x future growth rate using a
10% cash tax rate and 1% growth rate. A 1% return, which, if a 35% corporate tax rate is
taken out, would be a gain of 0.6565, which is greater than the 0.6% tax here proposed.
The company comes out about better than if it had done nothing under the cash
tax regime, but, by investing the money in such bonds, or research/ development projects
earning a similar rate, society comes out ahead. There would more funds for earning
returns and for loaning money, as well as use by the state, rather than just sitting on a
balance sheet waiting to be spent. And, some interest are tax deductible. Tax credits for
investing are a more preferable policy, but would add to government deficits; the choice
between the two, if not using both, would depend on a government’s finances. This
would facilitate risk, stimulating an illiquid economy. And, if, in 2018, $2 trillion dollars
sit on America’s balance sheets, then the tax revenue, given a tiny 0.6% yearly tax, would
yield $13 billion dollars, large, considering the U.S. deficit is nearly $750 billion dollars.
In addition, tax credits for investment and hiring the long-term unemployed could
remove these vices from the developing economy. In the United Kingdom, Prime
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Minister Theresa May followed ideas in the United States dating to the 1960s, and
recently placed union representatives on corporate boards, but it was quickly rejected by
some as being “silly” (The Economist Group “Theresa” 2017g, 12). And, in the 2016
U.S. presidential election, candidate Hillary Clinton proposed tax credits for companies
that share earnings with employees. More similar, innovative ideas might be: dividends
paid to employees, not just stockholders; allowing employees, under law, to vote for the
board members who support the highest wages, while solving the complex legal issues
regarding takeovers and mergers; or, in the long-term, creating a “Legion of Honor” of
wealthy families or individuals who donate funds to the state, which could go for the
wage-depressed middle-class through Keynesian-style stimulus projects. This idea was
even proposed during the time of American President Franklin D. Roosevelt, but was
opposed by populist movements and third parties in the 1930s (Greenberg 2009, 1-2).
Furthermore, a new idea, proposed by Barry (2015), which has come to be known
as “pump theory,” suggests that when savings rate of the public are high, the government
could tax savings, and pump it into the economy through spending, yet cut taxes for
spending when saving is low. Typically, consumption and government stimulus increase
GDP the most, because they multiply, not savings. Disposable income would be taxed
before being saved, or savings tapped into themselves, so that the revenue could be used
for Keynesian projects, too risky for companies, to stimulate the economy. The
government acts like a tire pump, allowing pressure (savings) to accumulate, taxing
disposable income, and then pumping the air (savings) into the tire (the economy).
Interest rates would adjust to the level of saving, such that they will be low when savings
are high, due to outward supply, and high when savings are low, from inward supply.
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This policy would smooth saving versus spending, but would be highly political. The
negative effect would be on long-term savings, but states could allow savings to
accumulate until tax-rate (% spent) [sum (1+i)^y]/time value > tax-rate x sum, unless
individuals consume their savings given lower taxes. The policy is best used sparingly,
several pumps at a time. To smooth saving very long-term, nations should reconsider
high estate and capital-gain taxes, so families are less tax evasive, and capital is freed.
Discussion and Conclusions
Theories about finicky consumerism, particularly in 2018, over high-tech goods,
Keynesian illiquid investment, the Phillips Curve tradeoff, and volatility are all related,
contributing to the “Great Recession’s” topsy-turvy growth and employment. Some have
blamed weather, as the Federal Reserve did from 2013-2014, in the aftermath of the
2007-2009 collapse. In fact supply chains were effected, but there were other short-term
reasons, as the technology sales show in Results II. Long-term, weather can indeed affect
unemployment in certain retail industries, but these are affected by structural changes like
online sales. While housing starts and permits fell 3% (Bloesch and Gourio 2015, 17) in
2014, and statistically, housing sales have strong economic effects, as shown in this
article, this is not enough to blame weather nationally. Instead, the volatility of 20132014, amidst stagnation, was caused by finicky consumption over iterations of high-tech
goods, shown here via Apples’, IBM’s, and Samsung’s businesses- and a strong dollar.
Long-term, the risk to liquidity traps is low growth, it is indicated by the Phillips
Curve, and it stems from numerous structural changes to the developed economy, most
notably: the variable of women entering the workforce, which puts downward pressures
on wages, while finicky consumerism over high tech products, as well as low investment,
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have significantly impacted the volatility of the “Great Recession” and the stagnation in
its aftermath. The results were not conclusive in regards to productivity, which is shortterm, as inferred from Kawa (2017), and as investment affects the Phillips Curve slope
most, but, surprisingly, the housing market had the largest impact on volatility, most
likely for the 2008 crash itself. Chair Yellen herself said in June, 2017 that inflation and
unemployment are “hard to pin down, especially given the fact that the so-called Phillips
curve appears to be quite flat. That means that inflation doesn’t respond … to
movements in unemployment,” and, “research by economists … will help inform our
future decisions on this” (Fed.res. “Transcript of” 2017, 9-10, 14). The Phillips Curve is
thus a lens with which to view economic change, but its components affect volatility.
One can observed that the “Great Recession,” and its topsy-turvy, up-and-down
stagnation aftermath, had both demand and supply side impetuses, due to finicky
consumerism for the former, and investment on the latter. This is why it was so “great,”
and the aftermath so stagnated, so different from the 1970s; the risks still exist. These
have been the main factors causing Phillips Curve changes, high GDP and employment
volatility, with low inflation. In the very long-term, the way generations value leisure
over work, and do not respond to incentives, but spend fickly, affects consumption, as do
societal bequeathing habits. In the regressions and the game theory model, the effects of
consumer saving and business investment, while frequently similar numerically, have
different economic impacts, especially when they are not in concert with one another, to
the chagrin of Keynes’ foresight. In the high-tech economy, investment not matched by
consumers’ preferences results in inventories and losses, as shown via game theory.
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It would seem that conceptually (see Fig 7 again, App.), in times of low inflation,
firms make expectations in terms of short-term price/wage changes but also in terms of
employment. This differs from the contention since the 1970s that firms only “expect”
changes in wages, and only think long-term. This truism was shown today in the analysis
of the Federal Reserve, and hiring in the 2010s, but proving at what point, or “elasticity”
of the Phillips Curve relationship this occurs, will be left to the future. Statements by
central banks to keep inflation low, and increases in transparency, have enabled low
wages but expanded options to firms to spend on inventories, invest (riskily), at a time of
finicky consumerism, pay off debt, buy their own stocks, or expand workers, particularly
women and part-timers who earn less and are more flexible. And, it would seem that
shifts to the Phillips Curve happen during times of large, unexpected supply or demand
shocks, notably housing, creating greater volatility, while a flattening slope correlates
with 90% certainty to a lack of investment. The relationship is changing, and when it
does, it inserts new risk, and a need for new policies. A staggered, “pump” tax, to help
consumers balance risk through saving and spending, and a “cash tax,” to compel firms to
take riskier investments, might prove propitious to developing economies if used wisely.
Moreover, how emerging markets will soon react to consumerism, with rising
wealth, and the related micro-decisions about producing inventories or investing, as they
become more high-tech, such as India, Brazil, or China, will be left to future research.
Left behind, too, will be the emerging debate of how risk in developed countries is being
shifted to developing countries through larger states’ aggressive monetary policies to
combat illiquidity, and if there should be greater global cooperation. Future research
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should use more families to create refined certainty about long-term consumption, which
is also volatile, and with statistics, use lagged variables.
In total, in the short-run, the hypotheses are in part confirmed, that since the
1970s, certain structural changes, notably female employment, income inequality, finicky
consumption over high-tech goods, low investment, housing shocks, Federal Reserve
assurances, trade, and expectations of employment have led to varied outcomes, namely,
the risky liquidity trap of low inflation and high, but volatile, employment after the
“Great Recession,” the Phillips Curve tradeoff. New policies are needed to undue
consumption risks, and long-term, family business diversification matters. The high-tech,
risky, developed economy uses trade to obtain choices in goods, which will be shown in
Article II of this dissertation. This article has added to the literature by juxtaposing
concepts and variables in all facets of consumption in many new and unique ways.
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CHAPTER III - ARTICLE II: INTERNATIONAL TRADE – DAVID VERSUS
DIVERSIFICATION: EXAMINING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN RICARDIAN
ECONOMICS AND FINANCIAL PRINCIPLES, IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
Abstract
This article assesses the extent, if any, to which trade leads to specialization or
diversification, and if so, when the transition between the two occur in terms of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP)/capita and trade? Specifically, why do some states’ economies,
such as that the United States, when increasing trade of goods, still have a vast
diversification of firms sectors? What factors other than trade lead to diversifying, rather
than specializing? And, were these factors in the rise of international trade at the time of
the 19th Century Corn Laws? Contrary to orthodox, “Ricardian” trade theory, this article
explains that trade is risky, and causes firms to expand into diverse sectors, to protect
against the risk of famines, shocks, and cyclicality in their own and in trading partner
nations. Countries also trade similar goods, which is intra-industry trade, that reduces
risk, which is over-looked by many authors. Furthermore, the author hypothesizes that
larger economic nations should be better able to take greater risks, but may turn immobile
institutionally while international institutions have helped to mollify international crises.
This article uses historical documents, a simple game theory model, an analysis of postWWII crises with descriptive statistics on stabilization, qualitative cases of modern trade
cases not chosen to be regressed, and a statistical regression of randomly chosen
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries to explain
diversification deductively. A discussion ensues as to policies and literature as of 2018.
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Introduction and Theory
The purpose of this article is to explain how and why David Ricardo’s theory of
competitive advantage, more properly known as comparative advantage, conflicts with
principles of financial risk and diversification, and the many ways in which countries can
adapt to risk in trade. Ricardo (1817) showed that countries should specialize in those
products for which they are best at, due to their abundance of resources affecting
productivity as compared with the opportunity cost of making other goods. Ricardo’s
idea contrasted with Adam Smith’s previous theory of absolute advantage, which failed
to consider opportunity costs. Swedish economists Heckscher and Ohlin (1919) and
Ohlin (1933) built on Ricado’s work, showing countries can tell where their factors are
strongest, and produce accordingly. Later, Stolper and Samuelson (1941) showed that
trade causes uneven benefits. More recent works on trade include those on intra-industry
trade by Grubel and Lloyd (1975), and Krugman (1981) and Helpman (1981), who
examined distances and economies of scale. This article also addresses trade within
multi-industries, called “intra-industry,” “vertical trade” or “intermediate goods,” to
evaluate Ricardo’s theories while addressing other issues between trade and risk.
Background
David Ricardo’s theories were in large part a response to the Napoleonic Wars that
shook Europe in the early 1800s, that pitted England versus France, which, even from
earlier times, saw large tariffs across the English Channel, known as the “Corn Laws.”
Whereas previously, in the Middle Ages, countries competed solely against each other in
a zero-sum game, described by the economist and philosopher David Humes, Ricardo
showed that countries could develop comparative advantages in goods using land, labor,
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or capital to make the products, and then trade, therefore benefitting the world economy
more than if countries solely focused on their absolute advantages.
According to recent analysis by Wacziarg (2007), the danger of excessive
concentration is that it can lead to sector specific supply and price shocks. This can
affect national income, and lead to instability politically. Instead, diversification, the
opposite policy, can be an insurance policy against public sector shocks. Diversification
can also satisfy different consumer taste and preference changes. Still, concentration
supports comparative advantages in trade, and it benefits from productivity.
Wacziarg depicts a U-shaped curve using a Gini coefficient, which measures
inequality as a proxy for diversification versus specialization. At first, technological
convergence takes hold, creating a wide range of goods. But then, trade openness leads
to specializing, in accordance with Ricardo’s theories. When a nation acquires access to
world markets, sectoral diversification is no longer as needed. An alternative explanation
is that countries experiment to determine where comparative advantage exists, causing
the birth of multiple sectors early on in development, which can also be used as a buffer
against risk (Wacziarg 2007, 1-16). This article uses a market based approach, includes a
causal connection through a game theory model, verifies the data with an empirical
qualitative section, analyses institutions long-term, and regresses numerous variables.
Research Question
Do firms specialize or do they diversify to enhance or reduce trade risks,
respectively? Diversification is little researched, but Ricardo should have been better
aware of it, as the son of a wealthy bond trader, and who dabbled in finance himself.
Unclear in this is if, by specializing only in comparatively advantaged goods, as Ricardo
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argued, countries expose themselves to greater risks. For instance, the risks would be due
to short or long term changes in supply and demand, changes to terms of trade, or shocks
to the economy. Countries might be wiser to spread production across industries or
products, a concept called diversification. Since the studies cited using non-parametric
statistics are beyond this article, this author regresses number of “enterprises” (y variable)
by variables affecting diversification. Some author’s axes are labeled as showing curving
“humps.” Studies include level of technology (Imbs and Wacziarg 2000), as indicated by
GDP, openness to trade (Saint-Paul 1992), types of industry, types of trade, economic
freedom, which also measures institutions, and many others that will be touched on, but
not amount of “experimentation,” by sector, as in Hausmann and Rodrik (2003), which
would be harder to test for, and data is not available. The goal is to find the link between
number of enterprises (diversification) (y) and these other causal mechanisms (x), which
can affect developmental policy, to diversify or specialize. These decisions, in concert
with stabilizing international organizations, can reduce volatility, which affects growth.
Therefore, while classical economics suggests that countries specialize in only a
few industries or goods, and then trade for other products in which they do not have a
cost advantage, this article attempts to explain why some states, such as the United
States, have still focused on high tech goods, yet nevertheless have also included a vast
diversification of sectors and businesses. Once open to trade, do countries specialize, as
David Ricardo predicted, or diversify to lessen risks, and is this decision intuitive or
incidence based? Why, also, did the majority of global trade arise in Europe after (rather
than before) the Napoleonic Wars and potato blights, and what other historical factors
have impacted risk, positively or negatively, in foreign trade?
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Hypotheses
The initial hypothesis is that contrary to orthodox trade theory, countries, when
open to trade (x variable), diversify into more sectors, industries, and firms, (y variable),
so as to protect against the risk (x) of famines, drought, wars, shocks, and cyclicality,
with diversified trade (y) beginning in the mid-19th Century from the potato blight and
Napoleonic Wars (x), when international trade expansion “took off”(y). Larger economic
nations (x) are hypothesized to either be able to take greater risks in specialization (y),
through competitive intuition (shown in game theory), but they may conversely become
set in their ways, so there may be a curvilinear relationship. The regressions seek to
show that certain variables (x) cause diversification and greater enterprises (y), over from
1996-2007. Trade here is seen as mid-term since, most World Trade Organization
(WTO) rounds last 10-15 years. The OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development) defines “enterprises” in a very narrow way, simply put as: “a legal
entity possessing the right to do business on its own,” the reason for using recent data.
The article’s structure is a review of early empirical trade, to classical trade theory, to
modern theory, then to the methods and results, including institutions, to discussing and
analyzing the future of different types of trade, concluding with policy recommendations.
Literature Review: Early History
Historically, writes Bernstein (2008), human beings have been trading nearly
since their origins, building their first boats around 15,000 years ago used for trading for
obsidian flakes near the Balkans. This earliest trade was not “Ricardian,” but an attempt
to acquire different types of products. Humans may have also used water routes to reach
the Middle East, and then began ax and copper weapons trading, for the grains of the
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Fertile Crescent. Of help were the monsoon winds and camel use for shipping by sea and
land, respectively (Bernstein 2008 22-58). Diamond (2005) observes that historical
civilizations relying on trade of essential goods have often met catastrophic fates. Trade
is important, but so is domestic production. Some scholars have written about micro
techniques used by early traders to avoid riskiness in simple transactions, such as by
using a relative to accompany goods and make sure the compensation returned safely
(North 1990, 120). North even cites ancient historian Herodotus that early trade predated
language, as traders used hand signals from an arm’s length distance (North 1990, 122).
Several centuries later, Rome may fallen because of the risky trading outflow of
much of its metal currency, just as American President Richard M. Nixon removed gold
as a reserve currency in the 1970s, a decision still controversial today. In the early
Middle Ages, trade may have spread the lice that caused the black plague. This earliest
trade may have caused, or conversely reduced, health risks. Then, new explorations
started by likes of Marco Polo initiated globalization, a period of increased contact, and
opened up the Asian spice, silk, and dye trade. In the age of empires, countries traded to
acquire gold and silver, so-called mercantilism. Countries typically sent smaller ships for
exploration and conquest because it was less risky- the sinking of a smaller ship would
result in the loss of less bounty, spread amongst the ships. Ayers (1962) also writes that
steam engines were developed with the intent of reducing the risks of rickety oar ships.
This Middle Ages led to the writings by gold hoarding mercantilists. This era was
followed by the Classical writings of Adam Smith. He believed in an absolute advantage
to trade that could benefit one country at a time. Ironically, Smith once wrote, in his
whimsical style, “… drought [in ‘rice countries’] is, perhaps, scarce ever so universal as
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necessarily to occasion a famine, if the government would allow a free trade” (Burgess
and Donaldson 2010, 449). Only later, after the European Enlightenment, and the
revolutions, came the theories of Ricardo. Countries realized they could specialize and
produce goods as a comparative advantage, thus lowering costs, and benefiting society as
a whole (Bernstein 2008, 22-58). Is it similarly just a coincidence that later, after World
War II, the first joint European agreement was in regards to coal, a product which is very
risky to mine and volatile in regards to when underground discoveries are made?
Very Early/Classical Theory
Ricardo’s (1817) works led to graphs that were expanded upon by his successors,
such as Heckscher and Ohlin (1919), Ohlin (1933), and Stolper and Samuelson (1941)
(Fig. A14). The resulting production possibilities curve, also called the production
frontier, shows how much of each good every country can produce, and it either can be a
straight diagonal line connecting the two maximum amounts of each good, or curved
downward, since some factors of production are sacrificed is use in switching from the
production of one good to another. The second significant curve, the indifference curve,
indicates the quantity of each good people can consume to stay at the same point of
utility, or happiness. The slope curves upward because to give up one good, consumers
demand more of another, in what is also called diminishing marginal utility. The higher
the indifference curves, or farther point away from the origin, the greater the overall
happiness. An equilibrium is reached when the production possibilities curve and
indifference curve intersect. Ricardo showed that specialization and trade causes higher
indifference curve, and a larger amount of goods produced, for greater happiness.
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A number of influential studies have questioned Ricardo’s arguments. One study,
by Wassily Leontief (1953), concluded that the United States was exporting laborintensive products. The United States should have been producing capital intensive
products, because these are intense in machinery, when in fact at that time it was
producing labor-intensive products when it did not have low-paid workers. Subsequent
studies criticized Leontief for using data from the time of World War II, since war can
alter statistics by changing the dynamics of an economy. Additionally, Leontief used
only a simple, two factor model of labor and capital, and did not include “human capital,”
that of higher skills and education, needed to manufacture higher tech goods.
Linder (1961) followed by attempting to explain Leontief’s study by looking at
the fact that rich, developed countries tend to trade more among themselves. This fact is
even true today, as some three-quarters of trade is amongst larger states, but such states
never fully reach their total demand because of distance. Distance also reduces the
knowledge of foreign markets and demand preferences. Economies of scale (lower costs)
make producing goods in a single country more convenient. In short, as Linder (1961)
shows, similar countries trade with each other because they have similar consumers.
Still, many, such as Costanza et al. (1995), question the assumptions on which
“Ricardian economics” is based. Ricardo assumes that trade creates no externalities such
as pollution, that there are stable rather than constantly changing prices, that conditions
such as production are constant, that there is no buying-power coercion between wealthy
and poor states, and that there is free movement of capital, labor, and other factors. If
these assumptions change, the entire paradigm does as well. Economist Joseph Stiglitz
(2006) has been skeptical of the benefits of globalization, the vast amount of trade
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possible due to progress in transportation and technology. Many economists like Jeffrey
Sachs have supported “neoliberalism,” that of trading abundantly, but few address risk.
Most economists today, and even including political-economists such as Grieco
and Ikenberry (2003), like the idea of free trade, since trade barriers can be a cost to
consumers, resulting in deadweight loss. Tariffs as a whole have fallen substantially over
the last decades. Barriers can be risky, by preventing trade if there are natural or cyclical
disasters, but can also protect against risk, enabling stable domestic production which is
sometimes called import substitution industrialization. Traditional barriers such as tariffs
can be a fixed amount per good, or ad valorem, a percent of the goods’ value. They also
include quotas, with limits on goods, regulations, and “hidden barriers.” Some opponents
of globalization argue that developed countries take advantage of “cheap” labor, while
others hold the “infant industry” argument that tariffs can protect nascent firms. Still
others point to trade leading to income inequality, due to “winners” and “losers.” But,
globalization, the lessening of time and distance, has reduced many barriers; most
economists support greater and freer trade (Grieco and Ikenberry 2003, 43-47).
World trade has increased from 4% of world Gross Domestic Product in the
1950s to over 60% as of 2014, but it fell several percent in the 2008 financial crisis from
lack of funding (The Economist Group “A Troubling” 2014, 1). Laidi (2008) shows that
from 1980 to 2005, world trade quadrupled; GDP, which uses exports, only doubled.
Trade can be risky, from: dealing with diverse cultures, hidden barriers that link domestic
firms, and transportation risks. Trade can also create global crises if one country’s
production declines, or from currency risks, especially if central banks run out of funds to
maintain supply and demand of money, once settled by the movement of gold. But,
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currencies are safer as of the last two decades with “managed floats,” where governments
only intervene in currencies in extreme cases. Freer trade has resulted in lower prices, a
greater variety of products sold, better quality of products, greater competition resulting
in all of these areas, and greater innovation, despite its drawbacks like income inequality.
Modern Theory
In more modern theories, Sawyer and Sprinkle (2009) summarize the ideas behind
trade in the same industries, called intra-industry trade (ITT). A simple example would
be wheat versus corn. Intra-industry trade may reduce risks, but this is not a common
explanation for why it occurs, and is a theory offered by the author. Balassa (1963) had
initiated the literature on intra-industry trade through studies of European integration.
Some industries such as machine and farm tools have very high Indexes of ITT, 0.996
and 0.878 respectively, because many kinds of tools are needed to work on global
products, in which a unity of 1.000 for the index would indicate equal exporting and
importing. The index was developed by Grubel and Lloyd (1975).
Other theoretical reasons for “ITT” trade are brand names, that consumers prefer
fancier products from another country, such as “Perrier” water for example, or “faddish”
or contemporary products. Fads are designed in one country and then make their way,
through product standardization, across other countries through a product life-cycle that
starts with large countries and moves to smaller ones (Grubel and Lloyd 1975, 10).
Further theories suggest that large companies in countries market to very specific tastes
and preferences, which can result in the domestic production of lesser varieties, while
consumers take advantage of trade with countries producing different varieties (Grubel
and Lloyd 1975, 98-100). Grubel and Lloyd also put forth theories on contracts and legal
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agreements between companies (Grubel and Lloyd, 1975, 69), goods with similar inputs
(Grubel and Lloyd 1975 86), developing countries trading raw materials and staples
(Grubel and Lloyd 1975, 45), and re-export of stored goods (Grubel and Lloyd 1975, 81).
Krugman (1981) added to the intra-industry trade theories, writing about how this
trade will increase in the future, due to reduced transportation costs and economies of
scale of multinational firms. Firms can reach lower production costs in manufacturing
from their size (Grieco and Ikenberry 2003, 1-54). This refiguring can create oligopolies,
which have market power to further differentiate goods (Grubel and Lloyd 1975, 10).
In terms of other theories, companies located within close miles, such in Silicon
Valley, may also reach economies of scale, lower overall costs, and reduce transportation
costs (Kreinin 2010, 58). Fukuyama (1999) and Kreinin (2010) show this concentration
of industries may be based on historical habits and the need for networking, respectively.
Sometimes, countries try to protect against imports of the same products, especially in
agriculture in the developing world (Kreinin 2010, 61, 63). Hausmann and Klinger
(2007) have attempted to explain this “product space,” or product differentiation, in that
goods change over time due to slight changes in factor endowments, mostly in wealthy
countries. A few articles do discuss the diversification within risky global supply chains,
but intermediate parts are not traditionally considered part of GDP. Some analysts, too
many to list, study the comparative advantages of insurance industries or buffer stocks,
but these would not satisfy demand for consumer goods in crises (Figs. A15, A16).
Other recent authors addressing similar risk topics include: North and Thomas
(1973), who, while not using the term “risk,” address labor diversification, during laborchanging pandemics like the mediaeval plague. And, a well-diversified society allows
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for free movement between employment sectors, as suggested by Rodrik (1998), who
writes about uncertainty/risk and employment security. Hummels et al. (1998) discuss
supply-chain diversification of intermediate products. Intermediate parts need to be
standardized because they are the basis for fixing most mechanical problems. Imbs and
Wacziarg (2000) write on labor diversification, and highlight that excessive industry
concentration can lead to supply and price shocks and political instability in developing
countries. Booz and Company (2008), a global consulting firm, found that “economic
diversification can also reduce a nations’ economic volatility and increase its real activity
performance,” which is discussed later on, and Wiig and Kolstad (2012), show that
economic diversification can affect political stability in underdeveloped states.
In the future, Williamson (2002) shows that diversification is needed to protect
against droughts, blights, and other “acts of God,” and factories and other capital that can
be destroyed. Earlier, Bigman and Reutlinger (1979) had noted that this can be buffered
by reserve stocks of commodities, although this can increase prices (Figs. A15, A16).
Lin (2011) writes that outbreaks of pathogens or precipitation changes can be “buffered”
by crop diversification, but state subsidies usually apply to a certain crop. Still, changes
of crops biologically, or greater mass production through chemicals or more machination,
may help. According to Elsgaard et al. (2012), climate change is expected to increase
droughts and heatwaves across Europe; diversification and trade seems the best deterrent
options. Two recent climate studies, one by Burke et al. (2015), shows that global
warming could reduce per-capita GDP by 23% by 2100, while the other, by Citigroup led
by Channell et al. (2015), shows, crops grow better, and workers are more productive, at
cool temperatures (Burke et al. 2015, 2).
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Most importantly, as of 2017, the recent literature on trade and diversification,
building on Ricardo and the others, stems from Imbs and Wacziarg (2000), and focuses
on trade diversification in the last several decades; consequently, this period is used in the
regression. Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and Yosha (2003) and Koren and Tenreyro (2004)
both find an increase in specialization once the country becomes large enough to bear the
risks. Cadot et al., in a revised 2011 article, and Klinger and Lederman (2004, 2006),
each discover a U shaped curve of first diversification, then specialization, with
inequality, but this article will look for U curves in enterprises. De Benedictis, Gallegati
and Tamberi (2007) find no existence of U shaped curves, but perpetual diversification,
completely undoing Ricardo. Of all of these studies, a myriad of differing variables are
used to measure risk, concentration, and diversification versus specialization: for
instance, many use the differentiation of products and new products. Such works,
including one from the United Nations (U.N.) (2012), use manufacturing goods, and still
find strong diversification. One might note, though, that larger countries might be more
inclined to diversify and trade since they can take advantage of terms of trade effects, and
import inexpensively. High income countries, too, have the capital to better adapt to
globalization, which is part of the study here. These previous studies, however, are weak
in their explanations of causality (U.N. “Diversification vs. specialization” 2012, 1-71).
Contribution
This article will add to existing literature by answering the question of what
factors, historically and statistically, cause countries to diversify or specialize in their
international trade, thus affecting how risky their international trade is, and at what point
countries switch tendencies. Unlike other works, the article uses mixed methods,
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including statistics, which do not use products as a measure of diversification, but rather
the number of shocks which convinced states to diversify their economies. It analyzes
several crises involving trade, and the supply chain and international risk-recovery
system in place.
The fifth methodology applies several Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) regressions
to test the relationship between trade and risk, risk and enterprises, and the effect of
numerous variables upon risk and the number of enterprises, such that trade risk should
be lessened by diversifying into more enterprises and greater industries. Regression is
“used to estimate the slope and intercept parameters in the population” (Wooldridge
2009, 59). In the end, this article is somewhat deductive, using statistics to identify what
factors, such as risk, contribute to diversification, and also when diversification actually
is undertaken, thereby using “mixed methods,” or triangulation, to capture both the causal
reasons for diversification and the points at which it occurs. The work offers a more indepth view of trade in all of its forms, and its associated risks, than prior research.
Results
Methodology I: The Turning-Point in History
Probing how trade leads to diversification, there is no better place or time to
examine trade than from its ascent, when the Industrial Revolution, European peace, and
natural disasters all collided in the early 1800s, following 200 years of protectionism.
The repeal of Europe’s Corn Laws was complex, involving ideas from economists,
political leaders, and forces from social groups and institutions. Ireland was loosely
connected with the British system of government. This mid-19th Century food crisis in
Europe led to political changes, which helped spark Karl Marx’s work on the working
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class versus elite differences central to his economic theories, known as Marxism. Writes
Vanhaute et al. (2006), it “gradually … affected the whole world.” (Vanhaute et al. 2006,
1). Other analysts, such as Chang (2013), point to the 1860s as the key time period for
free trade, although the reasons why are not clear, perhaps due to the advent of railroads
(Chang 2013, 23-42). Also, they may be referring to the famines in colonial India in the
mid-19th Century, noted by Burgess and Donaldson (2010), and of which Ravallion
(1987) asserts, “[free] trade did have a stabilizing influence” (Ravallion 1987, Abstract).
While the Industrial Revolution was the spark of trade, diversification was the theory.
According to statistics by Vanhaute et al. (2006), Europe at this time saw the start
of trade. Governments based their policies on their need to help rural areas, how bad the
blights were, and the ideological orientation of the country (Bloy 2002, 1). The United
Kingdom opened trade to reform rural society and nourish its people; Denmark demurred
because of help from private charities; Holland had help from old institutions and elites;
Spain tried to stimulate exports; and Belgium was historically averse to trade. France
would reduce tariffs to lessen transportation costs with Russia (Vanhaute et al. 2006, 1).
British Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel (in office 1834-35 and 1841-46) was an
unusual member of the conservative Tory party, favoring free trade through-out his
political career, despite collegial opposition. Most of Parliament was in favor of high
barriers to protect domestic farming. Ireland, which was its own quasi-state at the time,
was the state most affected by the blights which permeated all of northern Europe, which
was seen by Parliament as a temporary problem that could be assuaged by purchasing
cheap, “Indian corn” from America to ship it to Ireland humanely (Kinealy 1998, 56).
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To take a step back, the “Corn Laws” actually referred to all agricultural and grain
tariffs, most namely, that on bread. They supposedly dated in some form to around 1360,
according to one clergy member (Storrs 1816, App. 1). The end of the Napoleonic Wars,
lasting the mid-1700s to the mid-1800s, removed the physical naval blockages between
England and France, and there was hope for an improved economy. But, bad crops and
poor weather struck Europe, causing periods of stagnation, as did the ending of the “war
economy,” in England, France and Germany (Buer 1921, 163). Scholars have argued
that tariffs can cause trade fluctuations, and thus growth volatility. But, the fluctuations
of the 1820s and 1830s were manufacturing oriented (Buer 1921, 159-179), since
agriculture was only a small part of total trade (Schonhardt-Bailey 2006, 173). New
supply chains were emerging, but some writers at the time questioned the “bounty” that
was paid to the sailing industry to ship grains rather than have it imported (Birt 1753, 5).
Some of the merchants during that time wrote optimistically about how removing
tariffs would lead to reciprocity and new markets in Spain, Latin America, Poland,
Denmark, Hambourg, Africa, and Sicily, and the colonies in South Africa and India,
which could provide stable corn trade in the future (Westlake 1833, 12-13, Birt, 1753, 45, Atkinson 1840, 318). Several writers blamed the French Revolution on high bread
prices, and one, pre-Revolutionary War, even warned of protected trade lessening sea
power such that “America, as a national confequence (sic), may not long endure
subjection to us” (Birt, 1753, 5). Many European nations experienced the same weather
at the same time, but this was not always true, as rainfall in parts of Great Britain varied.
The ideas at the time for the passage and repeal came not only from David
Ricardo, but also from T.R. Malthus, in his primary source book, Observations on the
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Effects of the Corn Laws (1814). Malthus was more familiar with the great economist
Adam Smith than Ricardo, and pointed out, even before Ricardo, that the benefit of free
trade was to meet different demand and supply quantities across various places in Europe,
especially France (Malthus 1814, 16-17). He looked not towards Ireland, but longerterm, writing that importation could “support a part of our present population, … in …
the next twenty to twenty-five years” (Malthus 1814, 19). Without this, “an unfavorable
season, … an evil of the of the slightest consequence, .. is not more likely to happen, if
our average imports were two million quarters, ….” (Malthus 1814, 21).
Instead, “free trade in corn would … secure a cheaper, but a more steady, supply
of grain” (Malthus 1814, 22). Malthus warned that “if (a country) become dependent for
the support … upon corn, (it) exposes itself to the risk of having its most essential
supplies suddenly fail at the time of its greatest need.” He continues, “It would be as
much again … those nations which raised the superabundant supply as against the one
which wanted it…” (Malthus 1814, 23). He warns that one shock to trade could be “a
widely extended war,” noting that during the Napoleonic Wars, wages were “subject to
great fluctuations” (Malthus 1814, 24). He ends up in support of tariffs, mostly for their
government revenue, but not during “extreme cases” such as shocks (Malthus 1814, 34).
Not only was Malthus the only economist writing on the subject at the time, but
so was David Ricardo, the two engaging in a lively debate through letters conveniently
referred to as Grounds and Essays, respectively, which were submitted to members of
Parliament. Many of their writings refer back to the free trade principles exposed by
classical economics founder Adam Smith (Young 1800, 6). In these letters, Malthus
actually vacillated and had doubts about repeal, particularly because of national security
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interests, fearing that foreign dependency on corn could be jeopardized by a war.
Ricardo in part agreed, saying that “Bonaparte” was wise to limit corn trade with its rival
Russia, but overall thought that free trade would lessen risk, what he called “dangers,”
and open new foreign markets, thus making greater use of available land, a theme in his
writings (Salvadori and Signorino 2015, 164-165). Like Malthus, he foreshadowed game
theory, a basic model which later authors show (Salvadori and Signorino 2015, 168). It is
very interesting that the debate over the Corn Laws are believed to have actually inspired
Ricardo on his creation of the comparative advantage theory, with an exact time frame in
1816, at the start of the debate, nailed down (Salvadori and Signorino 2015, 175).
Grey writes, however, that the writings of Malthus and Ricardo were not forefront
in the argument, except among the landlord class (Grey 1999, 14), and instead, the
government relied on a “younger generation of economists,” who were more optimistic
about Ireland sustaining itself (Grey 1999, 8-9). These were “Christian economists” from
Protestant British schools, who believed in removing “restrictions on economic life so as
to reveal the operation of the natural moral law … .” (Grey 1999, 14-15). Even so, Grey
writes, “It is difficult to identify [even] the direct effect of Christian economics,” such
they were often overshadowed by the “Benthamites,” followers of Jeremy Bentham and
John Stuart Mill who believed in utilitarianism and helping society (Grey 1999, 15).
An extreme case that Ricardo and Malthus foresaw took place with Ireland. The
Napoleonic Wars had heightened the need for Irish grain goods in England and it was an
attractable market for the Irish suppliers. Near the end of the wars, the 1815 version of
the Corn Laws were passed, which protected Irish corn in their home market, while the
invention of steam at Industrial Revolution’s onset provided easier export. By 1830,
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Ireland was feeding its people on cheap potatoes, not a native crop, and sending Britain
80% of its corn (Kinealy 1998, 53). The Navigation Acts, which stymied free movement
of goods, were also a barrier to trade (Kinealy, 1998, 58). The British policy was aimed
at the hope that “Indian corn” would be easier to digest and become a staple in the Irish
diet (Kinealy 1998, 56). Christian economists frowned on Ireland and its practice of
primogeniture, but generally supported aid (Grey 1999, 16).
Diversification was an argument for free trade. From the mid-1820s to the mid1840s, the United Kingdom was undergoing a process of “export-sector diversification
into a broader range of export trades… spread more evenly throughout the country”
(Schonhardt-Bailey 2006, 63). Those who were unable to diversify out of agriculture
supported protectionism of crops (Schonhardt-Bailey 2006, 110). Parliament members
from areas that were more diversified away from agriculture, and invested in industry,
favored free trade, showing the importance of the early Industrial Revolution.
Industrialists wanted open markets for their goods, farmers wanted protection, given that
foreign markets like Ireland were not yet formed, while the overall public wanted free
trade for lower prices. Schonhardt-Bailey agrees that famine “did not appear to drive”
the repeal impetus (Schonhardt-Bailey 2006, 126, 276). But instead, political leaders
involved in diverse industries used restructuring of Ireland in order to please everyone.
Prime Minister Peel’s policies were therefore based on “pragmatism,” which “allowed
the resultant political discourse to be expressed in humanitarian rather than pragmatic
terms” (Kinealy 1998, 50). Thus, England’s trade policies “had more to do with …
agriculture and social restructuring, than with … food shortages” (Kinealy 1998, 50).
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According to Kinealy, “It was widely accepted that ending the dependence on [the
potato] would be or moral and social benefit to Ireland and thus England” (Kinealy 1998,
52). In this respect, the potato was a Giffen good, a staple, in terms of Irish demand.
Overall, “Ireland was exporting enough corn to England to feed 2 million people, leading
Ireland to be the ‘bread basket’ or ‘granary’ of the United Kingdom. The impact of the
loss of supply [to England] was an important consideration … on the removal of
protective legislation” (Kinealy 1998, 53). Thus, though divisive, Mr. Peel used the
blights for two goals: “a free-trade programme (sic) within the United Kingdom, and the
modernization of Irish agriculture” (Kinealy 1998, 55). He “felt that a restructuring of
Irish society was necessary- from potato growers to large landlords” (Kinealy 1998, 56).
Of all of the historical documents debating the issue, the overwhelmingly majority
supported repeal, and free trade. This consisted of, too, the farmers, some who were
looking out for the “overall good,” known in economics as “utility,” that was theorized
around the same time by British economist John Stuart Mill. Even the middle-men,
middle class merchants favored repeal, some writing that farmers should be allowed to
take their own “risks” irrelevant of government (Westlake 1833, 8). Others favored
“competition” (Lawn 1801, 5), and some, the good of the overall “community” (Storrs,
1816, 20), “the common good,” the “happinefs (sic) of the whole country” (Debrett 1800,
7), and the “happinefs (sic) of the pooreft (sic) claffes (sic) (of the community)” (Debrett
1800, 12). Still, others blamed price fluctuations on “commercial (speculators)” (Young
1800, 38; Lawn 1801, pp. vi), as do many in 2018 over oil speculation. One writer
praised the storage granaries of Holland as a good policy (Rayment 1790, 35).

100

After the Corn Law tariffs were repealed, in stages, France, in 1859 (Owen 2005
2), did indeed reciprocate, as did many other nations in Europe who were experiencing a
manufacturing class than needed sustenance (Schonhardt-Bailey 2006, 176). Indeed, one
writer at the times pronounced, “Brother farmers! Be no longer deceived,” since lowering
prices of corn would also lower overall prices and create nationwide prosperity (Vacher
and Sons 1842, 12). The behavior of MPs (members of the British Parliament) is not to
mention the fact that tariffs generated little government revenue, and budgets were being
prepared more frequently at that point (Schonhardt-Bailey 2006, 173). Some argue that
MPs support repeal based on the fact that a fair number of them had diversified from
farming to own shares of manufacturing businesses, namely, parts for the new railroads,
and tended to their own pecuniary interests, just as America’s Founding Fathers
considered their own pecuniary interests during the Revolution only several decades
earlier, scholars note (Schonhardt-Bailey 1991). Veritably, the flow of money between
economic sectors had long been written about by Richard Cantillon (Pressman 2014, 15).
In the aftermath, the repeal resulted in a restructuring of the Irish economy, a
move away from grain to livestock, with potato acreage falling, and the poultry trade
increasing. Many workers also moved into manufacturing (Kinealy 1998, 59).
According to Sir Charles Trevelyan, Permanent Secretary at the Treasure and in-charge
of relief efforts, the intention was to bring about “the change from an idle, barbarous,
isolated potato cultivation, to corn cultivation, which enforces industry, and together
employer and employed in [mutual] beneficial relations” (Kinealy 1998, 61). Long-term,
the United Kingdom gained, chiefly Ireland, supply chains cemented, and Europe, despite
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a few surplus harvests in the 1880s that renewed debate, was set on a path of satisfaction
and free trade until a pause in World War I, but resuming afterwards (Owen 2005, 3).
Figure 10. Country Size and Production.
*The small country exports its surpluses which lessen the risks of the large, specialized country. This assumes the small
country has the comparative advantages. If it did not, and the large country did, then the square which reads, “does not conform”
would be the ideal equilibrium. If the countries were equal size, then a 3-dimentional framework would show that they each would
trade a medium amount. The “large” and “small” amounts are in proportion to a country’s size, which affects buying power, but this
is not essential in dealing with comparative advantage, although Krugman (1981) points out that large international firms can reduce
costs and reach “economies of scale.”

Institutions. Following free trade, in the period between World War I and World
War II, much of disaster aid was provided philanthropically. The United Kingdom and
the United States switched on and off the “gold standard,” increasing currency risks. But,
the development of the international risk-abating system at Bretton Woods, led by John
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Maynard Keynes, President Truman’s Point 4 plan, which helped establish institutions
globally, the Marshall Plan, and the formation of supply chains by businesses, helped to
reduced risk. The original idea behind the IMF (International Monetary Fund), World
Bank, and GATT (General Agreement on Tariff and Trade) at the Bretton Woods in 1944
was that it would allow nations a substantial amount of individual autonomy, choices,
and self-determination, but also to allow the IMF to attach policy requirements for their
assistance, thus greatly lowering risk (Mishkin 2006, 192). In his 1949 inauguration
address, United States President Harry S. Truman outlined four step plan for fighting
communism, the last of which was known as “Point IV,” its purpose to help the
“underdeveloped areas” of the world, particularly in Latin American and Southeast Asia,
and the first time that this term had ever been used or addressed. The combination of all
of these plans led to the “most rapid rates of economic growth and most enduring
stability in modern history” (Frieden 2006, 300). From 1948-1958, the world economy
grew 5.1% per year, and 6.6% per year until 1970 (Osterhammel and Petersson 2006,
121). American businessman Edward Deming would travel to Japan in the 1950s and
’60s to discuss efficient ways of organizing companies for trade, which became known as
“supply chains.”
Supply chains. Supply chains are defined as the “the network of … companies,
through upstream and downstream linkages, in the different processes and activities that
produce value in the form of products and services in the hands of the ultimate
consumers” (Serroukh 2011, slide 8). The coordination increases “market impact, overall
efficiency, (constant) improvement, and competitiveness” (Serroukh 2011, slide 5). The
linkages may consist of manufacturers, warehouses, distribution centers, retailers, and
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customers (Serroukh 2011, slide 6). Risky, adverse selection guides the choosing
partners (Handfield and Nichols 1999, 87, 155). Uncertainty, or risk, results from
breakdowns of vehicles and machines, travel time, weather and wars, and labor unions
strikes. Supply chains must therefore be planned carefully (Serroukh 2011, slide 8), and
power must be dispersed so that no single member has “too much control” (Handfield
and Nichols 1999, 156).
Sometimes, this mix can take decades, or even centuries, to form, such as the ones
in Britain over grain and flour, or those dating back to World War II. In Asia, supply
chains are linked by powerful families, called keiretsu in Japan, and chaebols in South
Korea, that the West calls “hidden barriers,” which will be shown in the next sections as
hindering firms in countries from diversifying. Some experts speculate that in the future,
companies will not compete against each other, but supply chains will (Serroukh 2011,
slide 10). The following, simple regression astutely connects the risk variable used in
later this article for nine random OECD countries, with supply chain variables from the
Logistics Performance Index. The supply chain variable increases with stability, as
expected, that well developed supply chains lessen overall economic risk.
Ho: Bsc = 0

Ha: Bsc < 0
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Table 8 Supply Chain Risk: This table shows that supply chains can be stabilizing.
Dependent Variable: Risk

No. of Obs.: 81

Coefficient
Supply Chain

-2.8040

Prob > F: 0.0000
t

-13.46

R2: 0.6965
p
0.000- * above
90%

Constant

10.5015

15.10

0.000- * above
90%

International trade organizations and financial crises. Governments that engage
in trade or international finance subject themselves to various crises. States must be sure
that they have safety nets in play, including domestic financial institutions with
regulations to restrict banks from holding risky assets, impose capital requirements high
enough to ensure that banks have enough capital to endure negative shocks, and be able
to close down insolvent institutions (Mishkin 2006, 54). Trade and finance volatility
since World War II have been assuaged by institutional organizations on the world stage
(observe the chart that follows). We observe four states, Mexico, Argentina, South
Korea, and Greece and how they used global bodies for crises.
Though the international system was set after World War II, countries often copy
each other’s financial or trade rules to remain competitive, and the largest trade and
international financial crises occurred after the 1980s. The first crisis was Mexico’s
1994-1995 “Tequila Crisis,” after deregulation under neo-liberal economic policies
opened up to financial inflows. Mexico engaged in privatization of banks, and many
began making risky loans under bad management. Political uncertainty followed a string
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of assassinations. Mexico was able to acquire $20 billion dollars in loans from the
United States, but the key to stability was a $30 billion dollar loan from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). As of 2017, Mexico’s growth has recovered to over 3%, though it
still lacks an efficient legal system and free-flowing bank credit (Mishkin 2006, 81-84).
South Korea faced a crisis in the late 1990s, largely because of their domestic
institutions called chaebols, which are family run supply chains. The chaebols started to
take undiversified, excessive risks, with debtors knowing that they would be repaid by
the government in the case of speculative behavior: moral hazard. The international, but
non-binding, Basel Accords had allowed foreign lenders to provide short term funds with
only 20% of the capital for longer-term loans (Mishkin 2006, 89). Chaebols, needing
money for speculative loans, turned to unregulated merchant banks, which are unique to
South Korea. A number of shocks then occurred, including a depreciation of the
Japanese yen, and a speculative run in Thailand, which made South Korea’s exports more
difficult to compete, so it had to devalue its currency by over 20%, and many of the
banks were forced out of business (Mishkin 2006, 85-97). Asian countries had trouble
returning loans in U.S. dollars, the loans which they had used to buy imports (Conrad
2013, 56). South Korea’s international crisis was short, due to $60 billion in aid from the
IMF. Political change diversified power, giving the central bank new liberties, and 617
financial institutions were closed or restructured (Mishkin 2006, 98-103).
The Argentinian crisis of 2001-2002 resulted from domestic, structural problems,
as well as their Convertibility Law, which tightly pegged the pesos to the dollar. Still,
Argentina had nearly the “most innovative” regulatory systems in the world. At the start,
banks did not realize that if the “free” Convertibility Law was ever done way with, for
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whatever reasons, they would be susceptible to currency risks. Next, the bond rating
system, based on the Wests’, did not consider that developing countries’ bonds can be
riskier. Then, the government faced massive debts from excessive spending. When the
U.S. dollar strengthened, so did the pesos, which hurt exports, and then, the state changed
the Convertibility Law- without any control, there was inflation, and everyone began
selling the pesos because it was worth so little. Argentina was only able to recover
through help from the IMF, and increased agricultural exports (Mishkin 2006, 112-125).
In 2018, they are refinancing their debt, lowering utility costs, and ensuing with bank
privatization. Finally, with Greece, this crisis, which began in 2009 when the state’s debt
reached 170% of its GDP, signified flaws in the European joint trading and currency
zone, which enabled fiscal, but not monetary, policy (Nelson et al. 2015, 1).
Descriptive Statistics.
The following descriptive statistics chart, with data from the St. Louis Federal
Reserve, shows volatility before IMF help and volatility after IMF help. Volatility was
measured as: Average of [(absolute value of) GDP-5yr./4yr. Average GDP]/ Average
GDP over the time length (calculated from St. Louis Federal Reserve data and the World
Bank). Five years before and after, and four years for during the crisis, were chosen
since GDP fluctuates in approximately 5-10 year cycles and crisis tend to be short-lived.
These countries were chosen because they represented the greatest financial and
international crises since World War II, and perhaps even the Corn Laws.
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Table 9 Stabilizing Impact of the IMF and Other Loans: The IMF is stabilizing.
Volatility (5 Years before and after, and within 4 years of the crisis)
5 yrs.
Before
3.46

During
4 yrs.
2.23

5 yrs.
After
3.82

Time and Amount of IMF Aid

0.207

0.164

0.253

In February, 1995, the IMF loaned $30 billion dollars, with
$20 billion coming from the United States.

S. Korea
(97-98)
Ave.
Growth
Volatility

7.9

4.5

4.7

0.170

0.191

0.118

Argentina
(01-02)
Ave.
Growth
Volatility

2.38

-1.83

7.82

0.046

0.421

0.243

United
States
(07-08)
Ave.
Growth
Volatility

2.54

0.35

2.0

0.359

2.603

0.192

Greece
(20082009)
Ave.
Growth
Volatility

0.04

-0.02

-0.04

0.373

1.882

0.917

Mexico
(94-95)
Ave.
Growth
Volatility

In December 1997, the IMF loaned $60 billion, some of
which was from the World Bank and foreign countries, and
foreign countries allowed refinancing of $25 billion in shortterm notes.

In 2000, Argentina obtained $13.7 billion from the IMF, and
$26 billion from other sources, plus $4.5 billion from
overdue creditors, and $8 billion more from foreign states in
2001.

In October 2008, Congress passed an emergency bill of a
$700 billion loan to buy Wall Street equity, and in Feb. 2009,
a $831 billion stimulus bill.

In May 2010, the IMF offered $110 billion euros, or roughly
$83 billion, which was followed later by more loans and
restructuring.
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While such institutions were not available during the time of the Corn Laws, this
chart shows the impact of post-World War II institutions on trade risk. Argentina’s low
volatility before its crisis is surprising, but it experienced several, stagnating recessions
which paralyzed growth at a low, steady level. Mexico showed very little volatility
during its crisis, because it was short-lived, meaning that recovery balanced out the
economic dips. Mexico also receive a plentiful $30 billion dollars in total aid, with $20
billion from America, because the United States valued it as an important trading partner.
The Greek crisis remained volatile afterwards because it was not fully resolved, and new
liberal parties came to power. One can see that growth can be stabilizing or destabilizing.
The main problem with the IMF today is that it usually has followed neo-liberal
policies for all countries, regardless of individual circumstances, and that it gives too
much power to the large countries, like the United States, which belong to it. Therefore,
some countries simply opt out of requesting loans, and the United States has vetoed
requirement reforms (Chorev and Babb 2009, 462-464, 478-479). Still, while the IMF
can provide conditions on loans, called “structural adjustment loans” as opposed to
“investment loans,” it is still up to the countries how to spend them (Mishkin 2006, 178).
The IMF is also able to assist in other ways, through macroeconomic policy advice, as a
global lender of last resort, and by promoting microeconomic reforms (Hale 1998, 1-2).
In the views of some, the rules of the IMF, and other lending institutions have
failed in terms of growth (Chorev and Babb 2009, 477), but they have brought stability.
The time that it takes to negotiate deals, which is critical to reducing risk, is lessening,
even though countries may engage in a risky “game of chicken” (Mishkin 2006, 182183). However, the IMF could benefit from better financial supervision, and increased
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transparency (Hale 1998, 5). Mishkin recommends eliminating red tape, emphasizing
financial reforms, lending based on collateralization, and changing the career hierarchy
(Mishkin 2006, 188-199). Jo Marie Griesgraber advises greater employee diversity, pay,
training, and experience (Griesgraber 2009, 2-3). But, the IMF has responded to risk
challenges by opening more offices (Stiglitz 2006, 260-265). Campbell (2004) would
call this institutional diffusion.
The World Bank, which loans longer-term, however, is changing more through
bricolage, the combination of elements. The bank now works aside the private sector
(Zoellick 2011, 102). The World Bank is becoming faster to deal with risks, also, and
offers more flexible policies (Guven 2012, 880). The bank’s roles have shifted, from a
focus on infrastructure in the 1950s, education and agriculture in the 1960s, productivity
and living standards in the 1970s, neo-liberal economics in the 1980s (Peet and Hartwick
2009, 87-91), and now healthcare with Dr. Jim Kim (The Economist “Lucky” 2016c, 14).
The WTO (World Trade Organization), which began as GATT (General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), has smoothed inter-country trade relations, where
unexpected policies can increase risks. Since 1985, the United States has signed 17
regional trade agreements, including NAFTA (Fernholz 2011, 1). Agriculture (such as
cotton and sugar), textiles, and steel are the most contentious issues (Pohland 2005, 3).
President George W. Bush took action over steel, while President Barack H. Obama
likewise did so over tires and solar panels. Because unity of all 153 nations is required to
start a trade round, consequently, the United States, such as through the TPP (TransPacific Partnership) has sought riskier, separate agreements enforced on their own. Trade
rounds usually last 10-15 years (Laidi 2008 2-5). A current issue is dealing with complex
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supply chains (Chen 2008, 8), and while the WTO can stop risky trade wars, it may have
too many problems given its resources (The Economist Group “Rules” 2017e, 59).
Results from Methodology III: Modern Cases of Diversification and Macro-Policy
So far, this article has mainly shown how intuition leads to diversification. But,
are countries in the 21st Century diversifying, and why, such as from shocks, which, not
like the prior financial crises, must call on longer-run macro and domestic institutions for
restructuring? This section demonstrates, as with the start of free trade in the 1800s, that
capital, cyclicality, or agriculture sometimes convince countries to stress diversification,
using a qualitative mix of government and business documents. The article turns to three
modern OECD countries not analyzed statistically: Japan, Finland, and Australia, to study
capital (energy), cyclicality (industry), and agriculture, all variables in the regressions.
Japan: The Risk of Trading Capital. Since even before World War II, Japan has
been concerned with diversification of trade, particular regarding energy issues. In 2010,
Japan was hit by an earthquake, and subsequent tsunami, that damaged capital of three
reactors at its Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, dismantling one-third of its energy output
(Calabrese 2012, 1). Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for the nation dropped 2.3%
initially, which was later revised to -0.7%. It was helped by roughly $4.5 billion in
international aid, but also by restructuring (Jiji Press 2012, 1). Japan’s nuclear capital
was a comparative advantage, since “Japan is the only non-armed country allowed by the
United States [to] use sensitive technologies [for] civilian nuclear energy” (Social “New
Voices” 2016, 7). The start of World War II arose in part from Japan’s energy needs in
its influence sphere. While missing natural resources, except timber, Japan is a leader in
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nuclear energy (World Nuclear “Nuclear” 2016, 3). Diversifying is needed as other
sectors rely on energy (European Parliament “Policy Briefing: Trade” 2012, 6).
Following the disaster, Japan’s energy consumption fell 4.2% from 2010-2012,
with a larger fall of 8.0% in electric consumption. This cost fell on families to save
energy, so the state formed a Central Peak Pricing Plan (CPP), which altered prices based
on the time of day (Meti “Strategic” 2014b, 13). Even food was affected, since electricity
affects food grown in cool greenhouses, and Japan has a comparative advantage in certain
crops. Those who recalled World War II suggested “spreading their investment tentacles
oversees” (Barrett and Notaras 2012, 7), to “be more food-secure…” (Barrett and Notaras
2012, 8). The issue is one of “diversifying” food logistics (Barrett and Notaras 2012, 8).
The overall situation was described by a 2014 government report as having “a
lack of flexibility in the supply structure” (Meti “Strategic” 2014b, 12). To resolve stuck
supply chains, the same government document suggested, “building a … ‘diversified
flexible energy supply-demand structure’ …” (Meti “Strategic” 2014b, 18). This change
would be a chance to enhance “competitiveness” and its “presence in the global market”
(Meti “Strategic” 2014b, 18). Furthermore, these goals could be accomplished by
diversifying its supply chain from its tightknit keiretsu (Meti “Strategic” 2014b, 34-46).
More specifically, one Ministry of Foreign Affairs official writes that Japan,
which had depended on nuclear energy since the 1970s as a way of being more selfsecure, would look to “wean itself”” off of nuclear energy, through solar and wind
investment. Japan also plans to: enact tariffs to pay for renewable energy, pass a globalwarming-devoted tax (a Pigouvian tax), and provide better insulation for households
(Climate Nex: “Japan: The road” 2015, 1-6). Despite these changes, Japan must deal
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with an institutional, culture firms, its keiretsu and zaibatsu. Still, “interfirm networks”
can help “disaster resilience” when “disruptions spread” (Matous and Todo 2016, 142).
Additionally, Matous and Todo note that, “[f]rom the perspective of vulnerability to
disasters, interindustrial (sic) [domestic or foreign] linkages are crucial” (Matous and
Todo 2016, 159). Japan has, though, centralized institutions for economic policy.
By 2016, Japan, which had opened up to energy imports, for electricity in power
plants, returned to trade and reported a surplus of 242.8 billion yen, or $2.2 billion, a
substantial amount (“Japan Reports” 2016, 1). The Japanese government is considering
reopening exports of nuclear plants because the state recognizes that exports and trade are
still crucial to the Japanese economy (Social “New Voices” 2016, 8). Yet, asserts United
States Professor John Calabrese, “diversification can go only so far,” but the Fukushima
incident has caused a “(r)e-evaluation of domestic energy policy [for] diversification”
(World Nuclear “Nuclear” 2016, 1). A few years on, the amount of new enterprises, due
to the shock, have increased (Meti “2014 White” 2014a, 1), further aiding diversification.
Finland: The Risk of Cyclically Traded Goods. Finland is a fairly small country
that has experienced numerous cyclical shocks since World War II, and is an example of
attempts at diversification, although largely unsuccessful due to a combination of poor
government policy and rigid institutional structures. These structures include strong
labor and capital rules and the need for specialized goods due to finicky, proximate
trading partners, in Russia (then the Soviet Union). Overall, “exchanges with the outside
world were crucial” (Translators “Finland Foreign” 2016, 1). Finland’s exports have
significantly affected its economy, shifting after its World War II depression from lumber
and munitions to specialized goods, such as chemical, paper and packing materials, and
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most recently, with some diversification, electronics. Production has relied on energy
imports from Russia, while shipping and tourism has been effected cyclically by high
prices, and low productivity. Finland has unwisely pursued a trade policy of protecting
agriculture and services but not industrial goods (Translators “Finland Foreign” 2016, 2,
4), such as wood crafts. “[C]ounter-cyclical measures” have not been stressed in policy
(Statistics Finland 2016, 2).
Finland has the “Nordic model” of the state working with businesses, but its
businessmen and bankers have greater power (Evans 1995, 227-229). Having little coal
or oil, which are comparatively advantaged goods, Finland has been forced to trade with
Russia. Its exports have been forced to become specialized, despite attempts to diversify
into: paper machines, elevators, cranes, and icebreaker vessels. The state has assisted, by
investing in infrastructure, energy, and education, and, like other Scandinavian countries,
maternity leave, and healthcare (Hjerppe 2008, 5-6). Despite a brief 1970’s recession due
to the global oil crisis, and a European Union deal that hardened competition for
industrial goods, the economy kept strong until the 1980s (Statistics Finland 2016, 3).
Freer financing heightened household indebtedness, and set the stage for the
“great depression” in the 1990s (Statistics Finland, 2016, 3). The fall of the Soviet
Union, its major trading partner, and financial deregulation, strongly contributed, write
Gulan et al. This resulted in a 12.6% decline in GDP, and unemployment rising to 17.9%
(Gulan et al. 2014, 1-3). When the Soviet Union fell, “a considerable part of the sectors
exporting … became obsolete after 1991” (Gulan et al. 2014, 25). However, a number of
industries were able to switch the goods they were producing, having an elastic supply
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curve. Gulan et al. call it an extreme example of the business cycle, magnified by the
high-risk, “casino economy,” started by deregulations (Gulan et al. 2014, 26, 30).
In 2018, Finland continues to struggle with its import-export mix, which creates
uncertainty, and the country will “need to address the lack of diversification in its export
sector….” (Eurozone 2015, 5). The top-10 Finnish companies are a third of the state’s
exports. Cyclicality has resulted in huge restructurings, such as after the dot-com bubble
burst in the early 2000s. Nokia, the cell-phone maker, yielded ¼ of Finnish growth from
1998-2007, but its price share later fell (The Economist “The Nokia” 2012, 1). Said one
writer, “diversification is key in industrial [technology] policy,” and another, “[e]xploring
the dependency on particular industrial clusters [can measure] where diversification is
most lacking” (The Economist “The Nokia” 2012, Comments), such as with Detroit, the
United States’ cluster in the 1950s for car making. Finland’s energy supply still depends
on Russia, affected by sanctions as of 2018 (The Economist “The Nokia” 2012, 2).
Lack of diversification will require another round of government restructuring,
involving “government investments or encourage[ing] [the] private sector to participate
in RE (renewable energy) programs…” (Aslani et al. 2014, 761). Furthermore, efforts
such “Team Finland,” for firms to promote exports jointly, and union labor reforms, will
help diversify, such as to in biotech, clean energy, and digitization, says a European
report (European Commission “Country” 2016, 36). In this author’s view, and others’,
part of the problem has been making “institutional adjustments” (Gorodnichenko et al.
2009, Abstract). Special interest groups have resisted them (see Olson in Article I). High
taxation, an aging society, and openness of the economy all acerbate risk (Hjerppe 2008,
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8). If another round of changes are not made, writes one author “[f]ailure to do so could
cause permanent damage to Finland’s potential output growth” (Eurozone 2015, 6).
Australia: The Risks of Trading Agriculture. Australia’s economy has seen many
diversifying challenges- “different industries have risen and fallen” (Aus. Bur.
“Research” 2014, 1). Agriculturally based in 2018, manufacturing has at times been
strong: the country saw a mining boom in the 1980s and ’90s (Aus. Bureau “Drought”
2012, 1-4). Agriculture, which, due to its proximity to Asian markets, is comparatively
advantaged, has been affected by droughts, in the 1940s, mid-1960s, with a 40% drop in
wheat, early 1970s, early 1980s, early 1990s, and early 2000s, the most severe (Aus.
Bureau “Drought” 2012, 5). In the last drought, the federal state gave $4.5 billion in aid;
the IMF aided with forecasts (Kennedy 2012, 1-2).
Beginning in 1992, the government established an official policy to aid farmers
under risk, which includes research and development into new crops, interest rate
subsidies, and advice and training. Most Australian farms are multi-product, and use
crop rotation or livestock. The larger ones diversify away from cereals, which constitute
70% of overall production, but they specialize to simplify supply chains (Chavas 2008, 45). Different types of farming make government aid complex (Aus. Bureau “Drought”
2012, 20). Still, the ultimate risk is to the farmer, to avoid moral hazard and over risktaking. State aid is only be offered if the drought was unpredictable, and not a result of
other weather factors causing price hikes (Aus. Bureau “Drought” 2012, 13). While some
farmers recall the past, others rely on “in situ,” the situation at hand (Head et al. 2011, 1).
Regions are important in Australia, but national economic growth can be affected
by national droughts (Aus. Bur. “Research” 2014, 2). The 2013 review of the Regional
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Development Committee found that a major economic threat was “reliance on one or a
few … industries,” and a need to “diversify” (Aus. Bur. “Research” 2014, 2). However,
specialization in regional clusters has allowed firms to develop intricate supply chains to
lessen risks, and a few regions are diversifying (Aus. Bur. “Research” 2014, 3).
The last drought of the early 2000s, which was really two separate droughts, was
likely caused by El Nino, the Pacific Ocean’s Gulf Stream (Barry 2008, 2). Australia’s
rice crop fell by 98%. Since Australian rice makes up 15% of the world total (Barry
2008, 2), 20 million people around the world were affected. There were subsequent riots
in Haiti, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Italy, the
Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Thailand, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. Australia differs from other
countries since rice is exported for GDP, and not consumed. Many farmers have
switched into sheepherding, wine making, or wheat, which use less water, or “lucrative
crops” (Bradsher 2008, 2), such as rice that blooms earlier seasonally. That rice is a
staple in foreign markets makes diversifying harder (Bradsher 2008, 4-6).
One writer observes that Australia’s export concentration, compared to
consumption, is one of the highest in the world (Thirlwell 2015, 4). Some 32.5% of
Australian trade goes to China. He writes, “[p]olicymakers need to reconsider industrial
policies” of making the entire society and country more “diverse” (Conley 2014, 3). One
Californian lawmaker believes that other countries can learn from Australia’s efforts to
diversify its water supply across regions (Olsen 2015, 1-2).
Politically, power is divided between national and state governments, some which
are resource rich and others which are not. While one might think that politics would be
fractious since 40% of the country is immigrant, Australia has a strong national
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government based on alternative voting. Australia’s low trade barriers and open market
has made it flexible economically, and it has a strong banking system that allowed it to
easily survive the global “Great Recession.” Still, the nation relies heavily on energy
imports. Australia belongs to many international organizations, and the World Bank has
called for it to change policies in favor of greater diversification (Reilly 2002, 156-170).
Results from Methodology IV: The Tests Using Statistics
This section contains a multiple regression trying to explain the degree of a
country’s diversification, of nine randomly selected OECD (Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development) countries; the countries were the Czech Republic
(Czechia), Estonia, France, Italy, Portugal, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the United
Kingdom. The years are 1996-2007, which were chosen for three reasons: the availability
of data, the fact that trade rounds usually last about a dozen years, and to recognize the
trade loss, from funding decline, after the 2008 global crisis. The variables include
energy, manufacturing, and agriculture, just analyzed among the cases. It correlates: a
country’s number of enterprises (y) (B*) with its GDP (B1), an index of riskiness or
cyclicality of manufacturing (B2), economic (B3) and political freedom (as more free
societies should have entrepreneurs able to be “pulled” into other industries) (B4),
insurance development (which reduces risk) (B5), vertical trade/intermediate goods
(which should increase risk) (B6), trade as a whole (which we see here should increase
risk and lead to more industries so that states have less risk from shocks) (B7), trade
openness (increases risk) (B8) and intra-industry trade (should reduce industries and risk)
(B9), oil resources (B10), agriculture (B11), level of technology (B12), a Gini coefficient
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of income inequality (B13), and entrepreneurship (B14). An additional model of
industries was not run given the data’s complexity, but could be a basis of future study.
The hypothesis is that trade, and other factors, increase riskiness, which leads to
greater diversification into more enterprises, and that other variables help mitigate for
risk. The last several variables should be riskier industries and lead to a greater industry
diversification, as well as the Gini, which indicates less spread out wealth and thus more
riskiness. The countries were chosen by moving down a randomized list, with several
countries being subsequently being eliminated due to lack of data. To this author’s
understanding, no such other exact regressions have been run.
Methodological caveats. To begin with, no statistical model can completely
capture all variables: for instance, currency risk was omitted from the model employed
here since there is no conceivable way to conceptualize whether or not it should lead to
more firms, with diversification, or fewer. A main concern overall is that the tendency to
have fewer firms may not only be a sign of specialization but can also be an indication of
mergers and acquisitions that lessened the diversity of an economy. Still, concentration
tends to occur within industries (such as manufacturing, agriculture, and energy), if these
are regressed. In the 1980s in the United States, concentration increased in the retail,
electric, gas, utilities, and transportation sectors, but concentration decreased in
manufacturing and life insurance (O’Neill 1996, 1). The reasons for concentration are to
increase market power, as opposed to specialization, the latter of which is used gain a
comparative advantage.
A second concern is that former communist countries, such as those in Eastern
Europe, may have different patterns of diversity or specialization given their historical,
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political-economic situations. The author did not use the United States as an example in
the statistical pool because it was not randomly chosen, and nevertheless, certain data
was missing. In the nascent days of the euro, there became a greater amount of European
trade, around the year 2000. Finally, while there was no apparent time series correlation,
it was observed that there was a reverse “feedback loop,” and that the number of
industries seems to positively affect the amount of trade in the next year period. Data
typos are an honest fact of life. The data was obtained from:
Risk: OECD Risk Classification
Be: OECD Enterprises
B1: World Bank-per capita
B2: World Bank index
B3: Composite Index, CESifo Dice Database Comparisons in Europe
B4: Worldwide Governance Indicators, Voice and Accountability
B5: Insurance and fin. Services, % of service exports, World Bank
B6: Intermediate goods: Calculated from OECD
B7: OECD Total Trade in Goods and Services
B8: Tariff rate, weighted mean for all products/ Imports (from World Bank)
B9: Grubel and Lloyd Index on Intra-European Trade from (Yoo-Duk Kang).
B10: Absolute value of energy imports, % of energy use, World Bank
B11: Agricultural Investment, FAO
B12: GERD from World Bank
B13: Inequality Spreadsheet from United Nations University
B14: OECD total patents per year
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Statistical work. Foundational work: these four regressions were run to test the
basic hypothesis, and the causal direction of the most important variable, trade, for the
diversification theory. The first regression is to demonstrate that trade increases risk,
captured through a simple equation of: Risk Index (Br, OECD risk) = Trade % of GDP
(Bt/gdp).
Ho: Bt/gdp = 0

Ha: Bt/gdp > 0

Table 10 Trade and Risk: Trade can increase risks.
Trade percent

0.0245

7.89

0.000*

Constant

-0.5022

-2.12

0.037*

Dependent Variable: Risk

Number of Obs. = 81

Coefficient

F > p = 0.000

t

R2= 0.4407
p

*= Significant at 95%. The second equation demonstrates that enterprises diversify and reduce risk. Risk= Enterprises (Be)
= 0

Ho: Be

Ha: Be < 0

Table 11 Enterprises and Risk: More enterprises can reduce risk.
Enterprises

-7.02e-07

-6.08

0.000*

constant

1.8276

11.91

0.000*

F > p= 0.000 No. of Obs: 81
Dependent Var: Risk

Coefficient

R2 = 0.319

t

p

*Significant at 95%. The third preliminary equation demonstrates that diversification affects GDP volatility. Volatility= Enterprises
Ho: Be = 0

Ha: Be < 0
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Table 12 Enterprises and Volatility: More enterprises can reduce volatility.
Enterprises

-4.48e-07

-3.71

0.000*

constant

1.7958

10.33

0.000*

Volatility [abs (ave.-growth)/average] F > p: 0.0003
Coefficient

No. of Obs: 108 R2: 0.1149

t

p

*Significant at 95%. A fourth regression was run using volatility as the dependent variable, but whereas this was calculated as the
absolute value of GDP difference from the country’s average over the period. The results using this measure of volatility were
significant. Ho: Bt = 0

Ha: Bt > 0

Table 13 Trade and Volatility: Trade can increase volatility.
Trade

0.0173

5.00

0.000*

Constant

0.0952

0.34

0.733

No. of Obs.: 108,
GDP_Volati~y |

F > p = 0.0000
Coefficient

R2 = 0.1909
t

p

*Significant at 95%

In all of these preliminary equations, the hypotheses were met. There was little
skewness or kurtosis with the number of firms per country, so it was close to normal, a
bell curve. For the preliminary regressions, the first used trade as a percentage of GDP,
while for the preeminent regression, total trade was used. Trade as a whole may be very
low for small, high risk countries. Additionally, as GDP rises, supply chains solidify, and
as the GDP figure in the denominator rises, GDP reduces risk and volatility. However,
GDP increases the number of enterprises, so if trade/GDP were used for the preeminent
equation, a growing denominator would render it as yielding fewer industries; likewise,
there would be a serial correlation between the trade/GDP and GDP variables.
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Preeminent statistical work: Enterprises
The null and alternative hypotheses are as follows, with all of the fifteen variables
listed in the previous methodology section:
Ho:

B1 to B14 = 0

Ha:

B1, B2, B6 to B13 (minus B8 to B9)

> 0

Ha:

B3 to B5, B8, B9

< 0

y = Bo (constant) + B1 + B2 + B3 … + B14
For the preeminent regression, your author regressed the number of enterprises in
a country by GDP per population, and GDP per population squared, hoping to discover a
U shaped relationship that would be indicated by a positive GDP and negative GDP
squared, that would show stages of diversification.
Table 14 Assumptions Test: There is no skewness or kurtosis.
Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality
Variable | Obs Pr(Skewness) Pr(Kurtosis) adj chi2(2)
Enterprises | 108

0.0000

0.0650

18.81

Prob>chi2

0.0001

The dependent variable looks normally distributed, and not skewed either direction.

Even though GDP turned out positive in the final regression, and turned out to be
highly significant, adding GDP2 was also significant, and increased the R2 value of the
model, which will be explained. The GDP2 term indicates that there is an inverted U
shape curve to diversification, or, as other authors that have found this relationship
describe it, a U shape curve of “specialization.” In other words, as countries start to
grow, they diversify until they reach a point, (Fig. A17), estimated here through calculus
to be [B1/2B2= 91.2691/(0.0010148x2)]= per capita GDP $44,969.01, or, similarly,
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$507.13 billion in trade, after which large nations are able to specialize even more, as
with the United States and computers and finance. Other iterations were lower. Large
states do not “become set in their ways” institutionally, but take on greater risks because
they can absorb the risk, which is consistent with other studies. The constant term may
indicate that number of enterprises is fairly standard, due to globalization that has
affected all countries, but the amount of dedication to each single industry may vary.
Table 15 Trade, Risk, and Other Variables: This regression shows much significance.
GDP_per_capita

91.2691

4.98

0.000*

0.935

GDP_per_capita2

-0.0010148

-2.53

0.013*

-0.447

Manufacturing Inv.

-8302.36

-0.83

0.411

-0.060

Economic Freedom

-110.0545

-0.01

0.992

-0.001

Democracy

-30102.61

-2.73

0.008*

-0.208

Insurance

-23409

-2.81

0.006*

-0.180

Intermediate Goods

20523.6

1.26

0.212

0.106

Trade

3.665781

6.10

0.000*

0.831

Trade_Openness

-19491.76

-2.97

0.004*

-0.129

Intra-Industry Trade -2882821

-2.92

0.004*

-0.304

Energy

-366.106

-2.87

0.005*

-0.232

Agriculture Inv.

67.54223

8.13

0.000*

0.444

Technology

-256979.1

-1.25

0.215**

-0.123

Gini Coefficient

542992.58

3.50

0.001*

0.228

Constant

3149305

2.29

0.024*

N/A

Entrepreneurship

Left out for

serial

correlation

N/A

OLS Regression, with Quadratic Variable
Dependent variable: #of enterprises F = 67.37 P > F = 0.0000 R2 = 0.9103 Obs.= 108
Independent variable

coefficient

t-score

P value

*= significant at the 95% level.
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beta

A Breusch-Pagan test was run for to observe heteroscedasticity, the divergence of
data from the line of best fit for very large or small numbers; there appears to be little.
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
Ho: Constant variance
chi2(14)

= 65.44

Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

For the other variables, all early iterations confirmed the majority of hypotheses,
but a re-chosen measure for agricultural and industrial production needed to be employed
because the early indexes showed relationships from year to year and not between the
countries themselves. Much of the work involved rounding as Stata would not take a
combination of decimal and whole numbers; it also was not helpful that the World Bank
changed their websites during the middle of the research. Although over 1,500 pieces of
data were entered into Stata, the lack of less than 1% of data called for counterfactuals to
be created in these cases, either taking the value of the previous of following year, or an
average. A degree of serial correlation may be present since a number of variables are
similar and involve GDP or population, which could not be avoided, other than by
searching for varied indexes and attempting several iterations of running the data.
Regarding the final model, the high F value indicates very strong significance,
and the R2 of 0.9103 indicates the incredible amount of predictability of the model
(91.03%), while the adjusted R2 of 0.8967 suggests that the sample size was not too
small, since size reduces standard error. Democracy, for which a “voice and
accountability” measure was used, caused a reduction in the number of firms, but
economic freedom most likely did not affect the number of industries because many of
the former Soviet States still have “push models” for their labor markets, and as young
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people are turning away from profit incentives, discussed in Article I. Economic
freedom, while giving freedom to start industries, may eliminate the impetus to. An
entrepreneurial variable was sought to correct for this dilemma, a proxy variable for
patents, but was serially correlated and influenced the others variables, and another proxy
dating to 1996 was unavailable. Using beta to compare the different coefficients which
are scaled differently, GDP and trade U curves do the most to diversify.
Intra-industry trade in essence did result as expected since intra-industry trade
reduces regular trade, which is risky, thereby indirectly reducing risk, and is an important
finding. Trade barriers were interesting in that they indicated that more firms are created,
most likely because they protect infant industries. Since most trade openness variables
use trade itself, this could lead to correlation, so instead an index was used. The index
may have been correlated, too, because, ironically, most of the states in the OECD have
similar average tariff levels. Manufacturing did not turn out as significant, most likely
because the states in the OECD are witnessing a decline of this sector, and are not
forming new firms, and perhaps also because data on these sectors are difficult to
measure, despite the fact that several different indexes were used. Agriculture was
positive, indicating riskiness. Investment in agriculture was used, rather than crops or
land acreage, in chemicals, fertilizers, and machinery. Intermediate goods trade was
surprisingly one variable that was not significant in either direction, meaning that they
conform to what one might call “Ricardian efficiency,” which shall be discussed in the
conclusion part of this article. Furthermore, energy reduces enterprises, probably because
energy results in large oligopolies, and finally, in one regression (see results), technology
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was ambiguous, because while technology can lead to more firms, it can result in barriers
to entry, such as patents, which prevent new firms from entering the market.
To address other caveats, GDP and trade should not be serially correlated since
GDP is Ex-Im, not Ex+Im, but manufacturing may be correlated with GDP. Two
different iterations were attempted, which used overall manufacturing-value-added rather
than an index, and manufacturing productivity, but both were strongly correlated with
trade and GDP. While manufacturing’s share of the economy in all these OECD states is
declining, manufacturing in certain iterations was volatile, more so than services,
contrasting with several previous studies. The trade openness index should not conflict
with exports as a whole. But, an index often does not consider the size of the country.
**When one changes technology to share of exports data from the OECD, rather
than the GERD Index, it becomes significant, negatively, while making manufacturing
even more insignificant, since the two appear to be in competition, and eliminating the
constant variable. The entire model becomes higher in R2 by 0.003, but the
heteroscedasticity value decreases. If one uses technology as an index, from the GERD,
it is insignificant, so the author erred on this side of caution. The income at which
specialization begins to occur changes slightly. Due to the possibility of serial
correlation, the index number was used. The determination of how technology affects
risk then is whether it is used domestically, when it does not affect risk, or whether it is
used in trade, in which case it can, and lowers risk, most likely by helping firms reach
economies of scale to become oligopolistic, serving as a form of intra-industry trade.
New technology firms can also displace older one, Schumpeter’s “creative destruction.”
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One can reason, however: the amount of risk diversification conceptually must
equal the opportunity cost loss of productivity to a country, which can be accounted for
by changes in the terms of trade relationships between countries, i.e: Equilibrium at:
∑ (probability of loss x extent of GDP loss) =
∑ (∆terms of trade of country A /∆terms of trade of B)
The risks of trade would be ∆ trade / ∆ consumption, since as the consumption sector
grows, as with import substitution industrialization in Latin America in the 1960s, trade
risks decline. But, this would put pressure on interest rates, not discussed here.
Therefore, the fitting equation would be ∆undiversified trade/ ∆total trade.
Analysis- Trade Developments
From the statistics, one can see that trade is risky, but that intermediate goods
have neither a positive nor negative impact upon the risk of a trading country: in this
sense, it can be seen as neutral, and therefore a way of taking advantage of comparative
advantages, mainly in industry. Consequently, it can be seen as Ricardian specialization,
not diversification. For the United States, as of 1998, there were 39,000 parent firms and
279,000 foreign affiliates globally engaged in vertical integration trade, or intermediate
goods, with huge foreign investment of $2.7 trillion (World “New Report” 2017d, 2). It
differs from intra-industry trade, which is not in parts alone (Hummels et al. 1998, 1-3).
In comparison, a few studies have found similar results with this one in terms of
intermediate good trade. Vertical specialization also differs from outsourcing, which is
the relocation of one stage of production to make a final good solely in one country.
(Hummels et al. 1998, 2-3). Horizontal specialization refers to goods made solely within
one country (Hummels et al. 1998, 1). Hummels et al. (1998) find vertical specialization
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increased globally by 20% from 1960-1970 (Hummels et al. 1998, 1), and according to
Clark has increased globally by 30% between 1970 and 1990 (Clark 2010, 1). By 1990,
14.5% of all trade amongst OECD countries was vertical (Hummels et al. 1998, 1).
Companies may take advantage of lower labor costs, closeness to markets, or favorable
government regulations (Clark 2010, 1). The industries that are most involved with
vertical trade are chemicals, machinery, and equipment (Hummels et al. 1998, 1-3).
A good example to look at of less risky, intermediate or vertical trade is North
America. The relationship between the United States and Canada extends to 1965 when
both signed the US-Canada Auto Agreement. Instrumental was United States President
Lyndon B. Johnson, before whom car trade was minimal. Canada had a 17.5% tariff on
U.S. car imports, and the U.S. had 6.5-8.5% on Canada’s. The 1965 accord brought
tariffs down to zero. Quickly after signing, auto sales expanded; Canadian car exports
and imports rose nearly tenfold, depending on brands (Hummels et al. 1998, 3-4). As of
2017, Canada is the largest market for U.S. cars, trailed by Mexico (Villarreal 2017, 2).
Vertical specialization was a hidden goal behind the developments. By the late
1990s, 60% of U.S. auto exports to Canada were in engines and parts, while 75% of U.S.
auto imports from Canada were unfinished cars and trucks. Canada’s vehicles exported
to the United States were 80-90% of all vehicle exports, meaning that “the vast majority
of vertical trade consists of the U.S.-Canadian flow” (Hummels et al. 1998, 4). Over
three decades, vertical trade totals over 35% of the U.S.-Canada auto trade: $30 billion
dollars (Hummels et al. 1998, 3-4). By 2017, Canada is the largest United States total
trade partner, followed by China and Mexico (Villarreal 2017, 2).
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In Mexico, maquiladora plants are usually non-Mexican owned, turning imported
components into output. Most maquiladora plants are in electronics, textiles, and
transportation equipment. These sectors encompass the work of 73% of all maquiladora
workers and 81% of maquiladora production. Of this, the electronics industry is largest,
though the transportation sector is the fastest growing, doubling from 1982 to 1995
(Hummels et al. 1998, 4-5). Mexican maquiladoras grew further in the 1980s under
favorable politics, and then from NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement) in
the 1990s, increasing labor. Since the 1980s, 45% of all U.S. imports from Mexico have
been from such plants. Maquiladora trade grew from 20% of the total U.S.-Mexican
trade in 1979, to 25% by 1989, to 39% by 1996, or $57 billion dollars. By 1996, vertical
specialization was estimated at 50% of all U.S.-Mexican trade (Hummels et al. 1998, 4-5)
Japan, now a fairly diversified economy, as has been shown, has outsourced and
offshored much of its manufacturing. By 1995, Japanese exports of components to Asia
amounted to almost 75% of all Japan to Asia trade. Over 50% of all Japanese exports of
components were to Asia. From 1988 to 1998, vertical specialization in Japan increased
by four times as measured by yen and nine times via dollars (Hummels et al., 1998, 5-6).
Spain’s car trade is another example or vertical trade, that of Opel, the subsidiary for
General Motors in Europe. It is estimated that 40% of Spain’s trade is vertical (Hummels
et al. 1998, 6). Despite a slowdown in vertical trade in the early 2000s, due to weak
global growth (The International “Prospects” 2015, 3-5), there now is as of 2017 a
resurgence, of now-called GVCs (Global Value Chains) (World “New Report” 2017d, 2).
Overall, vertical trade is less than horizontal trade, but vertical trade is growing at
a faster rate. Globalization in the 1990s made it simpler for nations to direct production
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from varied locales, due to improved technology and lower tariffs (Hummels et al. 1998,
12-13). Those industries with the least vertical trade are mining, agriculture, wood, and
paper (Hummels et al. 1998, 7), as was shown with Finland’s case. The reduced speed of
global free trade deals has spurred vertical trade, to gain cash (Hummels et al. 1998, 14).
Clark (2010) writes that tariffs, both to parts and final goods, are a crucial factor.
According to Clark (2010), who referenced Hummels et al. (1998), after a country
opens to free trade, the main factors that lead to vertical specialization are: national
resources and comparative advantaged goods (as Ricardo would have noted), workforce
availability and population, the size of the foreign market, location near the foreign
market, and the trade orientation of each country (tariffs and other barriers). Transport
costs are a large determinant (Clark 2010, 3). Lesser factors are exchange rate stability,
competition, and the political situation of the primary country, and Clark adds the type of
labor skills the country has. Furthermore, a survey by the U.S. International Trade
Commission finds institutions that promote civil liberties, freedom, and political stability
as measured by a political rights index, are important (Clark 2010, 2-3).
According to research by Hummels et al., the world’s largest economies are the
ones “least likely” to be involved in vertical specialization, and instead rely on domestic
diversification, which was not found here. This is because large countries find it easier,
they write, due to economies of scale, to maintain production within their borders
(Hummels et al. 1998, 7). The United States, Germany, and Japan, three large states, are
among the lowest in vertical trade. Clark writes that GDP, or market size, of the foreign
country traded with, is the greatest predictor of vertical trade, and that there is a statistical
link (Clark, 2010, 3). Hummels et al. note that vertical trade, out of all trade, as of 1998,
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may be 20-25% (Hummels et al. 1998, 7). In 2003, it was estimated that vertical trade
can explain 50% of the growth of global trade since World War II (Yi 2003, Abstract).
Finally, Clark (2010) offers that vertical specialization will soon move to countries with
greater funds for research and development, which makes sense theoretically (Clark
2010, 3-4). Global firms have difficult choices: to locate affiliates in developed or
developing nations. Worker education and import and export tariffs are strong factors.
Diversification Policy and Volatility: Comparing the Results
The regressions and process tracing here found that trade increases risk, that
countries diversify trade into more firms to reduce the risk up until a point, which
altogether reduces volatility, until countries are better able to absorb risk through
institutions like supply chains. An ill-suited fact is that diversification policy most likely
results in the government choosing “winners and losers,” which is frowned upon in the
West, but used in the East and South (Droege and Skaggs 2004, 1-3).
On the national level, the closest findings to this article are several studies, and a
summary of them (Strategy&), by Booz and Company, a global consulting firm, both
which highlight that economic diversification can reduce a nation’s economic volatility
while increasing its vitality. Booz and Company created two ratios: a “concentration
ratio” and a “diversification quotient,” the latter being the inverse of the first (Strategy&
2008, 1). Comparing “Group of 7” (G7) countries (which includes all of the countries
involved in World War II, plus Canada, minus Russia) with Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) states, G7 countries had a low 16% concentration level, while for the GCC, it was
26%. The diversification quotient for G7 countries was 6.07, compared to 3.87 for the
Gulf States (Shediac et al. 2008, 2). Economic concentration may be unescapable in
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regions rich in natural resources, which rely solely on petroleum and natural gas for their
exports. Examples are Brunei with oil, Zambia, which is solely fixed upon copper, and
Botswana, which is linked to the diamond industry (Shediac et al. 2008, 5).
Booz and Company also compared GCC states with the new “transformation”
economies of Hong Kong, Ireland, South Korea, New Zealand, Singapore and Norway.
Gulf countries, obviously, were concentrated in oil and gas, but other sectors had high
concentrations, many which were linked to the spillover effects of the oil sectors and are
concentrated short-term (Strategy& 2008, 1-2). These states are highly volatile due to the
sudden changes in oil prices, but “a strong foundation in export helps insulate against
unexpected changes … and volatility” (Shediac et al. 2008, 2).
In the regression earlier, energy seemed to reduce risk and lessen the number of
companies, due to its oligopolistic nature, which may be due to what is has come to be
known as “Dutch Disease” or the “resource curse.” This concurs with the case examples,
that a steady but diversified energy sector reduces risks. Manufacturing, or capital goods,
are volatile, but not subject to risks such as natural disasters, namely to agriculture. In
2018, developing states struggle likewise with diversification versus selling “cash crops.”
This previously mentioned study by Booz and Company found a statistically
significant relationship between economic diversification and economic stability, as did
the preliminary enterprises, risk, and volatility regressions here. High economic
concentration yielded volatility and economic cycles, giving weight to the author’s
argument that lack of diversification increase risks and the greater chance for large GDP
swings. But, the Booz study found that diversification in periods of prosperity can
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nevertheless result in volatility, because past economic shocks have long-term effects,
since workers lack the skills to switch between sectors (Shediac et al. 2008, 3-5).
Concentration, in the Booz study, was shown to lead to low productivity and
global competitiveness. Using a ratio from Sharpe, a Nobel Prize winner for his work on
risk, in GCC countries, a small 0.69% growth increased volatility 1%, while in the
formerly said “transition” countries, it took 2.69% growth for 1% volatility. This means
that Gulf States with high concentrations are much more volatile, and have lower growth
rates, compared to oil-rich but diversified states like Norway (Shediac et al. 2008, 3-5).
Within industries, diversification is usually greatest in services, such as tourism,
finances, and real estate. Write Shediac et al., “Countries with (low) labor diversification
may suffer economically” (Shediac et al. 2008, 6). Growth volatility for the Gulf States
have decreased, in the United Arab Emirates from 10-35%, to 5-9%, partly from fewer
shocks (Shediac et al. 2008, 11). The Booz study astutely assigns 30% of volatility to a
single variable, economic concentration. The other 70% is explained by unstable oil
prices, inflation, exchange rates, investor and consumer confidence, and general shocks,
although in 2018 oil states are making attempts at diversifying (Shediac et al. 2008, 3-5).
Frontiers of Specialization and Diversification: Factors in Specializing
Businesses and final trade sectors of an economy may not be the only diversified
components, but factor markets can be diversified, too. Imbs and Wacziarg (2000) found
that labor is spread out and diversified equally between sectors, but then reaches a point
where it begins concentrating. In short, countries specialize when labor specializes.
Early on, increasing returns to scale make it easier for factors of production, such as
labor, to concentrate in a few sectors (Imbs and Wacziarg 2000, 2). It is easier to produce
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domestically, rather than import goods at high costs: the latter needs infrastructure and
transportation (Imbs and Wacziarg 2000, 23). Countries less open to trade should be
more be diversified, Wacziarg (2007) say, also found here, up to a point. Imbs and
Wacziarg also observe that as nations approach their technological frontier, or apex,
productivity rises, leading to diversifying, to a point (Imbs and Wacziarg 2000, 10-11).
Infrastructure improvements, on the other hand, lessen transportation costs, which
can lead to greater specialization, since certain mass transport goods can take benefit of
the lesser costs (Imbs and Wacziarg 2000, 11). The “crucial assumption” for the U-shape
is that transport costs, spurring specialization, “initially” fall less quickly than lesser costs
from high-tech competition and innovation (Imbs and Wacziarg 2000, 18). In other
words, factors that encourage specialization- infrastructure investment- eventually turn
cheaper than those leading to diversification, technology, which here was found unclear,
and infrastructure was not examined (Imbs and Wacziarg 2000, 21). Looking ahead,
diversifying may help prevent against any industrial cyber sabotage (Knake 2016, 1-8).
In total, this study is in line with Imbs and Wacziarg study, who found GDP to be
a major factor of diversification, and Clark (2010), who found that GDP is a major factor
in vertical trade. Also, Brutti (2010), building on the work of Saint-Paul (1992), and by
Koren and Tenreyro (2004), find volatility in GDP is a major concern for small,
developing countries. The standard deviation of per capita income growth, or volatility,
is related to lower GDP growth. Brutti writes, “aggregate volatility, indeed, depresses
growth” (Brutti 2010, 1). And, growth increases income inequality. Poor countries,
Brutti writes, are more susceptible to risk due to strong dependence of commodity
production. Diversified sectors require strong contracts, which are only present in large
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countries with developed institutions (Brutti 2010, 1-3). Important are patents and the
rule of law: why would one start a firm if its assets could be stolen? (Brutti 2010, 1-3)
Also important, other studies find, are that sectors which use many suppliers, and
intermediate goods, reduce volatility, which is counter to the theory here, except if such
chains are connected efficiently through technology. Korgut et al. (2002) cite studies
finding that supply chain “diversification … should reflect interindustry technological
relatedness” (Korgut et al. 2002, 2). But, in the study here, technology was tough to
evaluate statistically: it can be considered a form of intra-industry trade, which lowers
risk, but in domestic commerce, it is insignificant. Lastly, when countries do specialize,
they do so differently. Developed countries specialize in “sophisticated” industries such
as nuclear power plants, as in Japan, with developing countries specializing in traditional
spheres like agriculture, family-owned, or religious businesses (Brutti 2010, 1-3).
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
This article began with the theories on trade from David Ricardo in the 1800s,
who actually conceived his ideas about comparative advantage due to the risks presented
by the lengthy 19th Century European wars and blights. While comparative advantage
still holds, diversification was indeed a factor that ushered in free trade, confirming this
hypothesis. The second methodological approach showed that countries can realize this
intuitively, while the case histories of the varied economies shows that it can require an
economic shock to different sectors of the economy. In the case analysis of the three
countries, the difference among them was seemingly the strength of state institutions.
Although studies have run regressions on diversification and specialization, most
only focus on one or the other, or use other measurements, such as labor concentration,
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number of products, or number of intermediate goods. This article used number of
enterprises, and included many more variables in its regression, finding that trade not
only increases risk, but results in diversification into more business areas, as a precaution against Keynesian shocks. However, some areas of business, particularly
manufacturing, made no significant difference, but instead, agricultural and energy
diversification emerged in importance. The specific comparison of diversification and
specialization is a fairly new to researchers, which made this article difficult, but unique.
This article also offers discovers another explanation to the handful of theories explaining
intra-industry trade, which in the regression was shown to reduce risk. As Grubel and
Lloyd wrote, because of the “risk” of supply chain strikes and disturbances, countries
“reduce the effects of uncertainty through international diversification of production…”
(Grubel and Lloyd 1975, 146), but this has largely been missed by modern economics.
In total, free trade and diversified trade lessens the possibility of calamities,
specifically with certain staple goods, which was shown in nearly all parts of the analysis
beginning with Great Britain and Ireland in the 19th Century, even though this was only
one of several concerns. From the regressions, countries can take advantage of free trade
by trading for similar products, “intraindustry trade,” which was highly significant as
reducing risk and expanding the number of firms, so long as this does not increase
competition such as to drive goods from the market (Grubel and Lloyd 1975, 136).
Intermediate parts and vertical trade were found to neither increase nor decrease risks, so
perhaps this is a strong area for developing countries and its firms to start to grow, as
they have in Mexico after NAFTA, although by themselves they are not included in GDP.
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The entirety of the statistical data was not conclusive, such as with manufacturing,
which still conforms to Ricardian economics of specialization, nevertheless, this does not
minimize that an enormous amount of variables used were highly significant. It is
surprising how accurate the statistical hypotheses were, though supply chains apparently
caused the discrepancy with some of the variables in the regressions, which is why
supply chains as institutions were discussed on their own. Still, this paper finds that trade
both increases risks, but also encourages countries to diversify into more firms. This
article therefore provides much needed new, deductive information, which meets a rising
interest in this topic, as risky failures of states convince them to heed to apropos policies.
In terms of policies, governments, beyond free and diversified trade, particularly
in developing states, might be best to avoid excessively high tariffs, encourage crossnational joint ventures with diversified leadership, and incentivize firms to diversify and
move into more industries, because this will lessen volatility and not only make growth
more stable, but also have the chance to magnify it. Yet, it should come with the insight
that there could still be large cyclical swings. Trade with more, and different, countries
would also be diversifying, and state agencies should make known accurate and timely
information about foreign markets to spur new business creation and competitiveness.
But in this respect, nations can rely on the long-term international organizations
developed after World War II. Concerning these, the WTO, IMF, and World Bank have
been greatly helpful in reducing risk, but, some would say, have stalled over time, and
new reforms in terms of structure and financing could be used, as well devoting more of
their analysis to preventing risk. More countries should switch to managed floats and
hold larger reserves of currencies, particularly for developing countries, to lessen the
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chance of international crises. Increasingly, countries will realize the political-economic
power afforded by loaning globally, and the stature it lends, as with the case of Greece.
The laws of comparative advantaged goods still hold, and governments should
continue to promote comparative advantage goods in trade agreements, and syphon
activity into these spheres for efficiency purposes, but also promote diversity, to help
protect against risks. Gains from trading less risky goods should be balanced with
productivity lost from trade in non-competitive goods. In larger, more developed
economies, this seems less of a problem, given that GDP has the highest beta score. Beta
standardizes variables so they can be compared against each other in significance. This
study concurs with others in finding that the small, developing countries are the ones
most likely to diversify, to avoid risk, but while they grow and become large countries,
they start to specialize more, because they can assume the risks, such as by having strong
institutional supply chains, democratic rule, and sound macroeconomic policies. Still,
institutions may stagnate over time, and lower growth, which will require retesting, as
well, to determine if the U shape found here begins to reverse in the other direction.
Even as late as 2017, countries from Japan, to Finland, to Australia, to countless
other states not addressed here, years after trade first exploded across the English
Channel, are still searching for ways to diversify their economies. Have states stopped,
empirically, diversifying when the statistical levels suggest? Japan reached levels of
trade for specialization around 2001, but Australia is just nearing this level, and Finland
is only at 1/5, but more will be seen as they approach the GDP/capita turning point level.
Policies with trade are tricky, choosing “winners” and “losers,” but, states can go further
to offer tax credits, lower tariffs, provide loans, form import/export banks, and seek out
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public-private partnerships to expand to new fields and products, and convince citizens
that this will reduce risks and volatility, or increase it if desired, to spur economic growth.
An example of this in the United States were the loans President Barack H.
Obama promoted to the United States energy sector. Loans, though, may themselves be
risky unto themselves, and must be measured and be carefully screened by officials, so as
to be least politically controversial. Countries can use tariffs to protect infant industries,
one being technology, which, according to one statistical variable used, reduced risk.
States can protect senile industries, and in some cases use intra-industry trade, to protect
from competition. Managers should work to develop strong, safer supply chains and use
greater insurance for volatile products, variables that were both significant at reducing
risk. As the energy variable was found to reduce risk, states should seek alternative
forms, and avoid “resource curses” by delegating state profits to financial funds that are
carefully protected from abuse, as some Middle Eastern countries already do, which Booz
and Company noted. Future research might better regress sundry industries rather than
products, which has been the standard, or expand on enterprises, the method used in this
article, and quantify the several complex conceptual equations. These would certainly
both be welcomed additions.
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CHAPTER IV – ARTICLE III: FINANCE AND GOVERNMENT – CAUSES OF THE
CURVE; ACCESSING RISK IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FINANCE
Abstract
Can bond yield curves and the Anxious Index indicate if too much or little risk is
being expected in the short-term, indicated by differences in term rates, thus predicting
recessions and risk? Various theories are discussed. This article hypothesizes that
government bonds, which are one type of financial investment, can to an extent indicate
coming periods of growth or recession. Bond yield curves, which show interest rates for
short term versus longer turn bonds, should turn inverted before recessions occur because
investors have more worried expectations about present investments, rather than the
future, and thus are willing to bear a greater risk premium, while in the future they cannot
bear any more risk. Little has been researched on countries other than the United States.
In addition, yield curves may be affected by shocks, inflation, debt, and maturity
preferences, which are tested for in regressions of bond term premiums, of monetary
policy, of debt, and of recessions, and then combined in several grand regressions. The
countries used are random developed and developing countries, post-World War II
(WWII). A comparison is made between the Anxious Index and Bond Yield Curve.
Finally, an analysis of national financial institutions are evaluated, to analyze risk through
diversification, as well as within a Boston Consulting Group (BCG) matrix to determine
the relationship between the risky concentration of society and that of a nation’s private
finance institutions, followed by a conversation of public and private financial policy.
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Introduction
The topics of “finance and government” are presented last in this dissertation,
because these functions nourish both consumption and trade with the money necessary to
operate. As they do so, bond yield curves are constantly changing, as are all types of
financial data. Can bonds indicate if too much or little risk is expected in the short or
long-term? The initial hypothesis under consideration here is that government bonds,
which are one type of financial investment, can to an extent indicate coming periods of
growth or recession. Bond yield curves, showing interest rates for short- versus longer
turn bonds (Fig. A3), turn inverted before recessions hypothetically because investors
have more worried risk expectations about the present, rather than the future, and are
willing to pay greater risk premiums, while in the future they cannot bear more risk.
Little has been researched on these issues in countries other than the United States.
The primary growth of society is through financial risk, which is the cardiac
aspect of the system, supplying each part with blood. Too much risk can spell disaster,
whether through crises or recession. British economist John Maynard Keynes was the
first to write about the qualities of money, which affected investment, and, in turn,
affected the labor market, all in the short-run, in The General Theory (1936). The
Investment: Saving- Liquidity: Money (IS-LM) Model, developed slightly later by J.R.
Hicks and Franco Modigliani, links the goods market to the financial market through
interest rates. Due to riskiness, the return on a project or investment may differ from the
original interest-rate-level source of funding, which require use of macro models. As
interest rates rise, there is more risk for demand, and less for supply (Figs. A18, A19).
Firms take out loans at specific interest rates, to fund projects they believe will have
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returns that are higher, what Keynes called the “marginal efficiency of capital” (Keynes
1936, 135) (Fig. A20). Current financiers call this percent the “internal rate of return.”
However, by the time all product development, or infrastructure, is complete, the market
may have changed (Figs. A10, A18, A19). Another factor affecting rates is that when
consumers save more, the supply of available short-term funds increases, lowering
interest rates, and increasing investment, until rates rise again from demand.
The Financial Instability Hypothesis was developed by Hyman Minsky in the
1960s as a corollary to Keynes’ works. Minsky vaguely attempted to link risk and microeconomic characteristics of a firm’s balance sheet and income statement, such as profits,
with macroeconomic phenomenon, most notably investment, prices, and wages. His
hypothesis focused primarily on company debts, but could be applied to governments as
well: “over a period of time in which the economy does well, views about acceptable debt
structure change [,]” but it is a “speculative investment boom [that] is the basic instability
in a capitalist economy” (Minsky 1977, 24). Instability occurs because “the revaluation
of acceptable debt structure, when anything goes wrong, can be quite sudden and quick”
(Minsky 1977, 25). Thus, he was a Post-Keynesian, but traditionally Keynesian in that
he believed government policy could indeed have some effect on markets, on the “course
of development of an economy” (Charles 2008, 125, 126).
One problem is, as Keynes pointed out in what he called a liquidity trap, if there
are no good investment opportunities available. And, crucially, it is important for prices
and interest rates not to be “sticky” and slow to adjust to market conditions, requiring
government intervention. Keynes also wrote about the velocity of money, which he
noted can change. For instance, it can lessen if consumers perceive more risk. Velocity,
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as Irving Fisher wrote, links money supply to the price level and the quantity of goods
(Buchholz 1989, 226). Minsky’s works are curious in that he downplays risk in microeconomics by treating business profits solely as derived from, and going for, investments
(Minsky 1982, 145, 189). But, profits depend primarily on interest rates, and firms use
them for lavish executive perks which spiked in the last two decades of the 20th Century.
A better, earlier explanation of how risk affects finance comes from University of
Minnesota professor Alvin Hansen, the “American Keynes,” which, in Mitchell’s (1954)
work, theorizes that during good times, investors and firms take out more loans at low
interest rates, until banks have no more funds, causing “runs” on banks. These runs occur
until banks are able to acquire repayments from borrowers and thus the process starts
again with lending. However, Hansen ignores the fact that risky projects may not yield
the returns originally expected (Fig. A12). These risks can cause defaults, spurring
policies of greater reserve requirements for banks. A similar crisis can occur for stocks,
if investors suddenly realize that stock prices are higher than their true value, or are a
“bubble,” if companies’ growth rates are slow. Minsky goes as far as explaining the
risky, profit-making motives of banks (Minsky 1982, 225, 229-230). The United States
crisis of 2008 was by financial by nature, causing both domestic and global failure.
In general, firms and business people dislike uncertainty, and/or risk, because it
yields problems with forecasts and planning, regardless of whether the risks are
attributable to economic, political, social, or any other factor. Conversely, some
developing countries suffer from lack of enough risk by functioning as barter economies.
Many in contemporary Muslim majority states refuse to charge interest on investment, as
Christians did in the Middle Ages. Interest was seen as unfair and usury. Instead,
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Islamic banking offers sharing of returns on investments. With micro-finance programs,
small groups lend money rotationally for buying small capital goods such as a sewing
machine, an assessment elaborated on in greater depth in this dissertation’s conclusion.
This article therefore analyzes theories that risk differentials across bonds of
different lengths, particularly government bonds that are the most risk-free case, are one
of the most successful predictors of coming recessions, and possibly even growth, though
usually with a year-long lag. Nearly every recession in the United States in the 20th and
21st Century, except for 1991, was predated by an inversion of the bond yield curve. The
yield curve is normally the short term T-bills to longer denominations all of the way up to
30 year Treasury bonds, which in theory should be the riskiest since their maturities are
the furthest away in time and more likely to be defaulted upon.
Investors may move back and forth between stocks and bonds over riskiness, or
between different lengths of bonds due to tastes and preferences, as suggested by “market
segment theory,” or “the preferred habitat hypothesis.” Fiscal or monetary policy,
inflation from oil, shocks, or micro issues collectively called the “financial accelerator,”
also raise bond yields, called “premiums.” Others point to policy decisions by central
banks in raising interest rates, while government debt raises interest rates, through supply
and demand, and thus risk, as well. The central idea is that the yield spread between
short-term bonds and long-term bonds indicates the risk expectations of investors of the
near future compared with the distant future. This idea of “expectations” dates back to
works by Lucas and Romer from the 1970s, and is now called New Classical Economics
(Klamer 1984, 1). New Keynesians have diffidently accepted expectations. If bond
yields turn inverted, it not only signals expectations of upcoming recessions, but also that
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the country has absorbed as much financial risk possible. The hypotheses are that the
expectation effects of the yield curve are real, that premium theories are more significant
than the market segmentation theory or the preferred habitat hypothesis, and that
government monetary and fiscal policy (debt) also raise or lower yield curves (Arnold
1998, 319). The author will attempt to unearth which of these theories are veritable.
Literature Review and Theories
Empirical evidence substantiates that the market segmentation hypothesis holds
for the short term, in the contexts of studies by Mustafa and Rahman (1995), Park and
Switzer (1997) Simon (1991), and Taylor (1992). Research for longer periods is weak.
One examination of the theory was a paper by Phillips (2003), which looked specifically
at the United States (U.S.) government in 1999 (Phillips, 2003, 1). The “market
segmentation” theory contends that bond investors have a market segment in which they
like to invest, for business reasons. A similar theory, the “preferred habitat hypothesis,”
argues that bond holders will only move out of their habitat for a premium (Kidwell et al.
2000). Phillips (2003) examined this “preferred habitat hypothesis,” using the Constant
Maturity Treasury (CMT) yields, a weekly yield curve estimate by the Treasury
Department. Using OLS regression analysis, he subtracted forecasted yields from the
CMT expectation and found only a slight, insignificant difference, but significant at the
time in November, 1999 when the Federal Reserve announced its buyback program. He
finds this as verification of his initial hypothesis, but also notes that bond yields may have
reacted to Federal Reserve interest rate policies. However, short-term yields did not
cause investors to move from longer term markets to shorter ones (Phillips 2003, 1-5).
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Turning to another theory, Thomas and Wu (2006) considered interest rate moves
following announced changes in future deficits. These two authors cite several studies
which find that following announcements of laws being passed on reducing deficits, such
as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law of 1985, and the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990,
interest yields were lower (Thomas and Wu 2006, 1-2). Relatedly, Thomas and Wu find
that each one percent increase in the expected two-year-ahead deficit/GDP ratio likely
increases the yield spread by 20-50 basis points (Thomas and Wu 2006, 5). According to
Fisher (2001), such expectations are a main determinant of bond yields, including risk
aversion and “convexity,” by which he means uncertainty, which can remove the ability
to arbitrage (Fisher 2001, 1), the ability to shift money for slight gains in yield variations.
Another possible causal path of why yield curves are related to recessions is
microeconomic- yield curves worry bank managers by putting pressure on the margin
between interest earnings and funding costs. Low margins can lead bank managers to
take more risks in hopes of earning more. During the 2001 recession, the charge-off rate
for U.S. banks, which are losses divided by total loans, increased by 50% until it reached
a height of 0.16% in December of 2002. Since loans usually have longer time-spans than
shorter term deposits, long-term interest rates are crucial in creating revenues. When the
yield curve inverts, and long-term rates fall, margins oftentimes shrink, as do profits,
which encourages greater risk taking, called “chasing yield” (Balla et al. 2007, 37-38).
Banks can also pursue a leverage-growth strategy, of expanding assets owned in
an effort to broaden out risk. Surprisingly, banks usually try to take on more risk, by
lessening lending standards, lending in areas they would typically avoid, or providing
new instruments, all of which, unfortunately, generate more loan losses (Balla et al. 2007,
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38). This risk taking actions by banks is another causal factor of why flattened curves
may actually “cause” recessions, but usually there is a lag before recessions, which gives
more weight to expectations theory, and banks as of 2017 are more cautiously managing
assets and using fixed rates and fees. From 1986 to 2006, the percentage of bank income
from fees rose from 6.45% to 9.32% in the United States nationally (Balla et al. 2007, 2).
Still, Wang and Yang (2012) disagree, claiming both recessions and inversions
may be caused together by some event, such as a financial crisis or tight monetary policy,
which first affects the yield curve, and then output, but not causing the decline in GDP.
This explanation differs from theories that higher short-term rates drive out investment
and cause recessions. The yield curve inversion is merely a “by-product” (Wang and
Yang 2012, 6). The LM, or money market curve, shifts left, and Y (GDP) decreases.
Regrettably, they offer no real world examples of the “shocks” that they say affect these
changes (Wang and Yang 2012, 5-6). Using another example, Hamilton and Kim (2002)
theorize what occurs when central banks use a contractionary monetary policy. Investors
expect there will be a temporary rise in the short-term rate, then long-term rates will rise
less, the curve will flatten, and there will be less short-term spending, hurting growth. A
policy of expansion would have the reverse effect (Hamilton and Kim 2002, 4).
The issue of whether yield curves predict recessions involves two types of
literature; first, trying to predict the actual future growth rate, and second, trying to
predict the probability of recessions; here, only the latter theory is of concern. Although
most research is post-World War II (WWII), some economists find predictions of output
dating back to 1875 in the United States and 1870 in Germany (Haubrich 2006, 2-3).
Balla et al. (2007) report that “a recession has not followed every inversion” (Balla et al.
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2007, 39). The largest discrepancy was 1966-1967 when the curve flipped but there was
no official recession (Balla et al. 2007, 39). Still, today, other economists claim the yield
curve “might not be as reliable a predictor … as it used to be” (Haubrich 2006, 1). In the
1992-1994 period, Federal Reserve Chairman Allan Greenspan commented on the flat
yield curve, arguing that the traditional yield curve is less important than the gap between
“the current and long-run levels of the real federal funds rate” (Haubrich 2006, 2-3).
This gap theory leads into an analysis by Wright (2006-07), who believes that the
probability of a recession can actually be predicted by the degree of inversion. Wright
contends that, “The shape of the yield curve that has historically been the strongest
predictor of recessions involves an inverted yield curve with a high level of the funds
rate” (Wright 2006-07, 7). Such evidence seems to verify Chairman Greenspan’s
comments. Wright, in 2006-2007, predicted a 50% chance of recession in the next four
quarters using the model with the federal funds rate, but only 20% when not including ithis results, in hindsight, turned out to be somewhat prophetic (Wright 2006-07, 60).
In addition, attempts to predict growth may fail due to the powerful lack of
inflation in the 21st Century, which makes future yields look less steep, an area that
Haubrich has examined (Haubrich 2006, 4). Phillips (2003), mentioned earlier, also
questions orthodoxy by rejecting that the central bank’s monetary policy affects the yield
curve. He notes that the federal funds rates rose in 2000, yet the yield curve declined in
this period. Phillips then tested the expectation hypothesis with a statistical regression in
which the yield on the U.S. 30-year bond was a function of a constant and on a premium
from all of the shorter term bonds, with a high explanatory R2 of 0.98 (Phillips 2003, 5).
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Stock and Watson (1989) reinitiated the discussion of why yield curves might
affect economies, with their new economic indicators being the premium difference
between the six-month commercial paper (private bonds) and the six-month Treasury bill,
as well as the difference between the ten-year and one-year Treasury bond rates
(Hamilton and Kim 2002, 1). Zamsky provided several reasons why the T-bill is the best
metric. They are the “benchmark rate for asset allocation decisions,” and the “pricing of
new bond issues,” they are used to “hedge interest rate risk,” they are used for
international “value comparison,” and they are very liquid (Zamsky 2000, 2). Estrella
and Trubin (2006) added United States data stemming since World War II. Another
round of papers followed, including Harvey (1988, 1989), who linked term structures to
output growth, and Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991), who used the difference between the
ten-year Treasury bond and the three month T-bill and several European states beyond
the United States. Plosser and Rouwenhorst (1994) examined three industrialized
countries, and found the term structure is a better predictor than monetary policy, while
Estrella and Mishkin (1998) found term structures to be the best predictors of a recession
in the next four quarters. Haubrich and Dombroski (1996) and Dotsey (1998) found that
the yield curve’s usefulness is declining over time (Hamilton and Kim 2002, 1).
According to Hamilton and Kim (2002), the causation of the yield curve is
unclear, because “no one has yet proposed a way of separately measuring the role of the
term premium itself in accounting for the spreads’ usefulness in forecasting” (Hamilton
and Kim 2002, 1), which would involve very timely surveying of premiums investors
would pay based on risk. Using the spread of the 10-year Treasury bond and the three
month T-bill, and independent variables for the Federal Funds’ rate, estimates for M1 and
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M2 money supply, and an index for oil prices, the coefficient for recessions linked with
GDP remained significant two years ahead (Hamilton and Kim 2002, 2-4). Therefore,
methodology is the key to one’s outlook on the subject.
However, market expectations of future macroeconomic growth may play a role,
because if one expects high growth, the yield on long-term bonds should rise, based on
“expectations.” But risk plays a role as well. If interest rates become very volatile
toward the end of an expansion, expectations do not change, but the risk premium does,
which could lead to a flattening of the curve (Hamilton and Kim 2002, 4). According to
Estrella and Trubin (2006), most research has been empirical, developing correlations
rather than building theories. They furthermore state that short-term rates are more
predictive, because prior to four United States’ recessions, the long term rates rose
instead of falling. They also find that the more pronounced inversions, especially the two
in the 1980s, are “associated” with deeper recessions (Estrella and Trubin 2006, 3).
Mody and Taylor (2003), in light of the yield curve’s lack of inversion before the
1990-91 U.S. recession, offer an alternative hypothesis discussed in the literature, that of
the “financial accelerator” (Mody and Taylor 2003, 1). This is calculated as the premium
on “high yield” or “junk bonds” on top of government debt or high-rated, AAA corporate
bonds. They found the accelerator theory particularly useful for predicting in the 1970s
and 1980, yet since then they do find that the “high yield spread has a high predictive
content” (Mody and Taylor 2003, 1). Tight U.S. monetary policy, via its effect on shortterm interest rates, increases capital outflows to developing countries. The reduced U.S.
supply steepens yield curves. High yield spreads predict higher default rates, less access
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to credit, and slower economic activity (Mody and Taylor 2003, 1-3). The author here is
not John Taylor, known his formula for monetary policy (Dornbusch et al. 2011, 187).
The financial accelerator begins when, and only when, there is friction in the
financial market, as in the case of asymmetric information or contract enforcement costs,
or more risk, such as in America. High yield bonds are at times more available in the
developing world, creating a “premium” for external funds from the more prestigious
United States (Mody and Taylor 2003, 4). Until recently, theorists did not know how to
explain this external premium, until some compared it to other scholars’ concept of
“chasing yield” which the accelerator theory portrays (Mody and Taylor 2003, 4).
A high yield spread in particular tends to predict an economic slowdown (Mody
and Taylor 2003, 6). Mody and Taylor (2003) conclude, however, by arguing that yield
curves lost their predictive power in the mid-late 1980s, which has already been
discussed, due to more aggressive policies targeting inflation. Conversely, the 1970s had
high inflation, and oil shocks, which resulted in flatter yields and less economic activity.
One should note, this is contrary to other findings that oil prices play only a small part in
yield curves (Mody and Taylor 2003, 11). Mody and Taylor predicted, in 2003, that the
accelerator’s friction would decline over time (Mody and Taylor 2003, 11), which was
apparently wrong, given the low U.S. rates today compelling investment overseas.
Writing in 2006, directly before onset of the 2008 U.S. financial crisis, Thomas
and Wu (2006) asked why the yield curve was flat, in spite of large deficits, numerous
rate hikes by the Fed, a “major” upsurge of energy prices, and higher U.S. inflation,
leading Greenspan to call it a “conundrum” (Thomas and Wu 2006, 5). Asian countries
were investing heavily in U.S. long-term bonds, but one would think this demand would
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cause the curve to increase. Market conditions were stable and less volatile, but the
financial crises that came about shortly after contradicts the before-hand stability.
However, Thomas and Wu predicted that Social Security and Medicare could put strains
on the system and cause longer-term rates to rise (Thomas and Wu 2006, 5-6).
Of importance is distinguishing between the shape of the yield curve and the
height, or level of the curve, the former which is more useful here. Europe is a good
place to analyze debt theories, as, by 2007, various countries were highly integrated.
Integration convinced some borrowers there was little difference between nations, when
there was a difference, in terms of risk. Greece had a margin over European Monetary
Union bond yields until 2001, but it disappeared once it joined the Euro after that year.
The Treaty of Maastricht made clear that each country maintained full responsibility for
its own debts, with no “bail-out” (Holland et al. 2011, 1). In 2010, the markets started to
diverge, revealing European debt was not risk-free. Credit agencies downgraded Greek
and Irish debt, first in 2009, then Portugal in 2010. From November 2009 to May 2011,
these three countries witnessed 32 downgrades from agencies (Holland et al. 2011, 1-6).
The European Union (EU) allowed no-debt servicing costs on loans, a nice
amenity, possible from a strong budget of 60 billion [euro]. In mid-July 2011, Greek
bonds were 15 points higher than in Germany (a stable country), Ireland’s bonds were
11.2 points higher, and Portugal’s bonds were 10.3 points higher, and they have not
receded, causing a complete loss of confidence that could last decades. The EU and IMF
agreed to reduce rates of interest in order to make borrowing more profitable. In other
countries, Spain had a spread over Germany of 3.1 points, Belgium was at 1.5 points
higher, and Italy was at 2.7. These borrowing spreads not only mean, as already stated,
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the loss of wealth to citizens, but losses to firms and banks, reducing consumer spending,
weakening balance sheets, crunching credit for banks, and increasing bank lending
margins. Because bond prices are inversely related to their yield, the increase in rates
meant lower bond values. The European rescue plans, given its debt crisis, involve
restructuring and swapping existing bonds for new, altered bonds with less principal or
interest, so-called refinancing, and extending bonds’ lengths (Holland et al. 2011, 1-6).
Europe gives further evidence to the theory that fiscal discipline lowers interest
rates. In addition, a country’s credit risk ratings, forecasts of its fiscal debt, minor factors
such as international trade risk aversion and the liquidity of its markets, which is related
to market size, also affect yields levels. Additionally, Bayoumi, Goldstein, and Woglom
(1995) found that bond yields of U.S. states are determined by level of state debt, while
national debt may also affect spreads between public and corporate bonds, according to
Alesina et al. (1992). Another statistic to be examined involving accurate risk prediction
is known as the “Anxious Index” (Trader’s “Reassessing” 2010, 1-3).
The Anxious Index, also called the Survey of Profession Forecasters (SPF), is
another index that can measure risk. Along with the Livingston Survey and the
University of Michigan prediction of inflation, the SPF relies on human intuition rather
than direct data alone. While, in the course of this analysis, the “yield curve” and the
“Anxious Index” are neither themselves “rules” which affect policy, the Anxious Index
does indeed rely more upon human “gut” feelings, best made by a holistic examination of
the market, whereas the “yield curve” simply follows data (Keane and Runkle 1989, 24).
A word about rules versus discretion is here warranted. A “rule” is defined as
“nothing more than a systematic decision-making process that uses information in a
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consistent and predictable way” (Poole 1999, 12). Other examples include fixed
exchange rate systems that developing countries use to maintain currency within a range,
or even attaching a currency to a commodity, such as gold. The debate that arose in the
United States during the Obama administration over budget issues concerns a fiscal rule
that Congress must pass and the President must sign to approve increases to the national
debt, although the money has already been appropriated. The law encourages fiscal
responsibility, but can be detrimental if the two parties do not agree for political purpose
and hold each other “hostage.” This is a common economic and political fact.
In 1968, the SPF forecasts were used on 10 macroeconomic variables; four were
eliminated and 11 were added in 1981 (Baghestani and Nelson 2011, 1). The SPF was
created in-part by Victor Zornowitz, and since then number of respondents have varied
between fifteen and sixty “experts” (Kean and Runkle 1989, 27). There has been some
discrepancy over what exactly constitutes a recession for all such studies. A study by
Lahiri and Wang (2006) concluded that “external shocks cannot, by definition, be
predicted.” However, shocks can time “to generate,” during the early stages of which
they can be better predicted (Lahiri and Wang 2006, 26- 27). Their study shows experts
as having under-confidence, since the average forecast of a recession was 7.2%, whereas
in other sciences weather or earthquakes are over-predicted (Lahiri and Wang 2006, 28).
A study by Keane and Runkle (1989) tested whether or not people are “rational,”
in the context of “rational expectations,” or the “efficient market hypothesis,” in which
case prices are in essence “built into the system” by everyone beforehand, all having
similar information. Therefore, “outsmarting” the market, especially in the short term, is
very difficult. They theorized, though, that professional forecasters have an incentive to
155

be more accurate since their reputation is on the line, as is their business. Further, they
contend their study uses different and more accurate data, assume that forecasters’ errors
may be correlated, and note that “the most helpful information in prediction the future
values of most economic variables is the current and past values…” (Keane and Runkle
1989, 29). The moment “when forecasters have current [information] is crucial” (Keane
and Runkle 1989, 32), as is the assumption that forecasters are rational. In this study,
forecast errors were low and were themselves unpredictable, indicating rationality.
Forecast errors were duly low for inflation (Keane and Runkle 1989, 33)
According to Lahiri and Wang (2006), “Psychologists have shown that
individuals [tend to] bias their estimated probabilities towards an anchor, the base rate in
this case (30%), particularly when they face difficult forecast situations” (Lahiri and
Wang 2006, 32). The SPF did not forecast the 2001 recession, and had true false signals
in 1975 and 1980, probably because, for the last, the National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER) denied the economy was in recession definition-wise when it most
likely was (Lahiri and Wang 2006, 33). Stock and Watson (2003), proponents of the
yield curve, noted the 2001 miss, but Lahiri and Wang wrote, “these forecasters possess
significant skill and are acceptable calibrated and resolved,” similar to the skill found in
Graham (1996) (Lahiri and Wang 2006, 35). Still, “the variance (error)… was found to
be three times more than necessary. This result are responsive to cues or predicators that
are not related to … negative GDP growth” (Lahiri and Wang 2006, 35).
Baghestani and Nelson (2011) cite Bernstein and Silbert (1984) as finding that
professional forecasters are “better than naïve predictions, especially for economic
measures where market roles are not directly driven by expectation” (Baghestani and
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Nelson 2011, 1). They find that some variables are easier to predict than others, and that
forecasts made at later times are more accurate than early forecasts (Baghestani and
Nelson 2011, 2). For instance, the unemployment rate is easier to forecast than the 3month T-bill rate. Inflation was found to be the most difficult, where using the Phillips
Curve based on changes in employment might help, as explained in Article I of this
dissertation. Nevertheless, while no single forecaster was “constantly accurate,”
“average forecast error” was considerably low, and professional forecasters were
evaluated to be more accurate than “naïve” ones (Baghestani and Nelson 2011, 1).
A Su and Su (1975) study suggests professional forecasters are more accurate
than econometric time-series models and also better at predicting changes in data rather
than the resultant data itself, such as changes in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) versus
exact future GDP. A Hafer and Hein (1985) research paper found forecasters to be more
accurate about inflation than models based on interest rates, which usually foresee higher
inflation. A Lahiri and Teigland (1987) study concluded that that forecasts are not
usually normally distributed. Consequently, there is a greater tendency for experts to
skew their predictions either right or left of the mean. Lahiri, Teigland, and Zaporowski
(1988) interestingly found that real (not nominal) interest rates actually decline upon
heightened uncertainty over inflation (Croushore 1993, 13).
A 1990 Keane and Runkle paper implies that forecasters are rational, meaning
they do not “leave useful information unexploited” (Croushore 1993, 13). Changes are
anticipated and built into the market ahead of time so that individual profit-making is
more difficult. A paper by McNees (1992) discovered that forecasting mistakes are
greater when recessions occur or expansions begin than at other times, and a Rudin
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(1992) study recognized that forecasters all have very different beliefs, which are not
always consistent with time series models (Croushore 1993, 13).
Regarding the ability to predict inflation, the author compares two articles, one by
Levy (1982), the other by Estrella (2005). Levy took the yield curve in times of low
inflation and “compare[d] it with the yield curves observed during periods of high
inflation in order to obtain an estimate of future inflation rates as predicted by the
market” (Levy 1982, 37). He acknowledged that short term rates indicate “liquidity
preferences and the risk of future changes” (Levy 1982, 37). When compared with the
benchmark, low inflation years of 1961-1964, “estimates were not significantly different
from actual inflation values…” (Levy 1982, 37). The only time as of then when
estimates missed was 1972-1981. The yield curve is a somewhat good predictor of
inflation and the instability it causes, but in the late 1970s investors could not foresee
interest rate policy during times of very high inflation. Levy admits, though, that taxes
can add an additional premium to yield curves (Levy 1982, 37-42).
The second article, Estrella (2005), urges supplementation, summarizes itself:
“The slope of the yield curve has been shown empirically to be a significant predictor of
inflation and real economic activity…,” but adds that it does so not because of
anticipations of changes in monetary policy (Estrella 2005, 722). Estrella cites a paper by
Mishkin in which inflation was predicted better in a shorter time horizon (Estrella, 2005,
723). He writes, “even if the monetary authority cares only about output deviations,
inflation (is considered)…”, and that “Apart from these extreme cases [of caring only
about output], the yield curve is a useful predictor of output and inflation that is optimally
supplemented with other information” (Estrella 2005, 734). “The greater uncertainty
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associated with forecasting inflation, as compared to output,” Estrella notes that his study
is “consistent” with other studies (Estrella 2005, 733). The relationship between the
“term spread” and inflation is stronger from 1963-1987, than it is after 1987, when Alan
Greenspan was appointed Federal Reserve Chairman, after which inflation targeting was
used more (Estrella 2005, 738-743). These findings, though, are only true if monetary
policy is active, not passive (Estrella 2005, 724), since other studies have found no link
because of “complexities” with risk premium that vary by time, movements in the funds
rate, and monetary policies based on different goals (Estrella 2005, 727). The curves
predictive power declines long-term as bond rates approach infinity (Estrella 2005, 742).
Methodology
This article contributes by containing more countries over a longer time period
than most others, and by testing sundry different theories of the ways risk affects bond
yield curves. Methodologically, the analysis contains several regressions for each of
these theories. Statistically, the Ordinary Least Square method can be used to link the
correlation of independent variables with dependent variables based on the “line of best
fit” through the data points that minimizes the collective difference from such line. Beta
tests are used to measure the standard deviation of variables and thus to compare the
effect of variables, since they are inevitably in different units, to see which theories are
more plausible. Dummy variables are binary variables that indicate the presence or
absence of some phenomenon, in this case, a recession or financial crisis, which will be
used as the x variable, so as to include other explanatory variables (Wooldridge 2009, 68,
187-188, 225). Bond yield information is especially important for financial institutions,
which typically buy in the short term and lend for longer terms. Also, they are critical in
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the “formulation of decisions pertaining to investment in plant, equipment, and
technology …” (Thomas and Wu 2006, 5). Investment institutions may try to restrict
lending if they believe the curve will flatten, in which case they may attempt to solidify
expensive rates, which may be another cause, not only a harbinger, of the recessions that
follow, along with a lack of demand in taking out short-term, risky loans.
The United States’ Operation Twist at the end of Chairman Ben Bernanke’s term
flattened out the current shape of the U.S. curve, raising it at the beginning, and lessening
it at the end, with little effect in the middle, a deliberate move. This action gives some
support for the preferred habitat hypothesis, since bond buyers remained in their same
“habitat,” but to test this theory, this dissertation section looks for shocks or policies
causing bond sellers to jump from one market to another, such as this “operation.” As a
result, the author will regress the 30-year minus 20-year premium on the Twenty year
bond minus ten year premium and also the volume change between the two, and look at
the beta, to see if theories related to premium are stronger, that is, if one premium affects
the other across time periods, or if market segmentation theories (which would increase
demand and premiums), hold in this period. One caveat of the regressions is that of
multi-collinearity, because the 20-year and 30-year bonds were also affected by the
change in volume caused by the Federal Reserve. Premiums indicate that longer term
bonds have more risk, which they should, because of increased chance of default.
In an analysis of European countries, the author will test an additional, age-old
question of whether debt-GDP ratios increase interest rate levels (Fig. A8). A regression
is run using the debt-GDP ratios for randomly chosen 2nd quarter, which is in the middle
of the year, from 2012-2015, with the average 10-month European country bond. The
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European data is excellent to use, since many countries have such high levels in the
2000s, and data is easily obtainable. Using the European countries: Portugal, Italy,
Ireland, Greece, and Spain, and several other random European countries, the author tests
the hypothesis that larger state deficits create higher interest rate levels, regressing by the
former. This researcher also runs a regression for non-Euro-zone, European states, after
noticing that these countries had much lower debt levels than the former. Belonging to
the Euro-zone may have an intrinsic quality that links debt to interest rates.
Finally, and most importantly, this dissertation sections creates an historical
model, to prove the “expectations” hypothesis, by regressing long-minus-short-term yield
spreads by a dummy variable for recessions that followed shortly afterwards, the money
supply (if this data is available), and a deficit/debt statistic, again, with a beta. Upcoming
recessions should cause, using expectations theory, greater risk and risk expectations, an
inverted yield curve. Less research has been done on whether or not the yield-curve idea
holds for foreign countries and the United States alike. If this idea holds in developing
countries, it could help indicate when too much risk is being taken and when it is not, or,
the underdevelopment of a country’s financial system.
This article will aim to include diverse global countries, but still, some such as in
Latin America, have periods of extremely high interest rates due to financial crisis and
capital flows. Homer and Sylla’s (2005) A History of Interest Rates includes data on
short- and long-term rates, namely Japan, India, South Africa, Sweden, Denmark,
Norway, and New Zealand, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States from
the 1940s to the present, but bond denominations differ across countries, so just a longand short-term rate will be used. Brian Mitchell’s International Historical Statistics
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books have interest rate and recession data, accessed through the Yale and Southern
Connecticut State University libraries. Some of the bond yield data came from the
Quandl Investing Database, as well as OECD data for Australia, the United States, and
New Zealand after 1990. A caveat is that some data was absent, needing counterfactuals,
such as with the United Kingdom where M2 was used, and India, where interest rates
were deduced from a graph for 1998-2006, and 2010. Taxes were not used as a premium,
as many investors are exempt. Breusch Pagan tests measure heteroscedasticity, the
divergence of data; all tests pass but for one, which will be indicated.
Results
Below, data from Fall 2011, the start of “Operation Twist,” gives credibility to the
market segmentation hypothesis since a change in volume affected supply and therefore
the value of the three month T-bills, short-term.
Table 16 Market Segmentation Test. A change in volume affects interest rates.
Average_Volume

0.0732064

3.54

0.008*

constant

-0.0035081

-0.72

-0.0147582*

Market Segmentation
Dependent Variable: Three_month_T_bill
Variable

Coefficient

P > F= 0.0077 R2= 0.6098 Obs: 10
t

p

*= significant at 95% or greater

Next, Operation Twist, the Fall 2011 policy of the United States’ Federal
Reserve’s to lower long-term rates, was tested by regressing the change in 30-year rates
via changes in volume initiated by the Federal Reserve. It also had an effect upon the
shape of the yield curve between 30-year bonds and 20-year bonds, but not upon the
difference between 20-year bonds and ten year bonds, which are shown below. Overall,
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then, its effect was to flatten out the current shape of our curve, raising it at the
beginning, and lessening it at the end, with little effect in the middle, a deliberate move
by the U.S. Federal Reserve. This gives some support for the preferred habitat
hypothesis, but not to the strength of this hypothesis compared to the others mentioned at
the beginning, which were addressed next, after the chart.
More volume means greater supply, so Ho: B = 0, Ha = B < 0
Table 17 Monetary Policy and Rates. Operation Twist lowered long-term rates.
Average_Volume_rise -0.4685

-3.10

0.015*

Constant

11.62

0.000*

0.4136515

Monetary Policy
Dependent Variable: Thirty_over_Twenty P > F= 0.0146 R2= 0.5458
Variables:

Coefficient

t

Ob:10
p

*= Significant at 95% or greater.

The negative sign indicates that the average volume rise reduced the 30-year over
20-year premium. Consequently, the United States’ Federal Reserve’s Operation Twist
was effective at reducing long-term bond rates.
To compare the two, the statistical work below represents running a regression of
the 30-year minus 20-year premium on the 20-year bond minus 10-year premium and
also the volume change, and the model with just these two variables was highly
significant. Both variables were significant, but the beta of the premium was almost
twice as strong at predicting the change as volume change, which leads one to presume
that theories related to premium are stronger. One premium for one period affects the
next. A caveat of the regressions is that of multi-collinearity, because the 20-year and
30-year bonds were also affected by the change in volume brought about by the Federal
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Reserve. The 30-year bond, meanwhile, varies day to day based on unintelligible factors.
The 20-over-10 is less than the 30-over-20, so the coefficient should be positive. Ho: B1
= 0, Ha: B1 < 0, while volume increases supply, so: Ho: B2= 0, B2 < 0.
Table 18 Premium Theory and Rates. One bond rate affects the rest.
Twenty-over-ten

0.7253331

9.38

0.000*

0.7224276

Average_Vol.

-0.2667448

-5.46

0.001*

-0.4206301

constant

-0.2070382

-3.46

0.018*

No beta

Premium Theory
Dep. Variable: 30-over-20 F > p = 0.000 R2 = 0.9665 Obs: 10
Variables

Coefficient

t

p

beta

*Significant at 95% or greater. These sample sizes are small, but the R2, and adjusted R2, are still high.

In an analysis of European countries, to test an additional, age-old question of
whether debt-GDP ratios increase interest rate levels, the author ran a regression using
the debt-GDP ratios for the 2nd quarter, randomly chosen, from 2012-2015, a “strong
case” since Europe has such high levels but was recovering from its debt crisis, with the
average 10-month European country bond during this period. As one can see below, the
results were highly significant, at a 1% level for the entire model, strongly indicating that
debt levels result in higher interest rates. Based on the data, a one percentage point
increase in the debt-GDP ratio, which is significant at the 1% level, increases 10-year
bonds by 0.12 percent. The author also ran a regression for non-Euro zone, European
countries, after noticing that these countries had much lower debt levels than Euro-zone
countries. The results shown were insignificant, meaning that belonging to the Euro zone
may have some intrinsic quality that links debt to interest rates, which demands further
research. Perhaps investors see putting forth money for so many countries, not
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diversified, is more risky: perhaps the euro is a more risky currency since it is linked to
the European Central Bank’s monetary policies, or perhaps because Europe only has debt
limit “suggestions,” which, when not met, may raise rates.
Fiscal Policy and Debt/Deficits:
Euro countries: Ho: B1 = 0, Ha: B1 > 0
Table 19 European Zone Debt and Rates. Debt raises interest rates, short-term.
Debt_GDP

0.0547321

4.66

0.000*

constant

-1.238575

-1.11

0.272

Dependent Variable: Average 10 yr. bond yield
Variable

P > F = 0.000 R2= 0.2590 Obs: 64

Coefficient

t

p

*Significant at 99%.

Table 20 Non-Euro Zone Countries and Rate. Debt is not significant.
Debt_GDP

0.0078588

0.52

0.606

Constant

2.788855

3.53

0.001*

European, Non-euro Countries:
Dependent Variable: 10 yr. non-euro bond yield P > F = 0.6058 R2 = 0.0071 Obs: 40
Variable

Coefficient

t

p

The constant is significant at 99%, but, more importantly, the model as a whole is not, after witnessing that P > F is 0.6058, which is
extremely high.

It is meaningful to note that Croatia was explicitly excluded from the regressions
because it changed its European Union status in the midst of the time frame, 2012-2015.
In the non-Euro area above, the relationship is less strong, and even non-existent,
perhaps, also, because non-Euro states have more control over their interest rates, or there
is greater incentive, given the increased responsibility, to manage their own fiscal policy.
These findings confirm the seminal papers by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010, 2012),
whose data were found non-duplicable by a professor-led group undergraduate students
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at the University of Massachusetts. Still, the works suggest that economies collapse
when they approach 90% debt to GDP ratio, yet there is no theory for the reason why.
The elasticities of debt and interest payment, which depend on risk, make a difference as
to the effect if a country exceeds a 100% debt to GDP ratio (Figure 8, again, App.). Also,
it is clear from this dissertation that debt depends on the institutional strength of a
countries central bank, and its willingness to allow for inflation of currency. These
factors will both allow for greater GDP, but would reduce investment, depending on the
elasticity of investment with regards to the interest rates, compared to a debt unchecked
by monetary policy, that would increase rates in this model (Fig. A8).
Viewing Fig. A8, growth of state spending is equal to spending itself, aside from
inflation, so this elasticity is 1, meaning that the loss of investment must not be caused by
elasticity than a loss of 1, but anything less than 1 will still generate growth, except for
the inflation; once investment reaches 0, no more growth would plausibly be possible, but
people may rely on previous savings for consumption, or else personal debt.
The higher the interest rate, the more investment should taper off with additional
interest increases, assuming that the risk of investment does not change, which can cause
liquidity traps (from Article I). The elasticity of investment can vary, ranging from high
numbers during liquidity traps to possible low numbers closer to 1 when investments are
less risky and more fruitful. The greater the investment elasticity, the harder it is for
states, while already at high levels of debt, to stimulate the economy, because increases in
deficits will raise rates and lessen investment. Government spending from the debt,
meanwhile, depends largely on entitlements programs, for when interest rates are high,
pension investments earn a higher return, requiring less payments to meet previous
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specified amounts. Most studies, from White (1956) to Guiso and Parigi (1999), find that
the elasticity of demand for investments is very small in relation to interest rates, which
suggests investors consider risks in projects strongly in decisions, and that short-term,
governments can stably increase GDP through debt to avoid crises, should they occur.
Recession Theory and All Variables Together
Ten countries, chosen semi-randomly based on the availability of data (Japan,
India, Denmark, Norway, the United Kingdom, the United States, Sweden, Australia,
New Zealand, and South Africa), offer the most information on historical interest rates of
this dissertation. Incidentally, none of the European countries utilize the euro, making
the interest rate data consistent across the time scope from World War II, 1945, thereby
including European integration. Of the 10 countries, four are significant as to yield curve
inversions predicting recessions, the United States and the United Kingdom, with a one
year lag, and South Africa, and Australia. Australia is significant only including the 1974
oil crisis as a recession, indicated by Hancock (2017), but not in the statistical yearbooks.
With the United States, the significance was at least 98.5%: for the United
Kingdom, it was 99.8%: for South Africa, it was with at least 99.9% significance, and for
Australia, it was with 99.6% significance. The magnitude of the effect of the inversion,
that is, the coefficient of the recession, was greatest for South Africa, and least for the
United States; in other words, the more developed the financial markets, the less the
inversion. As financial systems have become more complex, the time between yield
curve inversions and recessions appeared increased, meaning that more developed
markets, especially the United States as an example, can see risk further out.
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However, for the other countries under consideration, Denmark, Sweden, and
Norway did not have enough recessions over this period, to indicate a significant
relationship, while for India and Japan, GDP was too volatile over this period to connect
to inversions. Though the United Kingdom was significant, the Quandl data set was used
from 1961-2010, since interest rates varied among different sources, most likely due to
the strict austerity of its Exchequer from conservative governments in the 1970s forward.
This type of banking likely influenced its colonies, such as India, which also had very
high interest rates during this time. As for New Zealand, its yield curves were inverted
almost constantly during this time, indicating a lack of stable financing, which one could
call “development.” Denmark, Sweden, and Norway also have weak economic
institutions. Their central banks may not be able to keep rates low enough that would
lead to inversion. The institutions of banking systems is discussed later in this article.
The most interesting finding is perhaps the difference between the significant
and insignificant countries. There have been dramatic changes in savings since World
War II, with some of these countries falling from 20% and 30% down to 0%, but
countries averaging over 7% saving over the last 25 years (1985-2010) were not
significant for the yield curve inverting before recessions, and those for those under 7%
the yield curve held (OECD.org 2017l “Saving,” 1). New Zealand was the exception,
because it did not save 7% and yet was not significant with the yield curve. This suggests
that higher savings may allow investors in countries to react to higher interest rates in the
short-term with the plentiful funds able to bring down short-term rates before a recession.
A penultimate regressions was run amongst both groups, those where there was a
yield curve-recession linkage, and those in which there was not. This regression, for both
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groups, added variables for money supply, as measured by change in M1, cash and shortterm notes, the most liquid form of money making it a strong case, and change in national
debt, which is represented by a proxy variable of trade account deficit since data on
government debt is not available since 1945, and the two figures are similar conceptually,
as government debt goes to finance a trade deficit. The equation and results are below:
Ho: B1 = 0, Ha: B1 < 0, Ho: B2 = 0, Ha: B2 > 0, Ho: B3 = 0, Ha: B3 >0
Yield Curve Inversion= B1 recession (dummy variable) + B2 debt + B3 monetary policy
Table 21 Interest Rate Variables Combined. Recessions and inversions are linked.
Recession

-1.9181

-5.55

0.000*

-0.3316

% ∆ Debt

0.0046

1.50

0.136

0.0897

% ∆ in Money

2.9883

2.91

0.004*

0.1741

Constant

1.4108

0.00

0.000*

N/A

Significant states

Prob > F 0.0000

R2: 0.1461

Obs: 244

p value

beta

Dependent Variable= yield curve spread
Coefficient

t value

*Significant to at least 95%.

In this analysis of the four significant countries, the variable for a recession
occurring sometime within one year, and the variable for monetary policy, had the largest
effects on interest rates over the 1945-2010 year period, with recession having a slightly
greater influence of the two, at a 0.1575 higher beta. Changes in debt fell just short of
being significant. Increasing the money supply typically brings down short-term rates,
thereby increasing the yield spread. Despite this, the R2 explanatory power of the model
is very low at 0.1461, meaning that many other economic factors contribute to interest
rates. For the six countries in which the yield curve was not linked with recessions, first,
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the model is not significant, and additionally, none of the variables are. Premium theory
could not be included in these models because it is designed to study the effects of one
bonds relationship to another, and in these regressions, the dependent variable includes
all of the possible yield curve spread, from the shortest to longest term bonds, while for
the market segmentation theory, volumes of bond trades over this length are unavailable.
The Yield Curve vs. the Anxious Index. The yield curve and “Anxious Index” were
compared as to their predictive power of the yield curve, with data only going back to
1969 because that was the inception of the “Anxious Index.” When using a lag for the
bond yield curve, the yield curve for the United States was a better predictor of yield
curve inversions, at 98% significance, than the Anxious Index, when over 30% of
“experts” predicted recession. But, when the Anxious Index was changed to having a
lag, then it turned out to be a better predictor, at 99% significance, and this is the most
unexpected finding. When recession was the dependent variable, and the “Anxious
Index” is lagged, the “Anxious Index” is a better predictor, with 89.6% significance
which would surely be higher if economic quarters were used than years. Still, the yield
curve is much more significant at 99% when the “Anxious Index” is not lagged. These
results, though, are questionable due to a high heteroscedasticity. The Anxious Index can
predict more variables, like inflation, which the yield curve cannot really do since
inflation is already built into the long-term data.
Conceptually Theorizing. One can reason from all of these regressions that
finance is both public and private: Financial risk= ∆investment / ∆financing, or ∆debt/
∆financing (Gtax), and a breakthrough of this dissertation is that this finance includes ∆
Federal Reserves/ ∆ Saving, since all monetary power ultimately rests with the savings of
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consumers in private markets (see Fig. A8). The risk here is that government, or private
financial, spending which also creates inflationary pressures, as does aggressive monetary
policies, sometimes to compensate the former.
Institutions
Institutions: Property rights
Institutions affect asset prices, as well. Beyond bonds, stock markets are also
risky, increasingly in the 21st Century, where mortgages have been morphed into complex
stocks. Mortgages, and property right, have been a key issue around the world, have
historically important in all economies. Some, like Diamond (1999), explain the defeat
of Native North Americans by environmental factors: the shape and resources of “land.”
Diamond shows how agriculture developed in the most fertile regions, crops spread based
on the physical shape of continents, diseases from domesticated animals inured
Europeans to them, and larger populations first formed governments, and started using
technology. Austrian economist Boehm-Bawerk noted that stockpiling food, such as
through agriculture, allowed the time needed to innovate (Ayers 1962, 54-56). Skeptics
look to the Islamic expansion in Asia and Africa in the 7th Century AD, which was
successful despite few property rights in both regions at that juncture (Naghshpour 2013).
In the 21st Century, mortgages have been combined into risky financial securities,
“deriving” their value from the worth of the original asset. Derivatives, traded in such
markets as London, Germany, Japan, Hong Kong, and Shanghai, are “The very riskiest
portion of the market… .” (Foroohar 2016a, 31). They have actually grown globally by
20% between 2007 and 2013. So-called “shadow banking,” typified by hedge funds, are
owned by private investors and are subject to fewer regulations (Foroohar 2016a, 31).
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Mutual funds, which are the safest and least risky investments, saw bankruptcies
rise to 7% in 2012. Part of the problem, writes Foroohar, is the pressure put on money
managers by senior officers to create enormous profits, which increases risk (Foroohar
2016a, 246). Many companies are finding that turning towards financing, and away from
their core businesses, is counter-productive, as with Kodak, Hewlett-Packard, RCA,
Microsoft, and Intel (Foroohar 2016a, 160). With housing, in 2016, 10% of the richest
geographies own 52% of housing wealth (Foroohar 2016a, 213). Private equity, where
investors raise money for causes, has its own “significant risk” (Foroohar 2016a, 217).
Globally, many firms are merging today, with transactions in 2015 worth over
$900 billion, the highest amount since before the financial collapse (Foroohar 2016a,
146). Decisions on mergers can add synergies to the market through economies of scale,
but also lead to oligopolies and less diversification, and so must clear regulators’ consent.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 diversified technology. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act of 1999 repealed the long-time Glass-Steagall bill, thus congregating commercial and
investment banking (Torres 2012, 25). Furthermore, the 1999 law bypassed the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956, now allowing banks to compete for profit with profitmaking firms (Foroohar 2016a, 198). According to regulator Gary Gensler, “Investment
banks are at the center … of money and risk” (Foroohar 2016a, 199). Firms actually try
to profit from volatility. Regulators should debate, writes Foroohar, not just reserve
rules, but if it is “healthy to have a system in which banks compete directly with their
customers” (Foroohar 2016a, 199- 203), a concept noted in Article I of this dissertation.
Regulations
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Though his research may have been plebian, journalist Thomas Friedman (2007),
in The World is Flat, describes how entrepreneurs in developed and developing states,
particularly the latter, must spend months if not years filling out paperwork in order to
start a business. On the other hand, regulations can stabilize growth. The United States’
Enron and World.com culpability scandal of 2001 culminated in the 2002 passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley bill, which required CEOs to sign off on all financial statements. The
Economist (2016d) called this the end of the era of deregulation, which took place after
Olson’s dire warnings, and changed risk. According to The Economist (2016d), high tech
multinational firms are moving away from economies of scale efficiencies, and instead
“use innovations to expand their networks,” to bypass regulations (The Economist “The
rise of” 2016d, 6, 7). Firms are expanding supply chains, so that services have been
steadier than trade in goods: thus, regulations affect risk (World “New Report” 2017d, 1).
Much of the regulation as of 2017 for international companies is coming from the
European Union (The Economist “The rise of” 2016d, 16). Still, in the United States, the
Dodd-Frank bill, named after former Sen. Chris Dodd (D-CT) and former Representative
Barney Frank (D-MA), but also known as the Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010, was an attempt to prevent another financial crisis comparable to
the 2008 episode. International countries have used it as a model for their own reform.
The two main provisions are “stress tests” conducted periodically on banks, large and
small, to ensure that they have the assets to pay off loans, as well as protections for
consumers against unfair or unclear bank policies. Stress tests for solvency on such small
banks can restrict capital, and so far, no institution of any size has failed in the United
States. Dodd-Frank has convinced other countries to consider similar measures, and has
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led to many new agencies in the U.S., which have been criticized by numerous financial
economists, including Alan Greenspan (2013). The law may go too far by driving money
away from banks, just after the U.S. government was doing everything to finance them.
It is incredibly complex and bureaucratic, which introduces more risk, the risk it is trying
to prevent. And, it is costing the United States billions of dollars to implement.
Government Financial Institutions
Interest rates also depend on governments. Half of countries in the preceding,
penultimate regressions were British colonies, including India, South Africa, the United
States, Australia, and New Zealand. Each has a history of institutional concentration,
which may have led their short-term rates to be so remarkably high and risky. John
Maynard Keynes himself was British, who sharply influenced the United Kingdom, the
United States, and the global institutional structure after the 1929 U.S. stock market
crash. During the global Great Depression, he was on the British Economic Advisory
Council formed in 1930. This council was quickly replaced with two smaller groups, in
the British tradition of setting up committees to advise the weighty Treasury Department.
Before World War II, there were few full-time economists. As in all countries, war
motivated the need for economic analysis. In Keynes’ 1940 work, How To Pay For The
War, Keynes formulated the basic national income accounting equation, explained how
trade can reduce risks in crises, and offered a combination of debt, taxes, deferred wages,
and voluntary saving for financing (Keynes 1940, 1-78). He also used new concepts like
“inflationary gaps” and “output potential,” writes Coats (1981). Barry (2012b) validated
others’ findings that economists acting as executives lack the political skills to increase
growth, but tying legislative or civil economists’ skills to growth is much more complex.
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Central Bank Institutional Strengths
The United Kingdom is where most of the world’s earliest economists came from,
such as Smith and Ricardo, and it was the origin of the modern financial institutional
framework. Some English economists, like John Stuart Mill, were members of the
British Parliament during the mid-19th Century and helped pass social reforms. The Bank
of England, the “Grand Exchequer,” was created in 1946, and is more powerful, therefore
more risky, than nearly any other central bank, but it has remained moderately separate
from the state, as the Federal Reserve has in the United States (Coats 1981, 48-50). The
European Central Bank is also very powerful, as is Germany’s central bank, pursuing
tight monetary policy, perhaps as a precaution against the vast geographical extent of
Europe, helping to prevent currency crises.
In the United States, the Federal Reserve operates somewhat independently from
other the branches of government. But, the “Fed” can only purchase non-risky, federally
backed assets, unlike nations in Europe or Asia. Such foreign laws remove the risky
asset from the market, but increase it by placing the burden on the government. Central
banks prevent currency crisis risks, by holding reserves in other nations’ currencies, but
these can be drained by crisis. The “Fed” has become more transparent partially from
laws passed by California Rep. Henry Waxman (D-CA), but there are calls for reforms
such as audits (Pechman 1989, 113-115). Positively, President George W. Bush met with
Chairman Alan Greenspan upon taking office to display unity. The government also uses
quasi-government agencies like Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae to help expand housing,
despite calls for privatization, and for them to pay dividends to investors, rather than the
state, whom they have paid $266 billion since turning profitable in 2013 (Light 2017, 31).
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Many developing Asian states are “strong,” with less pressure from groups, like
labor, but they are diversifying (Pempel 1999, 167). In Japan, the Bank is weaker than
the Finance Ministry (Komiya and Yamamoto 1981, 280), but over the past thirty years,
Japan has had a “dispersion of policy goals,” in dealing with demographic pressures.
Politicians have increased their role in decision-making, a positive step (Okita 1989, 189190). China’s bureaucracy certainly needs to become more meritocratic and drive out
corruption. Despite efforts to downsize, risky concentration is increasing (Burns 2007,
58, 62-63), and the Communist Party, civil service, Standing Committee, and Politburo,
the highest group, are all densely run (Burns 2007, 62). In Taiwan, the Central Bank is
very powerful (Wade 1990, 196-197). South Korea has a weaker bank, but the state is a
powerful, prolific trade treaty signer (Evans 1995, 51-53). Each have planning agencies.
India and Brazil are referred to as “ambiguous cases,” “inconsistent” in success
(Evans 1995, 44). They both have huge, thick bureaucracies, which lack cooperation and
checks and balances. Indian offices, like Britain were hierarchal, not diverse vertically.
Marx said of the British regime in India in the 1840s-1850s that it was a “writing
machine,” because of the need to inform all decision makers, leading to socialism
(Ambirajan 1981, 104-109). Brazil shows how a bureaucracy, as in Latin American
tradition, can grow too dense. While the Japanese President appoints dozens of officials,
and the U.S. President appoints hundreds, the Brazilian President appoints thousands (up
to 100,000), from connections. The state tries to create “pockets of [market] efficiency.”
(Evans 1995, 61). In such developing states, economists have stable career paths, with
good spirit and respect, but hierarchy can lead to corruption higher up (Evans 1995, 61).
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Agencies in all such states were used by the British, or other colonizers, to create
cultural assimilation, so that “group think” type risk is lessened by camaraderie (Evans
1995, 66). Rotations through different departments help to develop cohesion, and reduce
risk since workers learn about all fields, along with fast career promotion (Ambirajan
1981, 120-128). In Europe, some states, such as Finland, have weaker agencies than in
Asia, with less “planning,” and a more separate business sector (Evans 1995, 227-229).
Similarly, Germany, while having a strong bank, has kept a tradition of dispersing power
among departments, and research institutes, which lessens risk (Kloten 1989, 47-49).
Civil Society/Trust as a Long-term Risk-Reducing Institution for Investment
In order to develop long-term, societies and countries need social bonds in order
to develop the sociological trust necessary to invest in business and projects. As Alexis
de Tocqueville (2004 ed.) noted during his visits to the United States in the early 1800s,
social groups contribute to the political and economic vitality of a country. One example
that illustrates the lack of this role is southern Italy, as described by Banfield (1958).
Accounting was invented in Italy, by the monk Luca Pacioli, during the Middle Ages,
and the word “credit” comes from “credere,” to believe, or trust (Putnam 1993, 128).
Without trust, investors fear risk. Even JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon has said the
secret to the United States’ economy, or any, is trust (Udland 2017, 2).
Banfield describes “amoral familism,” a culture of being totally out for oneself or
one’s immediate family. In Putnam (1993), Putnam shows statistically that southern
Italy’s lack of social bonding, from the middle ages onwards, led to corruption, and lack
of investment. Institutional failure in some states leave voters unable to make the
connection between political ideology and the effects on their own lives. Southern Italy’s
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institutions turned more vertical or hierarchal, such as the ranks in the Catholic Church,
as opposed to the North which was more horizontal, as in Protestant countries. Weber
called this the “Protestant ethic,” later known as the “work ethic.” In the 1970s, Italy
started some changes, by decentralizing the federal government (Putnam 1993, 43, 48).
Within Italy’s rural economy, little changed over time, as citizens have not come
together for the economy. Putnam says that, “Leaving aside labor unions for the
moment, sports clubs are by far the most common sort of secondary association” (Putnam
1993, 91). Social cohesiveness can help to encourage savings, as they could start some
sort of micro-bank (Banfield 1958, 52), or business ties, reducing risk. Unemployment in
southern Italy has been over 20%. In the 1990s in Italy, the North set-up two production
facilities in the South for agricultural goods, textiles, and leather products, and subsidies
offered by the government and the European Union could help further (Leonardi 1995, 3,
9, 13-14). In the central states can be found “terza Italia,” small scale family firms,
which could be a model for the South (Fukuyama 1995, 3). Other writers have seen signs
of socio-economic development- the poorer classes socializing (Ouditt 2006, 11). Most
recently, reforms by the Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, which would have implemented
more risk taking, while well intentioned, failed to win voter approval.
To use other examples, Migdal (1988) points out in Strong States Weak Societies,
that actions taken under colonialism had a large impact upon whether societies developed
into being web-like or pyramidal, slightly different terms than Putnam (1993) uses. The
issue is one of strength of the state versus strength of society, the two which compensate
for each other. One of Migdal’s examples is Sierra Leone, where British over assertion
led to a weak state, in which government laws did not determine the survival rules by
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which people live. Colonial development has also affected business law. The United
States developed from the United Kingdom’s “common law,” or judge-made law. Most
economists regard this system as more flexible, or less risky, than French-style codes.
Acemoglu et al. (2001) address the issue of political-economic institutions between those
of the English, Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch. Experts demur, generally, if partnerships
or limited-liability firms historically lead to more risk-taking (Foroohar 2016a, 299-300).
BCG (Boston Consulting Group) Societal Matrix
While a society may be diversified, and financial/economic institutions also may
be, the relationship between the two is important. A strong, diversified society should be
able to buffer centralized economic organizations, and vice-versa. Inequality can cause
volatility, because productivity is growing mostly for high wage earners (Conrad 2013,
49), and the wealthy tend to take more risk with their money (Conrad 2013, 88-89). In
Fig. A21, descriptive scatter plots are used to juxtapose concentrations of government,
with the concentration of society. The matrix itself is a Boston Consulting Group model
originally developed to pinpoint segments in a firm. One can place economies in the
matrix, as long as one realizes that there are just two variables. The HerfindahlHirschman (HHI) Index is used to measure financial diversification, and the data comes
from an average calculated by a paper by Liu and Mirzaei (2013) over a ten year period
of 2001-2010. The GINI coefficient is a measure of societal income inequality, and the
data is from the United Nations, which is rough since it is not calculated every single
year, but has been averaged as best as possible. Volatility is: [(abs. growth-ave)/ave.].
The nations were chosen semi-randomly so that some states Migdal (1988) cites were
used, along with the United States: the rest are fully random.
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Overall, income inequality and business concentration is one of the greatest social
issue of our time, for not only developed economies, and finance and trade have been
blamed. Equality’s importance economically is the reason it has been touched on in all of
the articles of this dissertation. President Barack H. Obama noted in one of his last
economic reflections about the United States that “Research shows that growth is more
frequent in countries with greater emphasis on [reducing] inequality.” (Obama 2016, 23).
One would expect countries in the matrix to look like what the BCG calls a “cash
cow” (Berkowitz et al. 1997, 38), with fast, developing states in the first and third
quadrants, where most of the countries should fall, and the smallest growing, developed
states in the 4th, the conclusion of the pathway. In the model (Fig 21, again, App.),
unequal concentration is risky: for good, or bad. The clear circles indicate countries’
average growth over this time frame, from the World Bank. The time spans includes the
2008 stock market collapse. The blue circle indicates the amount of volatility, sometimes
greater than the country’s average growth itself as measured. Here, volatility was chosen
as the average of the absolute value deviations divided by yearly growth average.
The results are as expected, showing that a strong society can buffer dense
businesses, and vice-versa, in a Migdal sense, reducing risk, in two of the four quadrants,
with the developing countries in Quadrants I and II, the emerging countries in Quadrant
III, and the sluggish developed countries in Quadrant IV, which need to rejuvenate their
economies. The United States seems to be repeating the model, which would expressly
turn true once the baby-boom generation passes, and will reformat the world economy.
The recommendations for the other countries based on this graph, in this policy
area, would be for Argentina: do not change but continue along the same path, for Egypt
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to take more risky policies because it can increase volatility, for Slovakia to continue as it
is, but be weary of immobility, for Portugal to diversify businesses, for Israel to take less
risk, by diversifying businesses, for Austria to take more risk to jump-start its economy,
for Germany, which was hit hard by the 2008 global financial crisis, but has since
recovered, to focus less on income equality. The United States will likely merge and
consolidate businesses, which it has been, and diversify its society. Japan should free up
business concentration even more; Mexico should diversify industry for less volatility.
Financial Policies
In terms of financial policy, “Too big to fail,” has become the global mantra of
reformers. The purpose of U.S. Dodd-Frank” bill, writes Torres, a professor, was to
“afford better protection for investors,” and “the protection of consumers” (Torres 2012,
19). The law created over 290 new regulations, and 13 new agencies, and may cost $2.9
billion to cement nearing the decade’s end. While aiming to reduce risk, it has “created
much uncertainty” (Torres 2012, 19). Torres says that it was meant to prevent moral
hazard, the risky behavior when actors know they will be reimbursed if they fail, but so
far, no United States bank or institution has failed the “stress test.” Torres writes that
“The regulations should not fall short by allowing risk that strays too far from becoming
unmanageable or hamper investment … to fit a range of ‘acceptable risk” (Torres 2012,
20). The 2017 Congress is weighing rebuking the law’s budget and powers. Dodd-Frank
helps by giving the Federal Reserve more power, to buy toxic assets (Conrad 2013, 202).
Given struggling monetary and fiscal policy, governments around the world
should try incentive measures to improve hiring and jobs for the declining middle class.
Furthermore, in the long-term the United States will need to address its demographic
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problems by fixing the Social Security system, which is risky in its debt, as are transfer
payment systems round the world. States can solve this either by raising the retirement
age, means testing, changing the CPI indexation, or raising the cap on taxable income,
which the Republicans in the United States might consider. The Chilean model allows
for investment in stocks, but it can lead to excessive risk taking via moral hazard. In the
United States, lastly, there is uncertainty over healthcare. Regulations can be an extra
cost to firms in hiring and firing, and are amplified by Congress hopping from “crisis” to
“crisis,” waiting too long to reach fiscal deals, due to polarization and gridlock.
Various studies have shown the effects of reducing business taxes on growth and
other economic indicators (Hines, Foley, and Desai 2004, 2728, 2740-2741). Barry
(2012a) displays a regression of multiple countries, showing that each 1% decrease in
business taxes led to roughly an eleven billion dollar increase in foreign direct investment
(FDI) inflow. The model is highly significant, explaining 74% of the data in terms of R2.
In the past decade, countries globally have cut business taxes, which effect government
revenues little. This includes Germany, which went from a 52% rate, the apogee in the
world at the time, to 38.9%. Belgium went from 40.2% to 34%, while Austria went from
34% to 18%, and Poland went from 30% to 19%. Canada slashed rates from 44.6% to
36.1%, and Iceland, one of the largest movers, went from 30% to 18%. To some extent,
this reflects conservative governments being in power (Hodge and Atkins 2006, 3).
When Germany lowered its business taxes, FDI inflows nearly quadrupled,
increasing to $154 billion dollars, consistent with Barry’s regression. A number of
Germany’s neighbors, such as Denmark, Finland, Poland, and Austria also experienced
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huge FDI inflows. Special econometrics may have played a role, that is, one country
affecting a neighboring country with which it is linked (Mintz and Weichenrieder 2010).
Nationalist, populist movements around the globe, are looking to cut taxes for the
poorest or middle-class, those bereft of globalization’s benefits. In the United States,
President Trump’s business tax cuts to 20% may accelerate growth, but could also lead to
inflation, making monetary policy even more challenging. Additional financial policies
might include a Buffet rule for inequality (of society), that would provide that the
wealthy must pay at least 30%, which is a medium tax rate for most countries, helping
diversify taxes amongst income brackets and lessen societal risk. A Tobin tax, named for
the Nobel Prize economist, which would tax stock market transactions to limit risky
speculation, was debunked in Article I of this dissertation. Foroohar writes that AfricanAmericans and other minorities have been hardest struck by the tight lending policies
after the “Great Recession,” such that inequality might be addressed by changing credit
metrics, and lowering down payments for “good” borrowers (Foroohar 2016a, 235-236).
An up-tick rule in equity markets around the world, in addition to the circuit
breakers that have already existed since the 1980s, would further allow investing
emotions to cool on stock markets during volatile times, and reduce the short-selling and
casino-like quality of stock markets, to reduce risk. The Economist Group (The
Economist Group “Broken Dealers” 2017a, 1) suggests it should be easier to purchase
bonds online, rather than the custom of using telephone. This would make bonds more
efficient in developed and developing markets, similar to stocks. And, ETFs (Exchange
Traded Funds), which now allow investors to buy a basket of bonds, will be regulated by
Europe starting in 2018: all bond trades will be recorded (The Economist Group “Click to
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trade” 2017b, 64). Countries could limit the equity size of banks, and remove the
oligopolistic risk of tech firms by limiting data collection for marketing, as Germany does
(Dwyer 2017, 10). Regarding property, states could require greater down payments on
mortgages. But, to not discriminate, states need more refinancing and home rental
policies, banks should own more insurance, and the state could regulate bank portfolio
assets. Short-term capital requirements, as practiced in the developing world, encourage
stability, but can hinder growth. Internationally, the Basel III accords have called for
greater international banking reserve requirements (Conrad 2013, 2014), though these
could be waved for smaller, regional or municipal banks. Furthermore, new technologies
are being used help to predict oncoming market volatility.
Discussion and Conclusions
The United States’ financial system is weak, but improving, at the time of this
writing. The unemployment rate is as low as it is, at 4.3% of late 2017, which is down
from almost 11% at the height of the 2008 financial crisis, which affected myriad
countries across the developed and developing world. However, since the unemployment
rate does not consider those unemployed more than 26 months, this number is likely
twice as high, because output or GDP growth, while improving at a mediocre 1.0 %, is
still below its potential. This renders the unemployment rate higher than its natural rate,
which is estimated by economists to be between 5-6 % (Dornbusch et al. 2011, 159). It
would be even higher it included those who have left the workforce, what used to be
called the “shoestring” effect- workers would wear out their shoes looking for jobs.
Keynes, as well as macroeconomic theory, would point to other justifiable reasons
for the slow response to the 2008 crisis, which include the fact that aggregate demand
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was low, because there was not enough spending, creating idle capacity. On the other
hand, the amount of investment was, and is still, low, because there are so few investment
opportunities that investors will not borrow at any rate, no matter how low central banks
lower rates. In Keynes’ time, liquidation was the key, businessmen thought, to curing
crashes. In 2018, the Dodd-Frank bill has taken money away from the banks, while the
“bail-out” was meant to do the exact opposite. And, to economists’ dismay, firms are
buying their own “Treasury” stocks to artificially raise stock prices. In addition, wages
are not falling, as Keynes would have predicted since they are “sticky,” due to: long term
contracts, imperfect information for job seekers, structural coordination problems, and
the lack of need to motive employees, hindering correction of the aggregate supply curve.
While monetary policy have made every effort, using various “twist” techniques,
shown to be affective in flattening the yield curve in this article’s regressions, fiscal
policy is strapped because the United States already has such a huge debt and deficit.
The United States national debt was exacerbated by President George W. Bush, who
squandered a surplus with tax cuts for the wealthy, added to by President Barack H.
Obama by additional, excessive spending. President Bush also expanded Medicare
without stable funds, joined by many Democrats. The United States has spent $4 trillion
dollars on two wars, which have historically led to recessions, unless they contribute to
the military industrial complex, as only in the two world wars. As such, political
infighting between the parties, worse than anytime previously, now limits fiscal policy.
Whether or not rules, such as the “yield curve,” or discretion, such as the Anxious
Index, are preferable, beyond regressions, ignites a long standing ideological debate in
economics. The discussion of rules versus discretion dates to 1936, when economist
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Henry Simons argued that it should be the government’s policy to keep the money supply
constant (Dwyer 2005, 3). The most well-known “rule,” for monetary policy, is the
Taylor rule, which implies that the Federal Research should raise or lower interest rates
based on the inflationary and output gaps. For fiscal policy, there have been a proposed
“balanced budget amendment” to the Constitution, particularly led by public choice
economist James Buchanan in 1980s, and “optimal taxes,” argued for by supply-siders,
though they do not exist. Not everyone, though, agrees to the balance of Congress’ 1946
mandate of low unemployment and inflation, since libertarians and “hawks” want lesser
inflation and higher rates, to maintain the value of their money, while “doves” want a
greater focus on employment, according to a Phillips Curve model. The weighting of the
coefficients in equations could be controversial, and overly simplistic. Central banks
already do use some form of rough type of rules. Even if all governments were to follow
rules, they would still be subject to change. Foreign central banks around the globe have
taken to strict inflation targeting, but they still do not tell where the goals come from.
Keynes wrote, “There is little likelihood of our discovering a method of …
probabilities, without any assistance whatever from intuition or direct judgement …”
(Bernstein 1998, 225). This is why the rules of common law, considered by many to be
an institution, often calls for a “reasonable person standard,” and not specific details on
every possibility in the case. Markowitz allowed for “gut” applicability in his
diversification theories since one can diversify by choosing an array of stocks, but the
choice of stocks may be different between different people (Bernstein 1998, 258).
Nevertheless, a range of other non-rule, predictive indexes exist, such as the VIX,
called “the investor fear gauge,” which is listed on the Chicago Board of Exchange and
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calculates risk on the S&P 500 stocks based on likely changes in put and call options due
to buying or selling of equities. The VXN is a new, 1993, similar measure for the
NASDAQ, computer traded stocks (Investopedia “VIX” 2017, 1), and “the Spikes” index
as of 2016 measures the S&P500 (Stafford 2016, 1-2). The price of gold, which investors
buy to buffer risk, is a good indicator. The “Index of Leading Economic Indicators”
contains two month old data and tries to predict recessions, but often misses or falsely
predicts them. The Jobless Claims Report and New Residential Housing Construction
Report (known as “housing starts”), are government releases that investors use. The
Consumer Confidence Report uses a small sample size of only 5,000 households, but
moving averages derived from it can be prescient, while the Business Outlook Survey
measures manufacturing managers’ sentiments, and the Durable Goods Report surveys
managers of products with three years or more life spans, but both rely on small and
overly-volatile samples. The “Beige Book” (or Summary of Commentary on Current
Economic Condition) has discussions from all 12 regional Fed banks (Allen 2017, 1-3).
Various agencies such as Standard & Poor’s, Fitch, and Moody’s rate the United States
Treasury bonds. Lastly, other measures from firms and agencies exist, and in some
developing states, commodity and agricultural goods are read like tea leaves.
The central issues of this article, again, were how risk and its associated policies
and behaviors affect interest rates, contrasted with other theories. This final section
speaks to the hypotheses, and discusses further ways of diversifying U.S. and global
financial sectors, along with additional microeconomic risks by comparing Minsky with
Keynes, and future harbingers. In the end, the hypotheses are confirmed. The theories
under consideration, (premium, market segmentation/ preferred habitat hypothesis, debt
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financing, recessions, and monetary policy) all were significant in terms of effects on
interest rates, through risk. Most pointedly, one of the penultimate regressions showed
that recessions and money supply have the strongest long-term effects, while the other
regression, of high-saving countries, showed no link. Strikingly, a 7% of GDP national
savings rate can explain the difference between the two groups. The “Anxious Index” is
a better predictor of the yield curve inverting than the recession measure does, but yield
curve inversions has higher significance and is a thereby a better indicator of recessions
than the “Anxious Index.” In short, the comparison depends entirely on methodology
and how one defines a recession, but both measures have value. In terms of government
institutional concentration, there may not be one best model, but some today question the
extreme tradition of concentration of economists in so few agencies, which is a British
model and used by the countries they colonized, including the United States. This more
than likely increases risk, with less labor diversification. The use of more diverse and
diversified, inter-department task forces, or subgroups might be advisable (Cairncross
1989, 34-36). Future research could form a national economic institution index, just as
Alesina and Summers (1993) created a basic scale for independence of central banks.
Some other interesting findings of this research are: the one-year U.S. yield curve
lag was found linked with recessions corroborates Trobias, Estrella, and Shin (2010).
They write there is a significant relationship between the maximum spread before the
recession and the length until the U.S. recession. These three find it to be almost constant
at 12.6 months, or 4 quarters, after the inversion. Their study corroborates the 12 month
lag used in this article’s regressions. The length of the recession in the 2010 study was
not affected by the spread, but, all of the United States recessions since 1968 average
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11.6 months. In their work, the recession length was not linked with how long the yield
curve stays inverted, and the spread size did not affect the duration of the inversion,
despite possible collinearity. Perhaps future research could identify these reasons.
Various other policies could reduce risk in the public and private financial sectors.
In his works, Minsky hinted at policy suggestions, including many of those offered here.
He saw the government as a stimulant in times of crisis, as did Keynes, but also as a
lender of last resort, which was an important factor in the 2008 financial crisis, going
back to Article I of this dissertation. However, Minsky believed social safety nets would
generate massive inflation, occurring in the 1970s, but in the 2010s they are a greater
stress on government debt, echoing ideas from Article I of this dissertation (Minsky
1977, 25-26). Institutionally, Minsky praised the robust institutions developed after the
first “Great War,” namely the strong central banks (Minsky 1977, 22).
The study also confirms other authors about what reasons raise interest rates
(Charles 2008, 128). However, it did not examine Minsky’s findings that, as Charles
(2008) writes, micro-economic earnings and investment affect firm debt, and thus risk.
Minsky held that when earnings (or profits) grow slower than investments, it gives rise to
business debt. The equation Minsky uses is I > sf (II- iD) → ∆ D↑ → ↑d → i ↑. Slow
profits create “risks” through external financing (Charles 2008, 129) (see Fig. A20). In
simple terms, just as in the premium theory used in this article, a premium is added to
interest rates (i) of corporate debt, because “risk increases” when internal financing does
(Charles, 2008, 131). Investment is “I,” D is debt, “d” is the debt ratio, and (sf) is the
profit retention rate, also known as “markup” (Charles 2008, 130-131).
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This study did not address Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) view of finance, that
firm capital structure is irrelevant to risk. The mix of bonds or equity a firm holds
depends on taxes, or interest or on dividends. Capital debt structures (debt vs. equity) are
determined primarily by social and industry norms and mores, but balanced investing
amongst debt and equity help balance growth, as seen in the late 2017 U.S. stock market.
The regressions run in this article support the view of underfinanced investments
creating financial risk and recessions. Minsky describes this, historically, in the United
States. He attributes the 1966 crisis to a “credit crunch” due to “a ‘run’ on bank deposits
(Minsky 1977, 22), and the 1975 recession on speculation and the failure of commercial
bonds related to the Penn Central Railroad. Along with the 1982 recession, these shocks
were cured in the short-term by federal deficits (Charles 2008, 128). Expectations based
on the yield curve, then, should hold, despite fluctuations caused by technology,
unanticipated monetary shocks, and any other crises similar to the preceding disruptions.
Minsky’s main difference from Keynes, in this author’s view, was his emphasis
on firms using equity to finance investment, and not just debt. Keynes largely ignored
equity, likely, since in his era, financial instruments were underdeveloped, which Minsky
said would constantly innovate, in the lines of Schumpeter (Minsky 1977, 24). This
author views the stock market, or equity, as providing a different capital flow. Each are
substitute goods, and a stable mix stabilizes both markets. Firms need assets to back up
debt, but may pay dividends on equity. Minsky also disagreed with Keynes that financial
markets are stable. New policy ideas have been offered here to mollify Minsky’s views.
In summation, while some believe that watching for yield curve inversions, as
well as levels, is like reading tea leaves, others fervently hold that it is a predictor of
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doom to come (Estrella and Trubin 2006, 3). In 2008, before the “Great Recession,” after
the yield curve inverted, Estrella’s models forecasted the United States as having a 40%
chance of going into recession in the next month. But, even a month before “the Crash,”
New York Fed officials were saying there was no possibility (Hahn 2008, 1).
One strategist at RBC Capital Markets in London, asserted, “I don’t think it’s a
recessionary signal, it’s (sic) a bit simplistic to look at yield curves as a sign of
recessions” (Chibber 2006, 9), completely ignoring the signals in 2006. Two other
businessmen said, “Some people talk about recessions, but I don’t see it as a sign of one”
(Chibber 2006, 9). They, and many others, were probably shocked by the 2008 global
crisis. Even former Fed chairman Greenspan, as noted, told Congress in July 2005, prior
to inversion, that “there is ‘a misconception’ of the yield curve importance. The curve’s
efficacy as a forecasting tool has diminished very dramatically” (Chibber 2006, 10).
To the contrary, say the results from this article; the yield curve is a strong
predictor, which is a contribution to the literature of this article, and it has included more
theories, countries, more variables, and a longer time horizon than in previous studies.
This article addressed each of the interest rate theories involved both distinctly and all
together as much as possible. Investors prefer to purchase bonds, to finance investments,
within certain markets, they pay premiums in interest for expected risk, which are also
affected by monetary and fiscal policy, and these risks in premiums spike before
recessions, the penultimate result of 10 countries from 1945-2010. If the findings are
correct, as more developed and developing economies save less than the key 7% of GDP
discovered, and as financial markets and institutions develop, predicting the risk of
recessions should become even more accurate. Future research could contribute with a
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governmental institutional concentration index based on the diversification theories used
here, and using specific quarterly statistics, rather than yearly data, over the long term.
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CHAPTER V: OVERALL DISSERTATION CONCLUSION/DISCUSSION
Do consuming high-tech goods and structural changes to unemployment and
wages increase risk? Do countries diversify trade and use it to reduce risk; when did this
start, and is occurring today? What financial policies and traits increase risk, such as
societal versus business concentrate, and can interest rates be an indicator? In this, the
concluding chapter, first, the findings are discussed, which are that the majority of the
hypotheses have been confirmed and the null hypotheses have been rejected, some with
high certainty (95%), others with less (90%), the latter being ideas left to future research.
The overall hypothesis, that risky behavior, actions, and policies, both long- and shortterm, are major factors in stable/volatile growth, has been accepted. This realization
should be apparent through the range of methodologies employed. Riskiness can create
greater growth, but volatility is the resulting drawback. Finicky consumerism in the
presence of risky investments, undiversified trade, and underfinanced investments all add
risk to societies. These risks are not under-evaluated in the sense that are small, far from
it, but because they have been unheeded the literature, in concept and in scope. From the
results, one can use the national income accounting equation to create a model of
conceptual risk which incorporates all parts of this article, forthcoming in this section.
Wesley C. Mitchell, an early 20th century U.S. government economist, wrote that
economic models can create great confusion and overlap, but the accounting equation
developed after World War II by U.S. government economists is helpful. If the premises
are correct, risk occurs across all sectors like a Doppler Effect in physics (Fig. A22):
it has layers like tectonic plates that build up and shift, leading to success or failure. Like
small companies, which need to take risks to advance, so, too, do small societies take
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risks with their institutions. Still, either practice can lead to disaster, such as it did with
the Tech Bubble in the United States in 2000, when firms were over reliant on financing.
The fluctuations in some states, such Finland, Italy, Israel, and Mexico, are signs of too
much risk; another dot-com bubble may be fomenting (Fig. A19).
This work adds to the neoclassical synthesis, which combined Keynesian
macroeconomics with Marshallian neoclassical microeconomics through such models as
the Investment: Saving- Liquidity: Money (IS-LM) framework (Figs. A10, A18, A19).
This work also adds to the New Neoclassical Synthesis, which includes rational
expectations. But both of these syntheses are primarily shorter-term ones. While some
may suggest Keynes disliked statistics, the fact is that he wrote an entire book on it, A
Treatise on Probability (1921); put directly, he merely preferred concepts and gut
decision making to hard and fast rules for investing or decision making, as discussed in
Article III. Even in the most accurate forecasting, there always is the potential for
deviation from expectations, sometimes to the unimaginable. This truism is why the best
predictors today, such as Nate Silver of 538.com, can only make forecasts with a
specified degree of certainty, which itself is changing with new forecasting methods, in
response, for example, to the lack of available cell phone numbers for data collection.
The concluding equations here are mostly conceptual, because there is not an
exact relationship between interest rates and growth, nor volatility, but interest rates are a
good approximation of short-term growth. As Keynes was the first to show, investors
take out loans at interest rates they believe will yield a profit, now called the internal rate
of return, or the diminishing marginal return of capital, until the interest rates and profit
rates equal. Important to recognize is that the exact relationship is unknown. Recently, a
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study done by James Hamilton of the University of California at San Diego found only a
“mildly positive” relationship between short-term interest rates and growth, (The
Economist “Low pressure” 2016b, 22), but the concept rests worthwhile, seen below.
Basic Math Models
A society’s growth consists of both a risk free (fr) and a risk premium (r)
component within the Keynesian national accounting framework, in which components
make up Y, or GDP (Gross Domestic Product), the entire value of the economy: (1) Y=
Institutional factor I (index) [( Crf + Cr)+(Irf + Ir)+(Grf + Gr)+(Trf +Tr)], where T= net
trade. This model is inspired by Sharpe (1964), who predicted stock returns by risk-free
and risk premium market movement.
The overall risk-free growth of a society or country can be approximated by the
shortest-term interest rates (assuming low inflation and no recession is expected), plus the
sum (∑), of any unexpected profits, which equates to the time value of money for credit
economies. It is offered here (above) that over a year, growth of the entire economy
consists of both a risk free rate of growth, as well as a risk premium from taking extra
risk, but which adds to volatility. Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) write on similar topics,
scaling the micro to the macro, conceptually, but with differing mathematics (Fig. A16).
The greater the risk, the greater the expected reward. But, too large risks, which are
typified by imbalances in accounts or economic sectors, can over time create volatility,
while too small imbalances, or the policies related to them, can cause sluggishness. Total
risk can also be summarized from the three conceptual sections, as:
(2) Risk = ∆consumption/∆investing + ∆trade/∆consumption + ∆investment /
∆consumption + ∆G spending/ ∆revenues - ∆ reserves/ ∆ savings
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Potential GDP, which macroeconomists consider only when all resources are
used, and is possible only in the short-run, is the maximum amount of expected GDP
from the apparently right amount of risk (Figs. A2, A18, A19). The ensuing table uses
growth rates and statistics on all parts of the national income accounting equation, from
the OECD from 2010-2015, to avoid going back too far and finding the effects of the
2008 global financial collapse, and to include more recent data to make the policy
recommendations more relevant. The 2015 data on government reserves was lacking, so
averages were used, and even if averages were not used, there would be no change since
ratios are employed. Although the data was calculated to the mean, trade percentages
were used for 2010 since it was a severe outlier following the 2008 global financial
collapse. Mexico had missing data, but it was averaged, while South Africa, Argentina,
and India could not be used due to missing data in each of these cases. The premium is
the growth with the highest level of risk, yet same volatility, since the equation uses
denominators to buffer volatility with greater growth. Some countries have used so much
risk that they are above this premium, while other countries have seen losses (see Fig.
A19)
Included in the table is nearly every country that was analyzed in the three
articles of this dissertation. With (2), for C/I, the more investment, the less risky
consumption will be, since investment will be creating products that consumers demand,
but consumer spending, as opposed to saving, can add risk from lesser funds for the
future. Regarding I/C, profits from consumption are used for investment, as Minsky
argued through his works, but only in part, because profits also go for other uses:
therefore, greater consumption reduces the risk of investment. The more investment, the
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less risk from greater consumption, and the more consumption, the less risk from more
investment. This was shown in Article I. For trade, all trade is risky, which is why
imports are included, but to determine whether imports or exports are more risky than the
other, given the presence of disasters and cyclicality addressed in Article II, is best left to
future researchers. However, the more domestic consumption that an economy has
domestically, the more that the risks of trade are mitigated. More pointedly, a strong
consumption sector can buffer a trade sector. Trade acts as an appendage, separate from
the other sections, which can reach out and grab growth, although trade, as the 2008
financial crisis showed, needs financing as well.
Nevertheless, consumption is featured in three of the ratios of equation (2)
because it is the largest sector of the economy, at least in the West, and trade without
consumption is risky because of currency and financial pressures. Put succinctly, a
strong domestic consumer sector can buttress the risks of a large trade sector, the latter of
which, on the other hand, can lead to increased growth with greater risk and volatility.
Short-term bonds are an approximate measure of risk-free investment, but they are
already included within the risk premium since they are part of investment. As for the (G
spending/ revenue – (increase in reserves/change in saving) component of equation (2),
this reflects the Keynesian view that government spending can affect the economy
through spending stimulus, while also the fact that using reserves can affect monetary
policy, which Milton Friedman argued for, but both come with large risks (see Fig. A8);
this was presented in Article III. Increasing reserves, which matter in international trade,
lessen the corresponding risk. Finally, beyond savings, the government would not be
able to monetize debt, and central banks’ actions of selling reserves would have
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enormous inflationary effects, making money worthless. The state would have to sell off
its assets.
The institutional part of the table is an index from the Institutional quality dataset
from Kuncic (2013), taking the institutional number from 2010, since this is most recent
index available. The work here links institutional number with growth, with a one year
lag. Consequently, from regression, it is determined that for every literal 1 increase in the
institutional index, there is a 5% increase in growth one year later, but 2% in volatility.
That makes it clear that institutional reform takes years and is difficult. The R2 is low.
These percentages were found by a regression of nine random OECD countries, from
2000-2007, before the global collapse. Likewise, a 0.1 increase in the index should result
in a 0.5% increase in growth and a 0.2% increase in volatility. Unlike the Yield Curve or
Anxious Index, from Article III, which raise an immediate, proverbial “red herring,” the
averages here can be used to review policy over longer time frames.
Table 22: Institutions and Growth. This table shows institutions’ importance.
Dependent Variable: Growth

P > F = 0.0186

R2= 0.0874
t

Ob: 63

Variable

Coefficient

S. Error

p

Institution-lag

0.0517856

0.0214216

2.42

0.019*

constant

2690.126

1059.022

2.54

0.014*

*Significant at 95% or greater.
The risk premium below is the expected growth rate operating at the highest level
of risk policies, most which have been addressed here by using all parts of the national
income model. But, the greater the risk policies or activities, there is a possible further
increase in volatility, which is measured here as simply the absolute value of the years’
198

growth minus the five-year average, then all together averaged. As a result, a country
may be able to grow beyond its premium, or below its risk free rate. Volatility is
measured slightly differently in parts of this dissertation, sometimes dividing by growth
in the denominator, depending on the need for complexity. As there are many possible
ways of calculation, volatility is consistent in each article and for all countries, models,
and regressions. The acid (or quick) test is volatility over GDP. If there were a natural
risk rate, as there is for unemployment, it would depend most on long-term institutions.
The risk free rate is represented by a T-bill from Trading Economics.com as of 22 May,
2017, with the assumption that this ties with growth if inflation is low and no recessions
are expected, which can raise rates as shown in Article III. Sadly, the institutional
regression did not indicate an institutional-free rate (the constant).
Therefore, no mathematical formula was used to develop the policy advice, just a
so-called “gut check” that Keynes would have delighted in, while the many policy
options, which include more aggressive monetary or fiscal policies, depend not on
economics but on decisions made by public officials. An equation would resemble: the
[“natural rate” (Rpremium - Rfree) – Ractual / acid test]. This model is again conceptual,
just as saying the “average” of numbers is the total sum divided by the total numbers; that
is, defining “average” this way, the formula is average by definition, just as the risk
premium is here. It is an index, so other models with slightly diverse results are possible.
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Table 23: Risk Policy Advice: This table gives advice to states, on risk.
Linking Keynesian risk free (f) and premium (p) growth with Institutions (I).
State

Inst.Coef. Rfree

Prem. (p)

% GDP

Volatility

Acid Test

Policy Advice

U.S.

1.1338

1.00

4.3120

3.0264

0.2775

0.0917

C/SMR

Japan

0.6043

-0.10

5.7883

2.6138

1.1163

0.4271

SMR

Den.

1.8276

-0.65

5.8697

2.6082

0.8656

0.3319

MMR

U.K.

1.5787

0.25

7.2013

3.1732

0.8526

0.2687

C/SMR

Italy

0.5074

0.00

-0.0239

1.4109

1.2926

0.9162

SLR-IR

Israel

0.9610

0.10

3.6490

4.4329

1.6326

0.3683

SLR

Mex.

-0.023

6.75

5.4851

3.4341

2.2928

0.6677

SLR-IR

Norw.

1.0622

0.50

7.9886

4.1543

1.4579

0.3509

C/SMR

Swe.

1.4985

-0.50

5.8663

2.8008

0.9856

0.3519

SMR

Est.

1.2905

0.00

5.4503

6.1422

2.9289

0.4768

MLR

Port.

0.4046

0.00

1.8982

1.6908

2.6886

1.5901

SLR-IR

Pol.

0.4459

1.50

5.3709

4.9582

1.371

0.2765

C

Slove.

0.1908

0.00

5.4800

2.8534

1.2662

0.4438

SMR-IR

Austral

1.4087

1.50

6.1005

2.2352

3.245

1.4518

SLR

NZ

1.7278

1.75

3.6328

3.94

2.5441

0.6457

SLR

Austria

1.1015

0.00

6.1774

3.3668

1.3426

0.3988

SMR

Czech

0.8545

0.05

6.6353

4.1625

1.31

0.3147

SMR

Slovak

0.6983

0.00

7.7358

5.2768

2.7061

0.5128

SMR

Fin.

1.5679

0.00

-3.8123

1.7348

1.2767

0.7359

SLR-IR

Germ.

1.0804

0.00

5.0830

3.7371

1.3685

0.3662

C

Greece

0.0644

0.00

6.6595

-1.342

3.1661

-2.2592

C-IR
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The BCG matrix could be used to break down single countries’ sectors by growth
and volatility, to pinpoint in which specific areas they should increase or decrease risk.
In the far right column, MMR stands for much more risk should be taken, SMR
means for slightly more risk, SLR means that slightly less risk should be taken, MLR
means to take much less risk, C means to stay constant, and IR is institutional reform.
Countries with high growth and low volatility in the table should take more risk,
indicated in the far right column, depending on their risk premium potential. More
pointedly, the greater the potential, the more risk they should take. Countries with both
moderate growth and volatility, with low potential, should stay the course. Those with
higher growth potentials should stay the course or take slightly more risk. Countries with
high growth but high volatility, and that are close to or above their growth potentials,
should take less risk, with the amount of less risk depending on their growth potential.
Countries like Finland, where potential growth is low, partly from unstable investment,
could use institutional reforms, as could states like Greece, well below its potential. See
Article II for short case studies and information on these unusual two countries, with
material on Finland’s Nokia in Article I. Future research might test using medians,
instead of means, which could lower the United Kingdom’s premium, for example.
This model (2) indicates that monetary policy and fiscal policy are nearly similar
in effects and risk, since neither government spending nor central bank activity can take
place without government revenue, which depends on consumption, trade, and
investment, although long-term it depends on how much citizens and companies have
accumulated in savings or in debt. Monetary policy should be used when fiscal policy is
constrained, and fiscal policy should be used when monetary policy is strained. This is
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also a lesson to governments from the 2008 Crash. Monetary policy might have slightly
less risk because most countries have more reserves saved than governments do for
spending, aside from fiscally sound countries like Germany or wealthy states like those in
the Persian Gulf, shown in Article II, but in the short-term, monetary moves increase
inflation, and volatility. Governments are usually stronger than central banks, the latter
more dependent, due to currencies, on global institutions, discussed in Article II and III.
All money crucially rests on accumulated, saved funds by individuals, firms, or banks;
the West, regrettably, is rife with personal and public debt.
Biological Model
The overall sectors of the economy, and equation (1), can be connected by
comparing them to a biological human being, in the line of German economists, such as
Gustav von Schmoller and Wilhelm Roscher, who did the best job of explaining
economic theory over time. The consumption sector can be represented by the skin,
which can easily change or be created, just as small businesses start or fail, and it
constitutes roughly two-thirds of the West’s economies, and one-third of the East’s.
Damage to it can cause an infection, such as the gluts in inventory shown in Article I.
Investment is like the cardiac system, supplying each part with the sustenance it needs,
such that a blockage can cause a severe crisis or shock. Banks are like the respiratory
system which brings in the oxygen, or money, to be transported. Trade is like an
appendage, which can reach out and grab more GPD or resources. The state is like the
brain or nervous sector of the economy, but others would argue that this applies only in
command, or social states, and that the nervous system is more like institutions that
collect data on the free market. The government is more typified by the immune system,
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which takes responses from the nerves, in this case being the free market, and makes
adjustments accordingly. Food is capital investment or other resources, which is digested
with physical capital and technology, via productivity, the metabolism, how quickly it
burns. Cells are the citizens, voters, or business people. The liver is like the state’s
central bank, storing resources. One can see from this table, that in the West, institutions
are most important for stability, then finance, which supplies consumption and trade; in
the East, or developing states, trade risk would subsume greater importance.
Ancient man saw the heart as most important, while today, most people would
probably say the brain. In the data above, one sees the skeletal system, or institutional
structure, is preeminent for risk, providing a framework which is always growing, like
bones. Such bones include organizations, groups, mores, rights, and rules, which link
governments, firms, and consumers together, as well as the supply chains that tie
domestic and foreign businesses. These- bones- are the greatest buffer, or protection,
against physical, outside shocks, but they can become broken, only to grow back to their
original, or even better, trajectory. Once we grow, which takes much time, such growth
can sadly come to stagnate. Lastly, the reproductive system is like trade agreements or
institutional international agreements, which extend past one’s own body just as a child is
an extension of oneself, but reproductive organs can also portray the political or voting
system, which renews or freshly introduces new policies as new leaders come to power.
The 2008 Crash and the “Great Recession,” which in part inspired the need for
this dissertation, and was discussed throughout it, was a result of systemic problems from
bad policies and behavior across all parts. The recession started in the United States and
spreading globally. Governments were taking too great risk with debt, in the presence of
203

retiring baby boomers globally, which limited their funds available to respond. Monetary
action was tapped out after years of aggressive activity that rendered them ineffective,
and agencies like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the United States had spent years of
easy lending policies. Societies were becoming too concentrated at upper and lower
incomes, with businesses becoming more oligopolistic and aggregating power. There
was a lack of sensible regulation, individuals were overly in debt personally, banks were
afraid to loan, and financial companies had repacked mortgages into complex derivatives
that no one could understand. There was an overall sense of overconfidence, and politics
were divisive, especially in America, with so many new media channels, all of which
contributed to the volatility and downfall, and the stagnation which followed.
Risk could have been prevented by more prudent action and activity in the
immediate preceding years. Consequently, beyond the policy ideas addressed in the
articles, mostly for developed economies, there are other excellent ways for developing
countries to balance risks in in these areas in their growth, such as micro-finance and
Islamic banking. More importantly, the Solow model assumes low risk, drawing no
requirements of development for its use (Solow 1956, 81). Analysis of each follows:
microfinance, which cautiously grows consumption, the Solow model, Romer’s model of
ideas, and Islamic banking, then social safety net policies, and political institutions.
Microfinance
Microfinance, primarily used for developing countries, originated in 1978 in
Bangladesh, when a circle of young men met to study rural poverty. Developed countries
might even consider it in pockets of underdevelopment within their purview. Although it
may seem risky, 99.6% of microfinance customers pay-off their debt, so it is less risky
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for lenders than traditional finance. It is a “nothing short of a revolution” in finance
(Armendariz and Morduch 2010, 2). In 2006, Muhammad Yunus won the Nobel Peace
Prize for the Grameen Bank he helped found (Armendariz and Morduch 2010, 1-17).
Microfinance not only addresses loans, but also saving and insurance. It has high
repayment rates from its group lending, innovative contracts, and low-risk practices.
Profitability has been very difficult for micro-investment institutions, and depends on
prudent regulations, helpful government subsidies, and sound management. According to
economic theory, one would expect individuals and firms from wealthier, more capital
abundant countries to invest in microfinance, since returns to capital do not “diminish,”
but Western investment stalls for several reason, among them the concept of risk.
Of these reasons, returns may be too low compared to risks, state regulations may
limit interest rates, or banks may raise rates, limiting incentives for borrowers. Risk is
further exacerbated by adverse selection, the inability of banks to determine good
borrowers from bad. There is a lack of available collateral, and there are moral hazard
problems: borrowers may use money in wasteful or unprofitable ways. Instead, villagers
may turn to relatives and neighbors for loans, who know them personally and their
“credit history” (Armendariz and Morduch 2010, 4-11). Similarly, African credit unions
as of 2018 offer small loans to employees for housing, agriculture, or education, a
personal touch to lower risks. Still, loans have become politicized, seen as handouts (The
Economist Group, “Fixing” 2017c, 58), akin to early microfinance fiascos in India and
the Philippines after World War II (Armendariz and Morduch 2010, 1-11, 17).
Grameen Bank’s microfinance is based on group lending, and that all members
are supposed to help, rather than individual collateral. There is a cycle of lending, such
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as, in a group of five people, first two individuals, then two more, and then the final
person. If one member defaults, then the group is denied future loans, spurring groups to
choose reliable, safe partners. Grameen starts with small loans and slowly increases them
as responsibility is proven, and lenders learn more information on borrowers.
Repayments start right away, on a weekly basis. Successful plans in Bangladesh, though,
may not thrive in Nigeria or Brazil, and there is a gradual effort afoot to increase
individual lending. Another ongoing change is movement away from microcredit, which
refers just to loans, towards insurance (Armendariz and Morduch 2010, 12-24).
Expansion could occur if countries use universal identifying numbers for users
(The Economist, “India’s ID” 2017, 1-3). In 2018, albeit, there is a debate if microfinance institutions should expand into commercial banking, offering stocks as well as
bonds, though at higher rates, but the variety of which would attract the West. This
vision may contain “mission drift” in microfinance’s aims. Most loans are $120 or less
go towards food vending, handicraft goods, and small-scale trade, which should continue.
Still, 2010 median interest rates ranged from 13-25%, varying by the lender (Armendariz
and Morduch 2010, 2, 12-24), all costly to the poor, who may earn less than $1 per day.
Microfinance can incentivize productivity. But efficiency if hampered by principal-agent
risk problems that Mishkin (2006) wrote of, the lack of info on the credit of the borrower,
or how the money will be used, and uncertainties over returns, all which increase risks.
The poor lack collateral because of few land property rights, discussed manifold in this
dissertation, so seizing assets can be hard (Armendariz and Morduch, 2010, 31-50).
Imagine that safe borrowers obtain returns y, and risky borrower receive ybar,
with probability p. Without risk, safe borrowers do better, y ˃ ybar, but with risk, pybar
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can exceed y. The cost of lending, k, must be less than $1 for each dollar lent in order for
banks to profit. With only two types of borrowers, safe borrowers leave the market when
rates rise above y, but risk lovers leave the market after rates exceed ybar. Efficiency is
improved by lending to both types, at a risk-determined rate. If banks lack data on
borrowers, markets may turn inefficient. And, to be worthwhile, projects’ returns must
exceed basic wages. The cost or price of lending, k, must be less than $1 for each dollar
lent in order for banks to profit, symbolized by R. For banks to make a profit, R = k/
[q+(1-q)p], where q is the proportion of risky borrowers (Armendariz and Morduch 2010,
39-50). Despite this flaw, microfinance is accelerating in places like Kenya and Ethopia
(The Economist Group “Saharan” 2017f, 63-64).
Efforts that can improve microfinance include peer monitoring, the threat of
social sanctions, and regulation. Studies show that delinquency rates rise as borrowing
rates do. One possible solution to dispersed motives from lenders to borrowers might be
if banks and micro-lenders joined forces. For example, in West Africa, susu collectors
visit clients on a daily basis, working as loan officers for banks. The problem is making
sure the collectors behave honestly. Banks do not simply fund small scale lenders,
hoping the increase in supply would lower interest rates, because studies show it could
negatively impact the market structure, if separate lenders raise rates, hurting poor
borrowers. In total, one sees the difficulties of operating in an environment of moral
hazard, adverse selection, and scarce collateral (Armendariz and Morduch 2010, 51-59).
Solow Savings Model
While investment is important, in the long-run, Keynes’ multiplier becomes less
important, and saving becomes crucial to maintain capital with changing economic
207

structures. This discussion has done little to elaborate on savings, seen as so important in
the New Growth Theory of the 1950s and 1960s. Savings is responsible for long-term
growth. Savings reduce risk long-term and also contribute to the advancement of
technology, which is represented by the digestive system in the biological model.
Technology is made endogenous within iterations to the low-risk Solow model. Whereas
Keynes ignored the long-term and focused on spending, but recognized that regulations
and policies are important, saving affects future, long-term growth, and depend on
peoples’ behavior, as noted in Article I of this dissertation. Contemporary TaiwaneseAmerican economist Richard Koo writes how firms after the 2008 Crash are using profits
to save and lessen debts rather than invest, as seen in Articles I and III, at an expense to
the present (The Economist, “Let’s get” 2014, 2).
Saving may lower risk, because consumption is less finicky. Investment and
saving are more stable long-term. According to the Solow model (1956), which can be
used for developing and also well-developed countries, population growth lessens
economic growth, assuming that technology and unemployment are held constant. Solow
shows that output, measured by y, is a function of saving divided by population growth
rates, n, and depreciation, d, raised to a certain, diminishing power. Growth (y) slows
because the capital to labor ratio is reduced; the (n+d)*k linear ray constrains growth due
to immigration (n) and depreciation of capital (k) (Jones 2002, 31). Without the tools for
production, like shovels for digging ditches, which increase growth, workers are rendered
meaningless, an assessment Solow took straight from Keynes (Keynes 1936, 106).
Empirical evidence suggests that countries with high population growth, such as
those in Africa and Latin America, have low GDPs per workers, while countries like the
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United States, France, and Italy have low population growth but high per-capita GDP.
The relationship is not strong, however. As discussed in Article I, where Okun’s rule was
mentioned, each Summer, when new college graduates enter the workforce, or when
societies have “baby booms,” growth slows while economies adjust; thus, population
should not matter, but employment does (Knotek 2007, 83-84). Beyond this note, when
populations grow, there are diminishing returns to labor. Marginal wages for labor must
equal marginal output returns, so there is less hiring, and lesser growth. In essence,
Solow simplifies Keynesian economics into more basic models, a “tightrope view of
economic growth” (Solow 1956, 91), though one might add that investment is
overshadowed in the model by saving, evident in Articles I and III of this dissertation.
Romer Endogenous Model and Model of Ideas/Skills
By contrast, Paul Romer’s model which followed relaxes the assumption of
technology as constant, holding that the greater the population, the more people you have
creating ideas, a prudent investment, which lead to more and better technology (Romer
1990, S89). Technology can be both a non-rivalrous and excludable good. This means
that more than one person can use it at one time, or borrow it without paying. By
increasing savings, the growth curve shifts outward, returning to a state above the
(n+d)*k ray, continuing to capital deepen and widen. Deepening refers to gains in capital
per worker, widening to gains in total capital. The best, least risky approach is focusing
long term, which affect both levels and rates, as opposed to the short-term, which only
affects levels and not rates. Developed countries can use technology to grow past their
capital-stagnated “steady states.” Technology, Romer held, is spurred by competition
between firms. And, Article II of this dissertation showed that technology, while risky in
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Article I, can be less risky if traded, especially for importing countries that learn from it.
In Romer’s endogenous model, technology is the driver of growth (Jones 2002, 96-110).
For the Romer model of ideas, author Jones (2002) discusses the proportion of the
workforce devoted to output, and the other to R&D, one represented by Ly, the other by
La. Ideas can be assumed to either lead to even more ideas, or fewer ones, but Romer
(1990) writes of increasing returns and long-run growth. The problem with developed
countries is that they are devoting so little of their workforce to the risks of research and
development (Jones 2002, 124-134). Technology can be considered institutional in the
sense that the key to technology is repetition. Once a new advancement is made in
producing a new machine, the knowledge exists indefinitely, without having to be created
again. Technology can also yield positive, productive externalities through use in
conjunction with other, different machines. Technology is why GDP always has, despite
volatility, an upward trend (Romer 1990, S22). But, while global GDP will certainly
keep growing, this does not necessarily mean jobs will, which is the largest test for the
near future with the advances in artificial intelligence (AI).
Two final effects on development of ideas mentioned by Jones to be addressed
here are skill level (h) and that of institutions such as regulations (I), but usually,
developed countries already have these in place. Regarding skill level (h), the closer that
workers are to the technology frontier, and the more time they spend training, the greater
will be growth (Jones 2002, 96). Policies, such as on-the-job training, can create stable
growth, but many companies in the United States cannot find skilled enough workers in
engineering and other high tech jobs. China, whether one considers it developed or not,
because it has surpassed the United States in GDP but has three times the people, is
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rapidly growing because it is investing in education, such as math and languages. The
United States is living beyond its means, with massive borrowing and government debt,
but Keynes would not worry short-term; long-term, debts are a threat (Jones 2002, 166).
Islamic Banking
In terms of finance, developing societies can still grow even if they do not offer
interest rates for saving or investing, but through less-risky percentages of profits.
According to numerous authors, Islamic banking is based on the religious beliefs of
justice, equality, fairness, and morality, referred to by Muslims as Sharia’a law. With
over 15 million Muslims in Europe, and although Islam is diverse, European banks can
capture this ethnic market. Aldohni (2008) writes that HSBC and Lloyds TSB in the
United Kingdom offer such Islamic securities, and that “Islamic banks can operate in a
conventional banking system” (Aldohni 2008, 181). The caveat is that Muslims in
Western Europe are less well-off to deposit and invest. Currently, over $800 billion
assets are managed in Islamic institutions, from banking to insurance to capital market
investments, and the fastest growth is with sukuk bonds, which are held long-term and
are rarely re-traded (Kettell 2010, vii- viii). As of 2011, there were more than onehundred financial institutions practicing Islamic banking, in 45 countries around the
world. The size of the market in the amount of funds traded each year has risen from $5
billion in 1985 to an estimated annual $30-70 billion in 2011 (Azarian 2011, 258).
Islam considers interest rates riba, or forbidden, as it was at times in Christendom,
in medieval times, so Islamic banks use profit and loss sharing arrangements, where the
rate of return is not known beforehand. The return is linked to a ratio and the quality of
the bank’s investment decision. Risk still exists, but the system places pressure on banks
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to be more conservative, to be assured of a project’s soundness. The providers and users
of capital share the risks, as opposed to Western banking, where the entrepreneur bears
the risk (Kettell 2010, xi). There exist six main types of agreements: a Salam, Ijara,
Murabah, Istisna’a, Mudaraba and Musharaka (Kettell 2010, 24-25).
Social Safety Nets
Another way for governments to use policy to reduce economic risks is through
social safety nets, or welfare program institutions designed to help the marginalized in
various ways. Social safety nets are lacking in such developing countries, unless these
countries use them in a traditional way of having family members help out. The West’s
safety nets formed at the start of the 20th century. In European countries, the Swedes and
Danes, because of their existing institutions which favor labor rights, took the most
aggressive approach, based on “principles of equity, universal eligibility, generous
benefits, full-employment, and maximum revenue income to support it all” (Campbell
2004, 135). In Germany, France, and Italy, officials were less concerned with inequality,
and more with “preserving basic class and status distinctions” (Campbell 2004, 135).
In the United States, the prevailing belief was that the private sector should play
the largest role and that the government should take a more moderate one. However, in
the United States, the government did strengthen property rights, corporate charters, antitrust laws, and gave financial assistance to industries and firms, and in the 1930s, 1940s,
and 1960s, greatly expanded social safety net programs, only to reform them in later on.
As of 2018, social safety nets can be of great aid to lowering personal risks provided that
they are temporary for individuals and help them to alleviate personal risk and get back
on the social and economic ladder where they can once again contribute to society.
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The United States functions more than other countries, such as in Europe, through
private savings; in the long-term, according to the medieval statistician Daniel Bernoulli,
“[The] utility resulting from any small increase in wealth will be inversely proportionate
to the quantity of good previously possessed” (Bernstein 1998, 105)- thus, one sees that
the leaving of large amounts of wealth in small families can generate a degree of utility,
while the leaving of large amounts of wealth to those who have grown up wealthy may
often result in wealth being squandered. This was shown in Article I regarding “greed,”
and also the institution of primogeniture. Bernoulli’s concept is typically only applied to
goods, but some economists see it as applying to money: diminishing marginal utility is
“one of the great intellectual leaps in the history of ideas” (Bernstein 1998, 105).
Political-Economic Institutions
Safety nets develop politically. It would be remiss not to more fully address
political institutions specifically, that were touched on it Article I. Politics can affect
uncertainty, and lead to economic risks. As Bueno de Mesquita et al. show, democratic
candidates favor large, public goods, to please as many constituents as possible, which
can lead to: infrastructure, utilities, or large militaries, whereas dictators favor small,
private “handouts” that maintain support among a cohesive few (Bueno de Mesquita et al.
2003, 37, 87). Dictatorships do not develop institutional checks to balance political risk,
such as legislatures or party systems, because the leader will simply cast them out,
resulting in a greater concentration of power and less risk dispersion. Dictators with
small coalitions may need to tax more, and they may extract more natural resources,
creating risky commodity sectors, or risky income inequality socially (Tonizzo 2008, 3).
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Economically, dictatorships lack diverse property rights, discussed in Article III
of this dissertation, because leaders control the land, and there is risky, little rule of law,
an example being Russia (Pereira and Teles 2011, 1). Internationally, autocracies are
also isolated and avoid the risk of open trade, which austere states like North Korea in
2018 pursue (Mansfield et al. 2000, 1). Przeworski et al. find the type of government
does not affect investment or capital savings, a so-called paradox because strong states
are necessary to protect property, but can also take property away. The labor force grows
more under despots, perhaps due to “push models,” and since there is more manual labor
for infrastructure building. Democracies better use technology productively, while
dictatorships use physical capital better. Wars, political upheavals, and changes to trade
policies affect growth, which Keynesians, call “shocks” (Przeworski et al. 2000, 142206). Thus, institutional change differs in political regimes. This dissertation’s Article I
found democracy as insignificant, while Article II found it as risk-reducing.
The link between economics and democratic change has been the subject of much
debate since Lipset’s 1959 article on this topic. Most ostensibly, Inglehart and Welzel
(2005) and Przeworski et al. (2000) offer very different views of political change. While
the former write of stages to democracy, the latter say that democracies are “more likely”
to endure turbulence, or risk, from greater wealth. Some write of countries constantly
switching back and forth unstably. They find that: autocracy has a 10.56% chance of
changing to a different government, presidential democracies have a 5.12% chance,
bureaucracies have a 4.11% chance, mixed democracies have a 2.66% chance, and
parliamentary democracies are most stable at 1.75% (Przeworski et al. 2000, 13-51).
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Instability, or risk, in dictatorships occurs, with greater chance of changing,
because as its society becomes complex, labor processes require participation from
employees in a push-type model, discussed in Articles I and II of this dissertation.
Technology leads to more private information, civil society emerges, protest arises, and
the regime falls. Some authors call this the “modernization or endogenous” explanation.
The data indicates this happens when they are a middle level of per capita income, which
confirms Huntington’s (1968) theory that these are the most unstable countries. It should
be noted, though, that Huntington specified that political change depends not only on
income, but also strongly on institutions (Przeworski et al. 2000, 81-121).
For democracy to last and be stable, thought John Stuart Mill, there must be some
shared values or “consensus.” Presidential democracies are more risky and more likely to
die than parliamentary systems, but presidential systems are less sensitive to economic
shocks, since they are more accountable to risk-averse citizens, a result that Mlachila and
Ouedraogo (2017) also find. Still, presidential systems are more prone to gridlock, what
the United States has had for two decades. But Przeworski et al. say that religious and
language divides make all countries less stable. They find Catholicism, with its respect
for authority, actually makes democracies more stable, contrary to Inglehart and Welzel
and Max Weber’s view of a stable Protestantism (Przeworski et al. 2000, 125-137).
An opposing theory to “modernization” is termed “institutional learning,” that
values, not money economically, leads to democratic change, but it is weak statistically.
Wealth and well-written constitutions are not what matters most, it says, but people and
their values, for a stable democracy. Examples are Singapore, which is very wealthy, yet
is not yet fully democratic, and India, which is growing in wealth but its leaders do not
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allow full political rights. Some scholars believe democratic change is conditional upon
elites, but other writers demur. Observe Poland and Taiwan, they say, where values were
required before democracy solidified (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 158-160).
The greatest political-economic stabilizing factor say most authors is rising
income, which makes people more content and less likely to rise up against the
government. And stability, says Huntington, is the key to economic growth (Przeworski
et al. 2000, 187). Norms and mores can be a glue that holds society together in lieu of
strong dictatorships, as was shown in Articles I and III of this dissertation. In the United
States, frequent elections for the House of Representatives keep the people tied to the
government, every two years. The House acts as a tea cup, brimming with energy, while
the Senate is the saucer that cools it down, as Benjamin Franklin said. Lijphart compares
democracies, finding consensual systems, where minorities’ are emphasized, are a
“kinder, gentler” democracy, helping calm political strife (Lijphart 1999, 260-261, 275).
Institutions and the Complete Risk Framework
Therefore, based on these writers, what are needed in all cases are “institutions of
scale,” the right balances, and dispersion of power. Economically, countries globally
need safeguards against corruption and extraction, such as “rainy day funds” that many
U.S. states have adopted, and many developing nations are using as institutions,
particularly regarding oil dollars. Countries need to develop peaceful transitions of
power and rights, as these authors have written, but such protections can only be possible
in democracies. Communism presents too much bureaucracy, it is overly concentrated,
and it lacks of specific information and adjustment measures. There needs to be the right
balance between local, state, and federal governments, which Putnam writes about for
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modern Italy on the lack of social interaction in developed societies. For balance, an
example might be the Articles of Confederation in the United States, which was too
weak, as was the United Kingdom’s early Magna Carta. The United States’ banking
system early on was too concentrated, too risky, and was broken up. The right power
division must be at the right time, neither too concentrated, nor dispersed, such that
instability is at its lowest, but allows for periodic revision that does not deviate from the
overall trend (Fig. A23). The first change is the most important, and most difficult, such
as how the Constitution was easier with bricolage, or combination of earlier elements
from the Articles of Confederation, were possible. There have been numerous other
examples in this study- diversifying in taxes, trade, and financial policies.
Some countries in development are simply not ready- they must progress through
stages of development written about by so many authors, and should they skip a rung on
the latter, they may slip and progress back to an earlier stage, with more volatility (Fig.
A24). But, other times, instability and “shake ups” that Thomas Jefferson wrote about
are required, just so long as the country returns back to the same risk trajectory. There
needs to be economic and political certainty and stability, but periodic revivals to reassess
and change socioeconomic makeups, in economics called “freeing up capital,” so that
new elites and new ideas can emerge given socioeconomic change. As Bueno de
Mesquita et al. wrote, there should be a balance between inner groups and outsiders for
stability, between elites, technocrats, and common citizens. This applies to the world
stage as well; the Treaty of Westphalia gave us the current world order based on politics,
not religious institutions, but the post-Cold War world saw a “New World Order” and a
Washington Consensus of globalization, which is now being tested by state nationalism.
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To put the pieces together (Fig. A22), Keynesian economic theory again holds
that GDP, or output, is a function of consumer spending (C), investment (I) (which works
through savings which affect interest rates, such that the two are equal), government
spending minus tax revenue (G-T), and trade exports which generate cash but not utility
(Exports – Imports). All of these inputs, or factors, affect and are affected by interest
rates in some way. When the government sells debt, it increases risk, and raises interest
rates, thus making fiscal policy, the use of spending and taxes, possibly risky. Firms
have the choice of financial consumer products or physical capital products, and it is a
path encouraged by governments in some developing countries. Countries will attempt to
change their institutional systems if the risk-reward relationship from change is greater
than that of not changing; some are culturally risk-lovers, or risk-adverse. As with string
theory in physics, this dissertation has contributed by making concrete steps to combine
the large, long-term institutions, with the short terms effects, through risk.
A society that does not take risks will not grow very quickly, but a society that
takes too much and too many risks will collapse. For instance, Europe is perhaps too risk
averse, and the United States (Fig. A23) is too risky. Consider the high-flying biotech
companies that turn based on the outcome of one drug test; there are advantages and
disadvantages to risk. It is the author’s view, in line with the German Historical School,
that every economic problem has a unique solution. For instance, most economists
believe both in monetary policy and in fiscal policy. However, one or the other may be
constrained by different conditions, leading the other to have greater importance. All
conditions in the economy, based on risk, must be looked at. Still, in the author’s view,
one of the greatest policy problems is that not enough policy leaders have a firm grip on
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how economic principles works. To correct for an economy with too much risk, “pump
theory” and a “cash tax” can correct for liquidity problems, diversified or intraindustry
trade can reduce cyclicality or shocks, such as the United States exporting oil to Europe
after Russian sanctions, and fully financing public investment can reduce unnecessary
high interest rates, which are shown to spike before recessions. Furthermore, saving as
per the Solow growth model, using microfinance, adopting institutional property rights,
encouraging institutions to liquidate and diversify risky assets in trade crisis, using
expectations based on yield curves, GDP, or wages, spreading out family firms, keeping
low public and private debt, using lenders-of-last-resorts, having diversified and equalitybased societies, and using international agencies can help.
In closing, risky behavior is one the central reasons why economies fluctuate, fail,
and/or succeed both long- and short-term, thus connecting the small with the large. In a
sense, there should be a “Risk School” of economics, to return to Keynes and away from
the New Classicists. But, this is not to negate the all of the other economic theories that
have come before, and the tools policy-makers must use in making decisions. One must
realize, risk cannot always be quantified and cannot explain everything; take, for
example, welfare economics, the study of gains and losses to “winners and losers.” Risk
here is usable only if considered as a secondary, spill-over effect. Also, risk primarily
describes volatility, not growth or recessions per se; but, either one may cause the other.
As Article III of this dissertation demonstrated, the United States and other
Western countries as of 2017 have vast amounts of debt, which should raise interest rates
and drive out investment and GDP, and also result in a greater trade imbalance that was
shown in Article II. But, the Federal Reserve has been buying the bonds to keep interest
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rates low, which should result in large amounts of inflation. However, Article I, showed
that a flattening of the Phillips Curve, due to structural changes, and a lack of investment
opportunities due to a finicky consumerism, have resulted in a lesser problem of inflation
and instead greater instability in unemployment, if measured properly in terms of labor
force participation. In total, there is low economic growth with periods of high or low
volatility, but depending on the mean that is used. Beyond reason, economies will
continue to fluctuate, and periodically result in troughs, or recessions, but sound policies,
whether risk reducing or risk increasing, can avoid the disasters and crises that have
affected the developed and developing worlds in the past several decades. Certainly, no
work can be long enough to explain everything; the contribution of this dissertation is just
three conceptual articles, but it is the author’s hope that the concepts discussed therein
will open up vast new realms of micro- and macroeconomic, scholarly discussion.
“So What” and Concluding Remarks
Some of the most novel findings of this dissertation, which the author does not
believe have been considered elsewhere, were presented in Article I, proposing that
consumers and producers collaborate and compete in-sync, altering consumption and
investment, not only in a quadrant, but on a continuum. And, equally valuable was the
careful analysis of what causes the Phillips Curve to change, and the associated volatility,
as Federal Reserve Chairwoman Janet Yellen said earlier in 2017 that this research is
currently needed from scholars for better forecasting of inflation and unemployment. For
the topic of Article II, there is as of 2017 an ongoing scholarly debate if trade causes
volatility or stability, and this dissertation finds that it depends: on many factors,
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particularly GDP, since larger nations have been better able to form more stable supply
chains, which are glossed over by economists in considering such linkages as institutions.
Continuing with Article II, existing research fails to specify a GDP or trade level
at which countries change from diversification to specializing in goods, as most other
studies use a level of income inequality, not GDP. In Article III, the range and scope of
the data is much longer and broader than past studies on the issues under consideration.
Above all, the aspects of the overall conclusions that academics, policymakers,
and practitioners alike will likely find most beneficial are the complete policy suggestions
for each country, even though data is always changing and the data should be updated
before making any risk-policy changes. The analysis of the human body comes from an
author who never cared for biology, nor any of the other hard sciences (except for maybe
physics), and it is fairly original, as, while the German economists wrote holistically
about the different parts of an economy, the author does not believe they created an entire
biological model. This model may be useful in teaching students in the future. The
mathematics of this section could be elaborated upon greatly by scholars with a superior
ability in that subject, as the author in his academic career has advanced only to Statistics
II and Single Variable Calculus, not Multivariable Calculus or Linear/Matrix Algebra.
The most surprising aspects of this dissertation where that productivity turned out
to be non-significant in Article I as affecting the Phillips Curve relationship and
volatility, that in another section of Article I, the analysis of family bequeathing showed
almost exactly opposite facts of what the author had hypothesized. An alternative
explanation was provided. Remarkably, in Article II, nearly every variable turned out to
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be significant. In Article III, there were two groups of data, one which confirmed to
interest rates theories, and one that did not, which needed a new idea for the reason why.
Altogether, the ideas in this work will allow state officials and business men and
women to judge, analyze, and question whether or not their countries are taking too much
or too little risk, and some of the steps they can take to remedy either. Some of these
policies are those based on careful analysis of others’ works, while others are entirely
original and may seem bold currently, but gain respect over time, especially should
policy-makers be men or women of intellect, and particularly if they have read John
Maynard Keynes’ The General Theory, a short work of less than 400 pages which can be
perused in under two weeks. Some of Keynes’ wording is archaic, but other parts display
the elegance of all of the former masters. And, many of the words bear nearly exact
resemblance to those used by President Obama and his economic advisors in the response
to the 2008 financial collapse, which contributed to the inspiration of this work.
Several months prior to the 2007-2008 collapse, while the author was in Bermuda,
the bond yield curve turned inverted, the implications of which are described in Article
III, and the author said to himself, “Holy ..., there is going to be a recession.” This writer
then spent much time writing letters to Congressmen and Senators, which he does so
regularly, warning of this scenario. Today, the author enjoys movies and literature about
the event, because, as with all crises, there were some heroes, admirably portrayed. As of
2018, the United States’ bond yield curve is precariously flat. And, similar to choices
made in the mid-1800s regarding the Corn Laws, the world is once again debating
“globalization.” President Donald J. Trump has jolted to the U.S. economy with tax cuts,
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but added long-term risks. Hiring is still volatile, but growth is aided by low energy costs
and a weak dollar for exports. This author would prefer greater risks in monetary policy.
The author hopes to build off of this dissertation with various papers on similar,
micro- and macro, political-economic, history of economic thought, and development/
trade research, some of the ideas for which have been formulated through this dissertation
and are already in progress, to ideally publish with high-caliber journals moving forward.
Author Notes
The author is the right person to have conducted this research as: he holds a BA in
history with courses in business and economics; an MBA with a finance focus, a riskrelated discipline; and he is an economic development major and political development
minor at The University of Southern Mississippi, and has taken classes on
macroeconomics, political-economy, globalization, trade, development, statistics,
qualitative methods, institutions, and, as an undergrad, economic history and the history
of economic thought. He has written four short books, published a dozen articles, and
presented at three global conferences, and he aspires to become a teacher, having done an
amount already. Aggregate graphs, along the lines of French economist Leon Walras
(1984 ed.), follow, in the Appendix: most of the graphs, unless otherwise noted, are
original and copyrighted.
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APPENDIX – FIGURES

easy monetary policy

growth

speculative, “Ponzi” financing

may occur
drop from crisis

tight monetary policy

hypothetical growth curve
debt
Figure A1: Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis Graph (Charles 2008, 134). The
figure shows growth increasing with debt until a crisis.
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Figure A2: Types of Risk/Growth and Institutions Model: The higher interest rates, or
premiums, on bonds or capital financing, which are in part created by greater risk, can be
avoided with better institutions.
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Or a short spike….
Inverted: expecting recession

Yields
Indifferent:
unknown, transitory periods

Increasing: expecting growth

T-bill

Time Denominations

30 yr. Bond

Figure A3: Basic Bond Yield Curves: Inverted yield curves indicate that investors are
expecting more risk in the near time, while increasing yield curves, which are more
normal, indicate that greater risk is expected.
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Product Choices
Safer product

Mean return/
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Utility

Standard deviation (risk)- from (Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981, 171)
Figure A4: Product Choices: Buying or producing riskier goods affects utility.

least preferable
Risk

preferable
most preferable

Accurate prediction of Y (GDP) based on Forecasting:

Figure A5: Rational Society Preferences: Society should rationally desire a greater GDP
given a specified amount of risk.
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Not Necessarily in Exact Order (A Schematic of Risk)
(Any change may affect growth volatility)
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Figure A6: A Schematic of Risk: Volatility follows a path, but only generally.
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Table A1: US and Japan Productivity: Productivity comes in “spurts.”
U.S./Japan Business Productivity Change Since the Previous Year: Calculated Avg. of Qs
(St. Louis Fed Bank)
US
Japan
US
Japan
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

2.8
3.5
4.9
1.2
-1.1
4.4
2.9
1.0
2.3
-0.9
0.8

2.55
3.5
4.9
0.83
-0.63
3.75
2.98
0.78
2.73
-1.33
0.8

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

1.7
0.8
2.3
-0.2
5.6
1.7
0.0
-0.1
2.0
-0.1
0.5

Alternative Phillips Curve

prices

prices
Instead of:
A

B

B
A

GDP/Employment

GDP/ Employment

Figure A7: Alternate Phillips Curve: The curve today is horizontal, not vertical.
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1.8
0.9
2.33
-0.38
5.45
1.8
0.08
0.03
1.6
0.23
0.48

Growth= elasticity of G+ compared to -I at the Federal Reserve able interest rate.
Loss from Investment

i

Growth from Deficit/Debt

yellow: more risk

G=Revenues

G>C+T+I/S+Trade

(i determined by Fed strength) (more elastic at low rates due to liquidity and the
diminishing elasticity of money- changes in interests rates are greater proportionately)
Total Output
Figure A8: Risk of Government Debt. Debt can increase GDP, but crowd investment.
Slight U.S. Service Sector Productivity Growth: 2014-2015
wholesale
trade

3

retail trade

2

food
services

1

0.00%

0.50%

1.00%

1.50%

2.00%

2.50%

3.00%

Figure A9: Labor Productivity in Different Service Sectors: (Original graph: data from
Sancya 2015, 1-2): Some productivity is increasing.
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LM
i/p

IS
Output
Dashed lines indicate standard deviations in output and interest rates from risk taking
once gains or losses have occurred.
Figure A10: Simple Version Standard Deviation Model: Risk, from production or
financial funding problems, cause the supply curve or LM curve to shift left- green,
unstable line.

Dear Sir/Madam,
My name is Todd J. Barry, and I am currently a dissertation-level PhD student in
International Development Economics through the University of Southern Mississippi,
while residing in Connecticut, USA. My dissertation… . However, one of my graphs is
based on the graph on page 134 in the article below, which deals with “risk and the
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Original work: If Productivity or Investment is expected to be low,
(2010s) and output to expand, firms ↑ L

If (P)/I is expected to be high,
(1990s) and output to expand, firms ↑ W
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(2008): If (P)/I is expected to be low,
and output to contract, firms ↓ W
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From housing, investment, or productivity fall-offs, supply chain disruptions, or disasters.

Figure A11: Supply and Demand with Investment: Expectations cause shifts.
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New Keynesian Pull/Push Model
Demand Pulls/Pushes L/W
Wages demand

High-Tech/ Industrial Production Model

Labor
Capital

Investment/Productivity

Project

Investment

L

Productivity
Labor

Wages demand

Profit

Labor

Figure A12: Investment Models: On the left, demand in Keynesian fashion pulls or
pushes investment and productivity. On the right, investment is used for producing
projects, with the money flowing to either physical capital, or labor, depending on which
one is more productive. The profits, which are expected to be higher than the cost of
financing, often are not.

Invest
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(1)
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Exuberance:
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(3)
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Figure A13: The Line of Balanced Growth: This corresponds with the Solow Model, that
if capital does not diminish, but keeps pace with GDP through investment and technical
progress, then consumption/wages and employment increase/decrease at the same time,
meaning that growth stays constant with little or no volatility (Jones 2002, 37).
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Ricardian Model of Trade, Applying Famines/Cyclicality
1

(blight)

3
Quantity of Good Two
(response)
2
1
3
2
Quantity of One Good
Figure A14: Trade during Crises: Above, the second country will produce more of the
blighted good because of the first country’s loss. Subsidies and future contracts may also
be used, or trade of a buffer stock. Trade of a buffer stock can reduce risk, but result in
inefficiencies from shifting resources. The amount of loss must be < cost of storage or
inventory, costs of production, or changes in price.

24%
no trade
Probability
of shortage > 5 million tons
12%
8%

tariffs

4%

free trade

0
3
6
9
12
Storage Capacity (million tons) from (Bigman and Reutlinger 1979, 665) © OUP.

Figure A15: Storage of Crops or Inventories and Risk: Storage can lessen trade risk.
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Storage and Prices

Prices
Storage

Supply/Consumption
Figure A16: Supply and Consumption: The graph is kinked, being affected more by
large changes in volume. The amount at the point may be unknown. Subsidies, buffer
stocks, and futures contracts can raise prices. The amount of loss must be < cost of
storage, inventory, production, or change in prices (Newbery and Stiglitz 1981, 426).
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Diversification, Then Specialization

Specialization

Trade

Entire Economy

Diversification

Total Trade

Income/Capita

$507.13 billion

$44, 969.01/person

UK and France by 2000

U.S. reached this level in the 2010s

Currently typified by Italy

Figure A17: Diversification vs. Specialization: This graph shows a quadratic curve.
IS- LM Curve Risk Conceptual Model
Potential gains

LM (Liquidity/Money)

From risk

i/P
IS (Investment/Savings, and products)
Potential losses

Risk gain potential= Risk loss potential
Output

Figure A18: IS-LM Curve Risk Conceptual Model: Each interest rate has its own level of
output risk. For risk averse countries, at point 1, output is less, but the potential for gain
in output is large and greater than the potential for losses (as measured by distance from
the bottom), while for risk loving countries, at point 2, output is greater, but the potential
losses from risk in output is greater. Policy changes can alter the risk graph while
changing the IS and LM curves at the same time.
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The Over-Risked Country Today- Overlapping Model

Potential gains

LM (Liquidity/Money)

i/P
IS-LM
from losses

Risk gain potential= Risk loss potential
IS (Investment/Savings, and goods)

Potential losses From risk

Output

Figure A19: Overly-Risked Country Model: The standard model does not show how the
risks of gain and loss are related, especially towards GDP. Overlaying it with the Risk
Conceptual Model, we see where some countries are right now (where the green
intersect), that is, the abundance of riskiness (loss potential is greater than gain),
combined with the losses from previous periods of the 2008 financial collapse.
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Interest rate

Risk-free Inv.
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Firm Internal
Investment
Investment
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Figure A20: Risk-free Investment Curve: Borrower’s and loaner’s risk meet, based on
demand and investment (Minsky 1982, 79). Republished with permission of M.E. Sharpe
through Routledge from Can “It” Happen Again? by Hyman P. Minsky (first paperback
printing, 1982); permission conveyed through Copyright Clearance Inc.
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BCG Matrix applied to partial Economies:

Congested Business (HHI >1600)
HHI, GINI

Diverse Business (HHI < 1600)
development

(growth, volatility)
II: Congested Business and Society e
Business
Mexico 1687, 50
c
(1.81, 1.2)
o
n
Israel 2153, 39
o
(3.26, 0.68)

Portugal 3349, 38
0.76, 1.57

Argentina 870, 48
(3.7, 1.7)

m
U.S. 387, 40
(1.66, .85)

i
c

III: Diverse Society, Congested Bus.
Egypt 1637, 35
(4.83, 0.028)

Slovakia 1827, 28
(4.98, 0.5)

I: Congested Society, Diverse

C
o
n
c
e
n.

concentrated
Social concentr. (GINI)>36
IV: Diverse Business and Society
Japan
diverse (<36)
591, 34 (0.76,
2.73)
Germany 556, 32
Austria 1516, 30
(0.95, 1.97)
(1.49, 0.8)

S. Korea and the U.K. would also fit here.

Figure A21: The BCG Matrix for a Nation: Above, from 2001-2010, one expects it to
look like a cash cow in first and third quadrants, and smallest in the fourth, since a strong
society can buffer a strong state. The HHI is a diversification Index, and growth (clear
circle) and volatility (blue circle), are also indicated in the parenthesis ( , ).
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U.S. Overlap Model [GDP = C + I + G + T]
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Figure A22: Doppler Overlap Model: Short- and long-term risks overlap.

Political Instability

instability
low point
Time
Figure A23: Political Institutions: Spikes are safe but only if the trajectory returns to
normal.
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Figure A24: Long-run Trajectories: Institutions travel on a path of risk.
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